People attend a rally against the approval of the so-called Steinmeier Formula, in Kyiv, Ukraine October 6, 2019. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko
For more than five years, Russia has used its military and proxy forces to wage a low-intensity but still very real war in eastern Ukraine. Newly-elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would like to end that conflict. On October 1, he announced an agreement based on the “Steinmeier Formula” to advance a settlement.
Angry
crowds took to the streets of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities over the weekend to
denounce the agreement, equating it with capitulation to Moscow. But is it? At
this point, not enough is known about details of the agreement—or even if the
agreement will hold—to reach a judgment.
Shortly
after the Russian military seized Crimea and Russia illegally annexed the
peninsula in March 2014, fighting broke out in eastern Ukraine. So-called
“separatist forces,” with Moscow-provided leadership, funding, ammunition,
heavy weapons, and sometimes regular units of the Russian army, occupied part
of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, also called the Donbas.
Five-plus
years of fighting have claimed over 13,000 lives and caused some two million
people to flee. Agreements reached in Minsk in September 2014 and February
2015—the latter with the direct participation of the German and French
leaders—have not been implemented.
In
2016, then German Foreign Minister (and current German President) Frank-Walter
Steinmeier proposed to resolve some sequencing questions from Minsk disputed by
Russia and Ukraine. He suggested that local elections be held in the part of the
Donbas currently occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces according to
Ukrainian law and supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE). Once the OSCE certified the elections as free and fair, the
occupied areas would gain special status, and Ukrainian sovereignty would be
restored over all of the Donbas, including along the Ukraine-Russia border.
The
October 1 settlement announced by Zelenskyy referred specifically to the
Steinmeier Formula. Many in Ukraine worry that the Steinmeier Formula aims at
promoting peace—but not necessarily a just peace for Ukraine—so Germany and
other European states can get back to business as usual with Moscow.
Zelenskyy,
however, announced a seemingly modified version of the Steinmeier Formula. He
stated that local elections in the occupied region would be held only after Russian and Russian proxy forces
withdrew and Ukraine reestablished control over the border with Russia. This
sequencing would amount to a victory for Kyiv and, if accepted by Moscow, would
constitute a significant departure from Russia’s previous position. Of course,
if the Kremlin does not accept this sequencing, the October 1 agreement is
doomed.
Those
who call the agreement a surrender fear that local elections, if not managed
carefully, will give political power to allies of those who have run the
so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics.” By all credible accounts,
the “People’s Republic” authorities have done a horrible job managing local
institutions and delivering government services. In elections held under
Ukrainian law, monitored by the OSCE to ensure that it met free and fair
standards, and with the bad guys with guns having left for Russia, would voters
really choose to empower people with demonstrably bad track records at
governance?
Another
issue that provokes demonstrators’ concern is the question of special
self-governing status for the occupied territories. At this point, however, the
debate is taking place in a vacuum, because the meaning of “special
self-governing status” has yet to be clarified.
Zelenskyy said that the Rada would develop a new law on local self
governance and that it would protect Ukraine’s key interests.
Some
oppose special status on principle, but it likely would prove impossible to
settle the conflict without something that looks “special” for the Donbas. The appropriate
question is how much autonomy does Kyiv cede to local authorities?
Certain
government powers—such as the responsibility to set foreign, defense and
security, macro-economic and macro-financial policies, to name a few—should
remain in Kyiv. That is vital for Ukraine’s coherent functioning as a national
state. But other powers touching on questions related to education, health, and
local police might be transferred to local authorities without comprising
Ukraine’s national unity.
According
to Zelenskyy, the Rada will develop the specific legislation that sets out what
authorities can be passed down to the Donbas. That question also may well prove
problematic with Russia, which could mean collapse of the October 1 agreement.
The
2003 Kozak memorandum provides a likely example of what the Kremlin envisages
for special self-governing status for the Donbas. Kozak’s memorandum spelled
out terms for reintegrating the breakaway region of Transnistria into Moldova. In
the end, the Moldovan government rejected the memorandum, because it would have
given regional authorities in Transnistria the ability to veto national-level
decisions, such as foreign policy and Moldova’s relationship with the European
Union, and made national policy-making unworkable.
Ukraine
should not accept anything like the Kozak memorandum. To do so would severely
complicate national policy-making and amount to abandoning Kyiv’s long-proclaimed
course of drawing closer to Europe and its institutions.
UkraineAlert sources analysis and commentary from a wide-array of thought-leaders, politicians, experts, and activists from Ukraine and the global community.
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The
main point, however, remains: we do not know what the terms of special
self-governing status are, just as we do not know whether Moscow would accept
local elections in the Donbas only after it pulled out its forces and Ukraine
had reestablished control. Depending on how these questions are answered, the October
1 agreement could be good for Kyiv, or it could bad.
Before
pronouncing a verdict, having answers to these questions would appear wise.
Steven Pifer is a William Perry research fellow at Stanford, a nonresident senior fellow with Brookings, and a former US ambassador to Ukraine. He tweets @steven_pifer.
Further reading
Fri, Oct 4, 2019
What does the Steinmeier Formula mean for Ukraine and could this be the first step in a peaceful settlement of the Donbas war?
UkraineAlert
by
Mattia Nelles
Tue, Oct 1, 2019
Is Ukraine about to be sold out and further weakened by internal splits?
UkraineAlert
by
Bohdan Nahaylo
Tue, Oct 1, 2019
I have one request for American political elites: stop making Ukraine a political football in the internal affairs of the United States. Nothing less than our security and Europe’s security depends on it.
UkraineAlert
by
Oleksii Honcharenko
Angry crowds took to the streets to denounce the Steinmeier Formula, equating it with capitulation to Moscow. But is it? At this point, not enough is known about details of the agreement—or even if the agreement will hold—to reach a judgment.
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