Mozambique's President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi arrives for the inauguration of Cyril Ramaphosa as South African president, at Loftus Versfeld stadium in Pretoria, South Africa May 25, 2019. REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko
For two years, an insurgent group whose affiliation and
motivations remain murky has perpetrated attacks that have killed over three hundred people in the
northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. The government in Maputo,
controlled by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) party, has
largely dismissed the group as a collection of criminals without
legitimate grievances, and has responded to the attacks with lockdowns,
arbitrary arrests, and summary executions. These tactics have largely avoided focusing
on the root issue of the insurgency: namely, anger over the lack of development
in the country’s poorest province.
On the campaign trail for the nation-wide elections
scheduled for October 15th, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi stated
that his government would be open to dialogue with
members of the insurgent group. Viewed alongside the government’s multiple and
recent agreements with Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), the main
opposition political party in Mozambique, it seems likely that this assertion
is more than an empty campaign promise. Yet with an insurgency that has no
identified leadership and elections that may bring forth additional violence,
how the government will address the insurgency going forward remains unclear.
Roots of the Insurgency
The group carrying out attacks in the majority-Muslim Cabo
Delgado province is called al Sunna wa Jummah (ASWJ). Despite being referred to
as “al-Shabaab” by locals, there are no visible links between the group and the
Somali organizations of the same names. At the outset of ASWJ’s first attack
against the village of Mocímboa da Praia in October 2017, little was known
about its leadership or agenda. Since then, no individual has emerged as a
figurehead or spokesperson for the group, nor have any specific demands been
made.
ASWJ’s tactics often take the form of grisly beheadings, and
thus appear to be heavily influenced by extremist groups such as the Islamic
State. In June, the Islamic State for the first time claimed
responsibility for an attack against Mozambican security forces in Cabo
Delgado, while in August, the group claimed responsibility for two
ASWJ attacks against civilians. Though the Islamic State has taken credit for
these attacks apparently perpetrated by ASWJ, it remains unclear what amount of
support the Islamic State is providing to the insurgents. Many experts believe
that claiming responsibility for attacks carried out in Mozambique, even if by
an unaffiliated group, is a low-risk way for the Islamic State to project power
now that it has lost control of most of its territory in the Middle East. Nonetheless,
given the lack of available information, connections between the Islamic State
and ASWJ cannot be ruled out.
Faced with few employment opportunities and living in desperate conditions, young people are drawn to ASWJ as a means of satisfying their basic economic and social needs.
A study on the insurgency published by the Mozambican Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos in September 2019 identified poverty, unemployment, and low levels of education as the primary forces driving young men to join ASWJ. The authors of the study interviewed a local resident, who said (translated from Portuguese) of the local economic situation that “Mocímboa da Praia has become a district abandoned by successive FRELIMO governments” where young people “live by begging for alms or working in the informal market.” According to the local source, attempts by residents to petition the government for improved economic opportunities have been dismissed and met with claims by the government that the residents are members of RENAMO.
Faced with few employment opportunities and living in
desperate conditions, young people are drawn to ASWJ as a means of satisfying
their basic economic and social needs, the authors of the study concluded.
Response by the
Mozambican Government
The response by the Mozambican government to the attacks has
been largely heavy-handed. After the first attacks in October 2017, security
forces imposed a lockdown in the area, closed mosques, and engaged in arbitrary
detentions. Groups such as Human Rights Watch have alleged
that since at least August 2018, security forces have engaged in arbitrary
arrests, torture, and summary executions of people suspected of being members
of the insurgent group.
The government has also responded
to the crisis through media censorship and suppression. Since June 2018, the
government has barred various media organizations and correspondents from
visiting Cabo Delgado, while the army and police have detained or arrested journalists
who managed to travel there. This has contributed to both an unwillingness on
the part of Mozambicans to openly discuss the insurgency as well as the general
lack of information about it.
Such brutal tactics on the part of the government and security
services risk further alienating a population that already feels abandoned by
the government in Maputo. They also do not appear to be particularly effective,
with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project reporting twenty-three
attacks by ASWJ in in the period from September 1 through October 9 of 2019
alone.
