| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 评论 |
| Increased investment, lower prices: the fruits of past and future telecom competition | |
| Kevin A. Hassett; Laurence Kotlikoff; Zoya Ivanova | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Find the paper in its entirety here. Abstract This paper shows that competition permanently reduces consumer prices for voice and broadband services and spurs telecom investment. This is particularly the case when competitors are able to lease unbundled network elements from incumbent local exchange carriers at regulated TELRIC rates. A review of empirical data, an examination of market practices, and the application of a new dynamic model of telecom entry, pricing, and investment demonstrates that, over a five-year period, the emergence of competition should mean $71 billion more telecom investment than under the monopoly structure that prevailed prior to the Telecom Act of 1996. Over 20 years, competition would add $155 billion to aggregate investment. And compared with an ILEC monopoly, telecom investment and employment outlays would increase by over one fifth in counties containing the majority of the U.S. population and by over 30 percent in counties containing almost a third of the population. Thus, the study conclusively refutes assertions that competition reduces telecom investment. The application of the model to all 3,108 counties in the continental United States also shows that consumers and businesses can, on average, save $57 per year on each phone line, or $15 billion a year in total, if the states follow the FCC’s competitive cost-based TELRIC pricing rules. These rules, which were approved by the Supreme Court, determine how much Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) should be charged to lease network access from the incumbent Bell Operating Companies. Our study notes, however, that wholesale prices that exceed competitive TELRIC levels can raise the cost of retail phone service and reduce investment by discouraging competition. If prices for so-called UNE-P network access are set too high, competitors will be unable to provide service economically to customers. Thus, they will decline to enter the market – leaving the field clear for monopolists to raise prices without the restraints of rate regulation. |
| 主题 | Economics ; Public Economics |
| 标签 | Telecommunications |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/articles/increased-investment-lower-prices-the-fruits-of-past-and-future-telecom-competition/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/238845 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kevin A. Hassett,Laurence Kotlikoff,Zoya Ivanova. Increased investment, lower prices: the fruits of past and future telecom competition. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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