| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies | |
| Pascal Billand; Christophe Bravard; Subhadip Chakrabarti; Sudipta Sarangi | |
| 发表日期 | 2010 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare. |
| 特色分类 | C70;L13;L20 |
| 关键词 | Oligopoly Multimarket Networks |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/spying-in-multi-market-oligopolies/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117892 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pascal Billand,Christophe Bravard,Subhadip Chakrabarti,et al. Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 2010922131761Nota_di（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 20109221317274NDL201（535KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 2010922131761Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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