Smoke is seen following a fire at an Aramco factory in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, September 14, 2019. REUTERS/Stringer
Major Saudi Arabian oil facilities were attacked in a series
of drone strikes on September 14, endangering the supply chain of the world’s
largest oil producer and further escalating tensions in a region already on
edge.
Ten drones hit oil facilities of the state-owned oil giant
Saudi Aramco on September 14—including a massive facility in Abqaiq—in a series
of attacks which Houthi
rebels in Yemen have claimed responsibility for. Houthi rebels have been fighting
Yemen’s government—supported by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies—since 2015.
Despite the Houthis’ claims, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo pointed the finger at Iran, tweeting that “Iran has now
launched an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply. There is no
evidence the attacks came from Yemen.” Tensions between Iran and the United
States and its allies have worsened over the last few months following Tehran’s
June
announcement that it had stopped complying with the 2015 nuclear deal—known
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
On June 12, two commercial tankers were damaged in the Strait
of Hormuz and a US
drone was shot down on June 20, both attacks Washington blamed on Tehran. In
July, the US navy announced it had shot
down an Iranian drone that made an aggressive action against a US vessel, and
on July 19 Iranian forces seized
a British oil tanker in retaliation for the detention of an Iranian tanker
in Gibraltar.
Responding to the latest attack, US President Donald J.
Trump tweeted
on September 15 that “there is reason to believe that we know the culprit,
are locked and loaded depending on verification, but are waiting to hear from
the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] as to who they believe was the cause of this
attack, and under what terms we would proceed!”
Reports suggest that the attack disrupted
more than half of Saudi Arabia’s oil capacity, making up 5 percent of the
total global daily supply of oil. Before the open of business on September 16, US
oil futures reached $60 a barrel—a jump of about 10 percent. The increase
in price was slightly muted by Trump’s announcement on September 15 that the
United States would release supplies from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
to try to contain prices.
The attack on the Saudi Aramco infrastructure comes just a
week after Prince
Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud replaced Khalid al-Falih as the energy
minister of Saudi Arabia. The move was seen as a potential sign that Riyadh
was pushing for an initial public offering (IPO) for the state-owned oil
company in order to raise more funds for overall diversification of the Saudi
economy.
Atlantic Council experts
react to the attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and what they mean for global energy
markets:
Randolph Bell, director of the Atlantic Council’s Global
Energy Center:
“The strikes on Aramco’s key oil processing facilities
follow two dramatic weeks of energy leadership reshuffling in the Kingdom and
statements that the Crown Prince’s intention to IPO a portion of Aramco soon.
While it is not yet clear if the attacks were from missiles, drones, or both,
and if they were launched by Iran-backed Houthis from Yemen, Iranian proxies in
Iraq, or from Iran itself, they are surely a significant escalation from recent
clashes in the region.
“Given the timing and the escalation, the strikes should be
seen not just as an attack on Saudi’s oil infrastructure, but on the IPO itself
and MBS’s broader economic agenda for the Kingdom.
“It remains to be seen how long it will take Aramco to
resume full operations. After initial reports that the facilities will be back
online by September 16, Aramco officials stated on September 15 that they
should get about one-third of production by September 16 and will update on the
remainder on September 17.
“Though there is plenty of oil in storage at the moment and
President Trump authorized release of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve if
necessary to keep prices in check, a longer timeline for the repair of the
facilities would still have serious implications for the global oil market. It
would also underscore Aramco’s vulnerability to regional instability at a time
when it is looking to attract outside investment.
“But even if the interruption is relatively short, which is
more likely, and Saudi benefits from the jump in the price of oil—which, under
other circumstances, would raise Aramco’s IPO valuation—the attacks are still
far more likely to remind investors of the geopolitical risk the company faces
and ultimately hurt the IPO. This particularly true if tensions continue to
ratchet upwards in the region, as President Trump suggested on September 15.
“In short, the attacks should signal to MBS that if he wants
to modernize and diversify the Kingdom’s economy on the back of Aramco’s
wealth, the Iranians will try to have a say in the matter.”
