| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes | |
| Kevin A. Hassett; Steven F. Hayward; Kenneth P. Green | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This essay is available here as an Adobe Acrobat PDF. No. 2, June 2007 As the Kyoto Protocol’s 2012 expiration date draws near, a general theme dominates the global conversation: leadership and participation by the United States are critical to the success of whatever climate policy regime succeeds the Kyoto Protocol. Two general policy approaches stand out in the current discussion. The first is national and international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading, often referred to as “cap-and-trade.” Cap-and-trade is the most popular idea at present, with several bills circulating in Congress to begin a cap-and-trade program of some kind. The second idea is a program of carbon-centered tax reform–for example, the imposition of an excise tax based on the carbon emissions of energy sources (such as coal, oil, and gasoline), offset by reductions in other taxes. In this paper we will address the strengths and weaknesses of both ideas and the framework by which legislators should evaluate them. The framing of a global climate regime presents a classic chicken-and-egg problem: the United States does not wish to enter into a regime of economically costly emission caps or taxes that would have the effect of driving industry and jobs to nations such as China and India that do not participate in such caps. China and India, however, are unlikely to enter into a restrictive regime unless the United States goes first, and even then, only so long as the policy regime does not threaten serious constriction of their economies. It is often assumed that if the United States goes first, developing nations will eventually follow, but this is by no means assured. Both China and India have repeatedly declared that they are not prepared to make even a delayed commitment at this time. Given these policy uncertainties–and other uncertainties about the eventual impacts of climate change in terms of severity, distribution, and timing–there are two guideposts policymakers should keep in mind. The first is that the United States can only effectively impose a national regulatory regime (though such a regime could eventually be harmonized with international efforts). The second is that, given the current uncertainty, policy should conform as much as possible to a “no regrets” principle by which actions undertaken can be justified separately from their GHG emissions effects in the fullness of time, such that nonparticipation by developing nations will disadvantage the United States in the global marketplace as little as possible. While the United States may wish to join with other nations in setting a post-Kyoto emissions goal, it should be wary of joining an international emissions-trading or other regulatory regime. One of the less-remarked-upon aspects of the Kyoto Protocol, and any prospective successor treaty on that same model, is that it represents an unprecedented kind of treaty obligation for the United States. Most treaties involve direct actions and policies of governments themselves, such as trade treaties that bind nations’ tariff levels and affect the private sector of the economy only indirectly. Kyoto and its kin go beyond government policy to affect the private sector directly or require the government to control the private sector and the investment decisions of the private sector to an unprecedented degree. It is not governments that emit GHGs, after all. Between the asymmetries of legal and regulatory regimes across nations, the United States should think hard about the dilution of sovereignty that a binding GHG treaty represents, even if the United States agrees with the basic objective of reducing carbon emissions. Problems with Emissions Trading for GHG Some economists favor the idea of emissions trading for its elegance in achieving least-cost emissions reductions while avoiding the manifold difficulties of prescriptive “command-and-control” regulation from a centralized bureaucracy. But this is something of a false choice, as such regulation is a deeply troubled policy option. While trading may be superior to command-and-control, it is not necessarily superior to other alternatives, such as carbon-centered tax reform. There are a number of emissions-trading success stories that, upon inspection, suggest significant limitations to the applicability of emissions trading for GHG emissions. Enthusiasts for cap-and-trade point first to our sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading experience under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. It is claimed that the costs of SO2 abatement through trading turned out to be dramatically lower than economists had forecast for a prescriptive regime, wherein the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have mandated control technologies on individual coal-fired power plants. But a closer look shows this success to have been uneven. There has been significant volatility in emission permit prices, ranging from a low of $66 per ton in 1997 to $860 per ton in 2006, as the overall emissions cap has been tightened, with the price moving up and down as much as 43 percent in a year.