全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection
	Lorenzo Rocco; Ottorino Chillemi; Benedetto Gui
发表日期	2006
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups affects efficiency and group stability. The paper expands on existing literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of profitable options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the efficiency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Rather, stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities.
特色分类	D64,D71,D82
关键词	Adverse Selection,Group Stability,Altruism
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-the-economic-value-of-repeated-interactions-under-adverse-selection/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117336
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lorenzo Rocco,Ottorino Chillemi,Benedetto Gui. On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection. 2006.