Read more on the tensions between the US and Iran:
Mon, Sep 16, 2019
Rejected again and embarrassed by the escalation in the Persian Gulf his policies have incentivized, Trump is likely to make similar belligerent comments this year and US-Iran relations will only worsen.
IranSource
by
Barbara Slavin
Kirsten Fontenrose,
director of Regional Security in the
Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs:
“During Prince Khalid bin Salman’s recent meetings with
senior leaders at the State and Defense Departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency, he was clear that while Saudi Arabia supports economically
squeezing the Iranian regime, they do not wish to see a war with Iran. While the
context has changed in light of the weekend attack on Abqaiq, the reasons have
not. Saudi Arabia would find itself on the front line of an armed conflict,
with Iran or its proxies to the east, south, and north. Such a conflict would
also cripple plans for an Aramco IPO and would drive foreign investment from
the country. Saudi Arabia has many long term reasons to showcase its resilience
and de-escalate.
“The challenge for the US administration is proving the origin of the drones without revealing sources and methods. Unless a few critical details can be declassified, the world will have to take the administration at its word. We learned when [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad used chemical weapons in Douma in April 2018—but much of the world refused to believe it—that this can be a hard sell.”
Read Fontenrose’s full blog:
Sat, Sep 14, 2019
The ten-drone attack on Aramco’s Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia on September 14 is a sign that the Houthis suffer from false confidence. Snubbing talks and launching attacks is not a way to garner sympathy from the United States or the international community.
New Atlanticist
by
Kirsten Fontenrose
Phillip Cornell, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic
Council’s Global Energy Center:
“Abqaiq is indeed a critical facility in the Saudi oil
processing chain, where more than half of the country’s crude oil is stabilized
for safer transport further downstream. The facility has been a known critical
infrastructure in the global oil market for a long time, and has been targeted
for attack in the past, notably in 2006. It is also the site of a major Aramco
residential camp, which also serves as an overflow for Aramco corporate
headquarters staff, as well as some drilling and refining operations.
“There is still some uncertainty about what hit the
facility, but initial damage imagery from the site indicates seventeen points
of impact, each individually targeted to specific buildings including
stabilization centers. Whether drones or missiles, these attacks appear both
asymmetric (hard to trace) and accurate.
“The large immediate impact on production is partly a result
of evacuations and personnel safety. Fires have been extinguished, and much of
the lost processing throughput should be online by September 16. Further
repairs could be completed in a matter of weeks. Saudi oil stocks can make up
for the shortfall, so export deliveries should not be affected, and strategic
stock releases by the International Energy Agency or the US SPR are probably
unnecessary.
“However, the attacks highlight the vulnerability of Saudi
infrastructure to cheap, accurate, and long-range attacks and more generally to
geopolitical events. In an oil market that faces structural softness from
weaker demand, surging unconventional supply, and long-term displacement,
geopolitical risk may buoy prices just as regional producers are struggling to
leverage them. But a heightened risk premium is likely to dampen interest in
Aramco stock ahead of an IPO, and if the forward curve shifts up it could also
encourage more North American drilling, further squeezing the Saudi fiscal
position just as it seeks to invest in economic transition.
“What is more troubling is the systematic dismantling of
institutions and commitments meant to underpin stable oil markets. The SPR is
designed as an insurance against such outages, and the Trump government is
overseeing further sell-offs. US commitment to regional security has always been
key, and current policy is erratic. The divisive approach to Iran means that
traditional US allies are not on-board. Geopolitics and great-power competition
are playing a greater role in economic policy these days, and while that may
satisfy some narrow interests, it does not bode well for stable energy prices,
or for the secure and dependable delivery of energy along global supply chains.”
Ellen Wald, nonresident
senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center:
“Aramco runs its company very professionally and has a great
deal of redundancy and built in storage. The company always touts its ability
to provide its customers with 99 percent reliability. Aramco has been prepared
for this kind of damage and, in fact, has dealt with series damage several
times in its history. These attacks represent an event, not a fundamental
change in the supply of oil.