[1] Over the last three years, SO2 permit prices have risen 80 percent a year, despite the EPA’s authority to auction additional permits as a “safety valve” to smooth out this severe price volatility. Several other aspects of the SO2-trading program are of doubtful applicability to GHGs. First, SO2 trading was only applied to a single sector: initially, only 110 coal-fired power plants were included in the system, but it subsequently expanded to 445 plants. While coal-fired power plants account for roughly one third of U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and will therefore be central to a GHG cap-and-trade program, a comprehensive GHG emissions-trading program will have to apply across many sectors beyond electric utilities, vastly complicating a trading system. Second, SO2 and CO2 are not comparable targets for emissions reduction. Reducing SO2 emissions did not require any constraint on end-use energy production or consumption. Coal-fired power plants had many low-cost options to reduce SO2 emissions without reducing electricity production. Some switched to low-sulfur coal (abetted in large part by railroad deregulation in the 1980s, which made transport of Western low-sulfur coal more economical than previously). The cost of “scrubbers”–industrial devices which capture SO2 and sequester it–turned out to be lower than predicted. Other utilities emphasized more use of natural gas. The impact on ratepayers and consumers was modest. CO2 is different: it is the product of complete fuel combustion. There is no “low-CO2 coal,” and the equivalent of SO2 scrubbers does not yet exist in economical form.[2] At the margin there is some opportunity for GHG emissions reductions through substitution–increased use of natural gas (which emits less CO2 per unit of energy than coal) and possibly nuclear power–but the inescapable fact is that any serious reduction in CO2 emissions will require a suppression of fuel combustion. This is going to mean lower energy consumption and higher prices, at least in the intermediate term. Even though confined to a segment of a single sector of energy use, the SO2 emissions-trading regime was far from simple. There were complicated allocation formulas to distribute the initial emissions permits. Despite the best efforts to create objective criteria, at the end of the day, the allocation of emission permits involves some arbitrary discretion. For political reasons there were special subsidies and extra allowances for the benefit of high-sulfur coal interests. Most trading in the early years took place between power plants within the same company. Establishing allowances and accounting systems for GHG emissions across industries is going to be vastly more difficult and highly politicized. The forest products industry, for example, will reasonably want credits for creating carbon sinks in the trees it plants and harvests, but the manufacturing sector that uses these wood products as a raw material will want credit for sequestering carbon. The difference will have to be split in some arbitrary manner that will surely introduce economic distortions in the marketplace. The auto industry will want credits for GHG innovations, while industries and businesses of all kinds will lobby for credits for reducing mobile source emissions from changes to their auto and truck fleets. There are going to be winners and losers in this allocation process. Multiply this problem across sectors and industries and it becomes evident that a GHG emissions-trading system is going to be highly complex and unwieldy, and too susceptible to rent-seeking influence in Washington. The problem of politically adjusting competing interests will be compounded on the international scale. The long-running diplomatic conflicts that can be observed over purported subsidies for aircraft (i.e., Boeing versus Airbus) and the European Union’s agricultural subsidies and trade barriers are examples of the kinds of conflicts that will be endemic to any international emissions-trading scheme. The favored solution to these problems is to over-allocate the number of initial permits both to ease the cost and to encourage the rapid start-up of a market for trades. This was the course the European Union took with its Emissions Trading System (ETS), and it has very nearly led to the collapse of the system. Because emissions permits were over-allocated, the price of emissions permits plummeted, and little–if any–emissions reductions have taken place because of the ETS. The over-allocation of initial permits merely postpones both emissions cuts and the economic pain involved. Economist Robert J. Shapiro notes: As economist William Nordhaus observes: Nordhaus points out the ramifications of such volatility, observing that “[s]uch rapid fluctuations would be extremely undesirable, particularly for an input (carbon) whose aggregate costs might be as great as petroleum in the coming decades,” and that “experience suggests that a regime of strict quantity limits might become extremely unpopular with market participants and economic policymakers if carbon price variability caused significant changes in inflation rates, energy prices, and import and export values.”