A History of Dialogue
with RENAMO
The ASWJ insurgency should be seen in the context of the
Mozambican government’s interactions with the RENAMO opposition party. FRELIMO
and RENAMO fought a bloody fifteen-year civil war that ended with a peace
agreement in 1992. Nonetheless, hostilities have sporadically continued as
FRELIMO candidates have won every subsequent presidential election and RENAMO
has continued to feel shut-out of the political system.
A ceasefire agreement was signed between the two parties in
August 2014 after more than a year of attacks by RENAMO forces operating out of
their base in the remote wilderness of the central Sofala Province.
Nonetheless, RENAMO contested the results of that year’s elections, and
reinitiated hostilities that resulted in a third peace agreement between the
parties, signed in August 2019, in which RENAMO promised to end military
hostilities and work towards a peaceful election. In negotiating this most
recent peace agreement, President Nyusi repeatedly travelled to RENAMO
headquarters in order to speak with the late Afonso Dhlakama, the former leader
of RENAMO.
During a September 15th campaign rally in Cabo
Delgado, President Nyusi, a native of the province, admitted for the first time
that the government would be open to dialogue
with ASWJ – on the condition that members reveal themselves. While campaign
promises are a long way from actionable policy, this statement should be taken
seriously when evaluated alongside FRELIMO’s demonstrated commitment to engaging
in dialogue with RENAMO.
The Unclear Path
Forward with ASWJ
How the Mozambican government engages with ASWJ going
forward will depend on the insurgency’s leadership revealing itself as well as
the outcome of the election. In past dialogue with RENAMO, there has been a
leader and a leadership structure with which Nyusi, or the other FRELIMO chief
executive, could engage. With no apparent leader after two years, it remains to
be seen whether ASWJ will be a partner for the dialogue that Nyusi appears open
to. And if dialogue is unlikely with no identified ASWJ leadership, it remains
to be seen whether the cycle of repressive government tactics and further ASWJ
attacks will be broken.
The elections scheduled for October 15th will also
be a critical factor in determining how the government responds to the crisis. Nyusi
is widely expected to win reelection. Yet the results, with Nyusi on the ballot
for FRELIMO and Ossufo Momade on the ballot for RENAMO, are expected to be
close. Pre-election violence has already occurred, with attacks against
supporters and officials
of both major political parties being reported. On October 7th, a
leading civil society election observer, Anastacio Matavel, was shot and killed as he was
leaving an election training session in the southern Gaza Province.
Should Nyusi win a close election as anticipated, it seems unlikely that the peace agreement with RENAMO will hold.
Cracks also appear to be emerging within RENAMO, with an
internal faction refusing
to accept Momade’s leadership and continuing to carry out attacks leading
up to the election. Should Nyusi win a close election as anticipated, it seems unlikely
that the peace agreement with RENAMO will hold, given that tensions are already
running high, that RENAMO leadership is currently unable to control all its
members, and that previous close elections have driven RENAMO to violence.
Mozambique was hit by two devastating cyclones earlier in
2019 that have left the country budgetarily stretched
thin. In the event of post-election violence, the government will likely
have to commit a significant amount of security forces to stem the tide of
violence. The amount of funds and forces that the government will be able to
commit to combating ASWJ will therefore be affected by severity of RENAMO’s
post-election violence.
Challenges Ahead
The violent insurgency that has cost over three hundred Mozambicans their lives, and many more their homes and possessions as ASWJ has burned entire villages to the ground, is a grave threat to the citizens of Cabo Delgado. Dialogue with ASWJ seems unlikely despite the government’s willingness to engage in it, and a contentious election environment has left Mozambique primed for post-election violence that could divert government resources from combatting ASWJ. Whichever way the government proceeds, it seems unlikely that a long-term solution to the ASWJ insurgency will be feasible without a concerted effort to simultaneously address the poverty and economic conditions underlying the insurgency in the first place.
James Rogers is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.
For two years, an insurgent group whose affiliation and motivations remain murky has perpetrated attacks that have killed over three hundred people in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. The government in Maputo, controlled by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) party, has largely dismissed the group as a collection of criminals without […]
| 