“Perhaps the most important and lasting consequences of the
attack on Abqaiq and Khurais will not be felt in the market moves this week and
next, but on the effect this will have on Saudi Arabia’s OPEC policy in 2020
and even into 2021. Saudi Arabia has been drawing on stored oil for months to
satisfy customer demand while keeping its output below its OPEC+ quota. Now,
Aramco will be drawing from storage at an even greater rate to make sure all
customer orders are fulfilled until full capacity is restored.
“Aramco will need to pump even more oil to refill its
storage for a long time to come, especially if Saudi Arabia does not intend to
pump over its OPEC+ quota. Refilling stored oil is seen as a strategic
necessity and as a result, Saudi Arabia will be unlikely to support further
production cuts. As for the Aramco IPO, at present, Saudi Arabia appears
focused on foreign policy calculations and not on assuring potential equity
investors of Aramco’s ability to recover and resilience in the face of such
threats. This could be an issue if Saudi Arabia pursues plans for an Aramco IPO
on Tadawul in 2019 or early 2020.”
Jean-Francois Seznec,
nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic
Council’s Global Energy Center:
“The drone attacks on the Abqaiq oil processing complex is a
major escalation in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Abqaiq treats
and prepares for export the oil from the very rich Saudi oil fields of Ghawar,
Shaibah, and others. The processing complex is heavily protected from ground
attacks and had repelled al-Qaeda actions in the past. However, air attacks,
which should have been prevented by the Patriot missiles, have worked. The
sophistication of the drones and of the attack itself will, of course, be
interpreted as Iran being responsible for the attack.
“Until now, Iran and Saudi Arabia were protected by the fear
of mutual destruction of their main oil export assets, should one attack the
other’s facilities. Now that the Iranians have lost most of their export
capacity due to the US sanctions, this fear of mutual destruction is no longer
there. The Iranian leadership may feel they have little to lose by attacking
the exports of Saudi Arabia.
“The question is not whether the Saudis will retaliate but
when, how, and with how much support from the United States. Furthermore, the
Russians will be great beneficiaries as they will earn much more per barrel on their
oil and gas exports. Of course, the United States, now the largest exporter in
the world, will also benefit greatly. Even, with a price that could easily
double, the Saudi remaining exports will still earn amounts close to what they
earned before. Only China, who imports most of its crude from the Gulf, will be
financially hit at the tune of $1.1 billion for each dollar increase per barrel.
“Thus, except for China, few of the players will seek to
defuse the situation, all feeling that they have little to lose and much to
gain. Hence, it would seem that the
September 14 attack stands a strong chance of escalating into an all-out
conflict.”
Reed Blakemore, associate director in the Atlantic Council’s
Global Energy Center:
“For the past several months, the market has been devaluing
a building portfolio of geopolitical risks in favor of the demand-side impact
of strong economic headwinds. The events of September 14 change that, and the 5
million barrels per day now estimated to come offline has momentarily forced
the geopolitical risk premium back into to the market.
“Looking ahead, several questions are worth considering, the
first being one of supply. Riyadh has announced that about 50 percent of the
now-offline production could brought back to market within the next few days.
The rest, particularly the damaged units reportedly responsible for processing
Saudi’s heavy crudes, could take much longer.
“Moreover, the severity of this attack brings renewed
clarity to the depth of tensions between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
Iran. Whether or not this was an attack directly orchestrated by Iran or
facilitated with Yemeni-based Houthi rebels as their agents, Iran has signaled
its ability to strike this infrastructure and expanded the playing field of
supply risks not just to possible closures in the Strait of Hormuz, but oil
production itself from a number of possible vectors. How Washington and Riyadh
choose to respond (for now limited to rhetoric) will show exactly whether this
is a flash in the pan or a step-change in Gulf tensions.
“Both elements will have an impact on question two, how a
new geopolitical ‘Gulf premium’ will be priced into the market. A quick return
of Saudi production will make prices bounce, but likely be steadily absorbed by
a still-gloomy demand outlook and keep the market in backwardation. A more
prolonged outage will bake a ‘Gulf premium’ into oil prices over the long term
and possibly push the forward curve into contango should the crisis continue to
deepen.”
David A. Wemer is
associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter
@DavidAWemer.
Contact an AC expert
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
| 
