| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter |
| Pablo Revilla
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| 发表日期 | 2007
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2007
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent's preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers' ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets. |
| 特色分类 | C78,D71
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| 关键词 | Many-to-one matching,Hedonic,Coalitions,Stability,Colleagues
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/many-to-one-matching-when-colleagues-matter/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117505
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pablo Revilla. Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter. 2007.
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文件名：
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NDL2007-087.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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