[5] Nordhaus is not alone in this concern about price volatility. Shapiro similarly observes: Additional pitfalls and dilemmas of emissions trading can be seen through a review of the spectacular trading failure of the RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market) emissions-trading program in Southern California. Launched in 1994 after three years of development, RECLAIM set in motion an emissions-trading program targeting SO2 and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions, and eventually hoped to expand to include volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions. All three types of emissions are important precursors to ozone formation in the greater Los Angeles air basin. RECLAIM, for the first time, offered swaps between stationary and mobile sources: stationary sources such as oil refineries could help reach their emissions reduction targets by purchasing old, high-polluting automobiles and trucks and taking them off the road–a cost-effective measure in a voluntary demonstration program. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) estimated that SO2 and NOx would be reduced by fourteen and eighty tons per day, respectively, by the year 2003, at half the cost of the usual prescriptive method of regulation.[7] There was great public support and enthusiasm for the program at the outset. RECLAIM never came close to operating as predicted, and was substantially abandoned in 2001. Between 1994 and 1999, NOx levels fell only 3 percent, compared to a 13 percent reduction in the five-year period before RECLAIM. There was extreme price volatility aggravated by California’s electricity crisis of 2000. NOx permit prices ranged from $1,000 to $4,000 per ton between 1994 and 1999, but soared to an average price of $45,000 per ton in 2000, with some individual trades over $100,000 per ton. Such high prices were not sustainable, and SCAQMD removed electric utilities from RECLAIM in 2001. SCAQMD also dropped its plan to expand RECLAIM to VOCs. Despite the hope that RECLAIM would be simple and transparent, there were serious allegations of fraud and market manipulation, followed by the inevitable lawsuits and criminal investigations. One particular problem with RECLAIM that is likely to plague any international GHG emissions-trading regime is the lack of definite property rights to the emissions allowances the program creates. A cliché of the moment is that industry would like some clarity and certainty about any prospective GHG regulatory regime. A cap-and-trade program, however, cannot provide certainty precisely because emissions allowances are not accorded real property rights by law.[8] The government can change the rules at any time, making emissions allowances worthless. This is exactly what happened to electric utilities in Los Angeles: their allowances were terminated, and the utilities were subsequently required to install specified emissions-control technologies and to pay fines for excess emissions. In effect, some Los Angeles firms had to pay three times over for emissions reductions. A GHG emissions-trading scheme on an international level will be even more vulnerable to these kinds of unpredictable outcomes. To the extent that a GHG emissions-trading program results in international cross-subsidization of the economies of trading partners, it is going to be politically unsustainable in the long run. An international emissions-trading program is also unlikely to survive noncompliance by some of its members. There are two final, overriding reasons to be doubtful about global emissions trading. It is possible that the defects of previous emissions-trading programs could be overcome with more careful design and extended to an international level, though this would require an extraordinary feat of diplomacy and substantial refinements of international law. Even if such improvement could be accomplished, it would not provide assurance against the prospect that the cost of such a system might erode the competitiveness of the U.S. economy against developing nations that do not join the system. The second reason for skepticism about global emissions trading is that it fails the “no regrets” test. It is considered bad form nowadays to express doubt or skepticism about the scientific case for rapid and dangerous global warming in the twenty-first century. If warming is either less pronounced than some current forecasts predict or if emissions reductions have limited effect in moderating future temperature rise, however, a severe global emissions-reduction policy through emissions trading (on the order of a minimum 50 percent cut by 2050) could turn out to be the costliest public policy mistake in human history, with the costs vastly exceeding the benefits. Could instituting a tax on the carbon emissions released by fuel use, as part of a revenue-neutral tax reform package, pass these two tests? We believe it could. Advantages of a Revenue-Neutral, Carbon-Centered Tax Reform Most economists believe a carbon tax (a tax on the quantity of CO2 emitted when using energy) would be a superior policy alternative to an emissions-trading regime. In fact, the irony is that there is a broad consensus in favor of a carbon tax everywhere except on Capitol Hill, where the “T word” is anathema. Former vice president Al Gore supports the concept, as does James Connaughton, head of the White House Council on Environmental Quality during the George W. Bush administration. Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute supports such an initiative, but so does Paul Anderson, the CEO of Duke Energy. Crossing the two disciplines most relevant to the discussion of climate policy–science and economics–both NASA scientist James Hansen and Harvard University economist N. Gregory Mankiw give the thumbs up to a carbon tax swap.[9] There are many reasons for preferring a revenue-neutral carbon tax regime (in which taxes are placed on the carbon emissions of fuel use, with revenues used to reduce other taxes) to emissions trading. Among them are: A revenue-neutral carbon tax shift is almost certain to reduce GHG emissions efficiently. As economist William Pizer observes, “Specifically, a carbon tax equal to the damage per ton of CO2 will lead to exactly the right balance between the cost of reducing emissions and the resulting benefits of less global warming.”[10] Despite the popular assumption that a cap-and-trade regime is more certain because it is a quantity control rather than a price control, such a scheme only works in very limited circumstances that do not apply to GHG control. The great potential for fraud attendant on such a system creates significant doubt about its effectiveness, as experience has shown in both theory and practice in the gyrations of the European ETS. Putting a price on the carbon emissions attendant on fuel use would create numerous incentives to reduce the use of carbon-intensive energy. The increased costs of energy would flow through the economy, ultimately giving consumers incentives to reduce their use of electricity, transportation fuels, home heating oil, and so forth. Consumers, motivated by the tax, would have incentives to buy more efficient appliances, to buy and drive more efficient cars, and to better insulate their homes or construct them with more attention to energy conservation. A carbon tax would also create incentives for consumers to demand lower-carbon power sources from their local utilities. A carbon tax, as its cost flowed down the chains of production into consumer products, would lead manufacturers to become more efficient and consumers to economize in consumption. At all levels in the economy, a carbon tax would create a profit niche for environmental entrepreneurs to find ways to deliver lower-carbon energy at competitive prices. Finally, a carbon tax would also serve to level (somewhat) the playing field among solar power, wind power, nuclear power, and carbon-based fuels by internalizing the cost of carbon emission into the price of the various forms of energy. Unlike carbon cap-and-trade initiatives, a carbon tax would create little incentive or opportunity for rent-seeking or cheating. As William Nordhaus explains: As energy is one of the three most important variable inputs to economic production (along with labor and capital), raising the cost of energy would undoubtedly result in significant economic harm. Using the revenues generated from a carbon tax to reduce other taxes on productivity (taxes on labor or capital) could mitigate the economic damage that would be produced by raising energy prices. The most likely candidates for a carbon tax tradeoff would be the corporate income tax (the U.S. rate is currently among the highest in the industrialized world) and payroll taxes, the latter of which would lower the cost of employment and help offset the possibly regressive effects of higher energy prices on lower-income households. But across-the-board income tax rate cuts and further cuts in the capital gains tax could also be considered. Exploring the Parameters of Carbon-Centered Tax Reform Published estimates of an initial optimal carbon tax on fuels are in the range of $10 to $20 per ton of CO2 emitted (in 2005 dollars). Nordhaus, for example, estimates the optimal rate for a tax implemented in 2010 to be $16 per ton of carbon and rapidly rising over time.[14] We will focus primarily on a tax rate of $15 per ton of CO2, while also providing enough information to allow a reader to consider the likely impact of a range of possible taxes. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, emissions of CO2 in the United States in 2005 equaled 6,009 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2, an increase of twenty MMT over 2004.[15] Emissions have grown at an annual rate of 1.2 percent between 1990 and 2005. Recently, the rate has slowed, with the average annual rate between 2000 and 2005 equaling 0.5 percent. Table 1 shows the price impacts of a $15 per ton CO2 tax under the assumption that the tax is fully passed forward. The price shown for gasoline is not in addition to that on crude oil (i.e., it is not a double-tax). It is included to show how the price levied on crude oil would change the price of the refined product.[16] This provides a rough guide to the excise tax equivalent price impacts of a tax on CO2. We can scale the tax rates to evaluate different carbon taxes. For example, a $10 per ton tax on CO2 would raise the price of coal by $28.55 x 0.66 = $18.84. The higher energy prices in table 2 should bring about a reduction in the demand for carbon-intensive fuels. A full analysis of equilibrium changes in carbon emissions requires a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model, an exercise that is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however, make a rough calculation using previously published results from CGE models. Here, we extrapolate results from the analysis of Bovenberg and Goulder of a $25 per ton tax on carbon.[18] Table 3 presents the price and output changes for fossil fuels following the imposition of the carbon tax in Bovenberg and Goulder’s study. We compute the arc elasticity as the ratio of the percentage output change to price change. Achieving a More Efficient System A cap-and-trade approach to controlling GHG emissions would be highly problematic. A lack of international binding authority would render enforcement nearly impossible, while the incentives for cheating would be extremely high. The upfront costs of creating institutions to administer trading are significant and likely to produce entrenched bureaucracies that clamor for ever-tighter controls on carbon emissions. Permit holders will see value in further tightening of caps, but will resist efforts outside the cap-and-trade system that might devalue their new carbon currency. Higher energy costs resulting from trading would lead to economic slowdown, but as revenues would flow into for-profit coffers (domestically or internationally), revenues would be unavailable for offsetting either the economic slowdown or the impacts of higher energy prices on low-income earners. A program of carbon-centered tax reform, by contrast, lacks most of the negative attributes of cap-and-trade, and could convey significant benefits unrelated to GHG reductions or avoidance of potential climate harms, making this a no-regrets policy. A tax swap would create economy-wide incentives for energy efficiency and lower-carbon energy, and by raising the price of energy would also reduce energy use. At the same time, revenues generated would allow the mitigation of the economic impact of higher energy prices, both on the general economy and on the lower-income earners who might be disproportionately affected by such a change. Carbon taxes would be more difficult to avoid, and existing institutions quite adept at tax collection could step up immediately. Revenues would remain in-country, removing international incentives for cheating or insincere participation in carbon-reduction programs. Most of these effects would remain beneficial even if science should determine that reducing GHG emissions has only a negligible effect on mitigating global warming. A modest carbon tax of $15 per ton of CO2 emitted would result in an 11 percent decline in CO2 emissions, while raising non-coal-based energy forms modestly. Coal-based energy prices would be affected more strongly, which is to be expected in any plan genuinely intended to reduce GHG emissions. A number of pos-sible mechanisms are available to refund the revenues raised by this tax. On net, these tools could significantly reduce the economic costs of the tax and quite possibly provide economic benefits. For these reasons, we conclude that if aggressive actions are to be taken to control GHG emissions, carbon-centered tax reform–not GHG emission trading–is the superior policy option. Kenneth P. Green is a resident scholar, Steven F. Hayward is the F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow, and Kevin A. Hassett is a senior fellow and director of economic policy studies at AEI. AEI editorial associate Nicole Passan worked with Messrs. Green, Hayward, and Hassett to edit and produce this Environmental Policy Outlook. This essay is available here as an Adobe Acrobat PDF. Notes 1. United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Progress Reports,” available at www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/progress-reports.html. 2. Sequestration projects currently appear to be not only very expensive, but they also reduce net power generation by as much as 20 percent, further aggravating the cost that will be passed along to consumers and rate payers. 3. Robert J. Shapiro, “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes,” February 2007, 22, available at www.theamericanconsumer.org/Shapiro.pdf. 4. William Nordhaus, “Life after Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming Policies” (NBER working paper no. W11889, December 2005), 15. 5. Ibid., 22. 6. Robert J. Shapiro, “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: The Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency of Emissions Caps and Tradable Permits, Compared to Carbon Taxes.” 7. RECLAIM covered 390 stationary sources of NOx and fourteen stationary sources of SO2, which represented only 17 percent of total basin-wide NOx emissions and 31 percent of basin-side SO2 emissions. 8. The Clean Air Act forbids it, in fact. SCAQMD’s RECLAIM regulations read: “An RTC [RECLAIM Trading Credit] shall not constitute a security or other form of property.” Section 4 of the RECLAIM regulations reiterated this point: “Nothing in District rules shall be construed to limit the District’s authority to condition, limit, suspend, or terminate any RTCs or the authorization to emit which is represented by a Facility Permit.” (Cited in James L. Johnston, “Pollution Trading in La-La Land,” Regulation [Fall 1991], available at www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg17n3-johnston.html.) 9. Carbon Tax Center, “Who Supports,” available at http://carbontax.wrkng.net/who-supports/. 10. William Pizer, “Choosing Price or Quantity Controls for Greenhouse Gases,” Resources for the Future Climate Issues Brief 17 (July 1999). 11. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation,” American Law and Economics Review 4, no. 1 (2002). 12. William Pizer, “Choosing Price or Quantity Controls for Greenhouse Gases.” 13. William Nordhaus, “Life after Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming Policies,” 15. 14. Ibid. 15. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information Administration (EIA), Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2005, DOE/EIA-0573(2005), Washington, DC: DOE, 2006. Total GHG emissions equaled 7,147 million metric tons CO2 equivalent using hundred-year global warming potentials. Note that a simple conversion of other GHGs (i.e., methane, nitrous oxides, HFCs, and PFCs) does not exist. The global warming potential depends on the time horizon. We focus on CO2 only in this study, though, ideally, a carbon tax would also tax these non-CO2 emissions. 16. This is a standard assumption borne out by CGE modeling. See, for example, A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence Goulder, “Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?” in Distributional and Behavioral Effects of Environmental Policy, eds. Carlo Carraro and Gilbert. E. Metcalf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 45-85. 17. We assume the tax on coal would be applied for electric utilities and major industrial coal users. Note that 91 percent of domestic and imported coal is consumed by electric utilities. (DOE, EIA, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2005.) The tax on crude oil is levied at refineries, and the tax on natural gas at the city gate. 18. A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence Goulder, “Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?” 19. Increased coal prices could also lead to increased demand for imported oil, an important policy consideration outside the scope of this paper. 20. Carbon taxes can be reported in either units of carbon or CO2. To convert a tax rate per unit of carbon dioxide to a rate per unit of carbon, multiply the CO2 rate by 44/12 (the mass difference between carbon and CO2). Thus, a tax of $10 per ton of CO2 is equivalent to a tax of $36.67 per ton of carbon. 21. The recent coal study by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology suggests that carbon capture and sequestration is cost competitive at a carbon price of $30 per ton of CO2. See John Deutch and Ernest Moniz, The Future of Coal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/. 22. Sergey Paltsev et al., Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals, report 146 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2007), available through http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#top. 23. Gilbert Metcalf, A Green Employment Tax Swap: Using a Carbon Tax to Finance Payroll Tax Relief (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution-World Resources Institution, 2007). 24. Don Fullerton and Gilbert E. Metcalf, “Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?” Chicago-Kent Law Review 73, no. 1 (1998): 221-56. 25. See Lawrence H. Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend’: A Reader’s Guide,” International Tax and Public Finance 2 (1995): 157-83, for a thorough taxonomy of the various double dividends. Also see A. Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence Goulder, “Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?” 26. The terminology of intermediate and strong double dividends is due to Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend’: A Reader’s Guide.” 27. Mustafa Babiker, Gilbert E. Metcalf, and John Reilly, “Tax Distortions and Global Climate Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 (2003): 269-87. Babiker et al. show that it is possible, however, to find taxes such that lump-sum replacement dominates, lowering a distortionary tax. 28. A. Lans Bovenberg and Ruud de Mooij, “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation,” American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (1994): 1085-89. See also Lawrence H. Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend’: A Reader’s Guide.” This essay is available here as an Adobe Acrobat PDF. |
| 主题 | US Economy |
| 标签 | carbon dioxide ; Climate change ; CO2 emissions ; emissions ; Environment ; environmentalism ; Greenhouse gas ; Kyoto Protocol ; Protocol ; trade ; Trade policy |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/climate-change-caps-vs-taxes/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/205144 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kevin A. Hassett,Steven F. Hayward,Kenneth P. Green. Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes. 2007. |
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