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\u003cp\u003eThe dominant narrative about Russia’s nuclear weapons in Western strategic literature since the beginning of the century has been something like this: Russia’s doctrine of ‘escalate-to-de-escalate’ and its large-scale military exercises show that Moscow is getting ready to use low-yield, theatre nuclear weapons to stop NATO from defeating Russia’s forces, or to coerce the Atlantic Alliance and end a conflict on terms favourable to Russia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll the elements of this narrative, however, rely on weak evidence – and there is strong evidence to counter most of them. This applies to the role of nuclear weapons in Russian military exercises. [\u003cem\u003eEditor’s note: in a longer commentary in the April–May issue of Survival, the author will also examine Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal and its nuclear doctrine.\u003c/em\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLooking for evidence\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExercises are important in understanding Russian nuclear posture, because, as the saying goes, Moscow trains as it fights and fights as it trains. So what do large-scale ones such as \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e (Western front) and \u003cem\u003eVostok\u003c/em\u003e (Eastern front) tell us?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhat they tell us is that the last time a \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e included nuclear use was almost 20 years ago, in 1999 – Russia was explicit about it – and that no known large-scale theatre military exercise has included nuclear-weapons use for at least a decade. This is unsurprising: Russia now ‘wins’ – or at least ‘resists’ – without nuclear weapons.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is often claimed that \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e 2009 included a nuclear strike against Europe: but this claim comes from a single source, a report by the Polish magazine \u003cem\u003eWprost\u003c/em\u003e. A cable reporting on a NATO debriefing of the exercise shows how the frequent confusion between ‘nuclear’ and ‘nuclear-capable’ permits speculation to be reported as fact. The US ambassador to NATO \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/BlJ7l/23112009-NATO-RUSSIA-NAC-DISCUSSES-RUSSIAN-MILITARY-EXERCISES\u0022\u003edescribed\u003c/a\u003e it as follows: ‘The exercise included … missile launches, some of which may have simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons’. However, as \u003ca href=\u0022https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf\u0022\u003equoted\u003c/a\u003e by a respectable expert, this became: ‘A Wikileaks document suggests that recent military exercises in the Baltic region and the Russian Far East involved simulated nuclear launches’.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRegarding \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e 2013, an in-depth analysis of the exercise co-published by the Jamestown Foundation – hardly known as a hotbed of Russia appeasers – \u003ca href=\u0022https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Zapad-2013-Full-online-final.pdf\u0022\u003econcludes\u003c/a\u003e that ‘the limited use of nuclear weapons was not simulated during \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e 2013’. Same for \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e 2017: a conservative US expert of Russian military issues \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/10/06/zapad-2017_a_major_russian_war_against_nato_again_112441.html\u0022\u003ewrites\u003c/a\u003e in a long analysis that, ‘Unlike the earlier \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e exercises, there was no indication that Russia was in a desperate situation when they initiated simulated nuclear strikes. Indeed, they had won’.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e a nuclear dimension overshadowing large-scale exercises such as \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003es. In 2017, for instance, RS-24 ICBM tests bracketed or bookended the exercise: one \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/10/06/zapad-2017_a_major_russian_war_against_nato_again_112441.html\u0022\u003etook place\u003c/a\u003e on 12 September (silo-based), two days before the exercise; another one happened on 20 September (mobile), its last day, although there was no indication that it was part of \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e. Also, a Northern Fleet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch \u003ca href=\u0022https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf\u0022\u003etook place\u003c/a\u003e during the defensive phase of \u003cem\u003eZapad\u003c/em\u003e 2017 (although an official Ukrainian statement – another source known not for disparaging Russian military threats – \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/news/2887.html\u0022\u003erefers to it\u003c/a\u003e as only an ‘electronic’ [sic] launch, i.e., a simulation). Nuclear exercises may thus be connected with, although separated from, recent\u003cem\u003e Zapad\u003c/em\u003es. (Autumn is generally the ‘season’ of Russian strategic nuclear forces readiness exercises.)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs an in-depth Swedish analysis of Russian exercises from 2011–14 \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.foi.se/reportsummary?reportNo=FOI-R--4128--SE\u0022\u003eput it\u003c/a\u003e, ‘nuclear forces often, but not always, trained in connection with annual strategic exercise or major surprise inspections’. If so, this suggests the obvious: Russia would see any conflict with the West as a potentially nuclear one, and Moscow would embark in nuclear signalling during the conflict.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact, when Russia uses dual-capable bombers such as the \u003cem\u003eTupolev\u003c/em\u003e-22M, observers often \u003cem\u003echoose\u003c/em\u003e to see a nuclear strike even though nothing indicates that this is the case. They are subject to confirmation bias. A long-distance strike against Sweden was simulated by such bombers in late March 2013. Its claim to fame stems from the fact that this was – bizarrely – \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf\u0022\u003ementioned\u003c/a\u003e as a ‘nuclear’ strike in a NATO Secretary General public report. But there is no evidence that this was the case. Sloppy drafting happens even in respectable organisations. Likewise, the dual-capable \u003cem\u003eIskander\u003c/em\u003e-M missile (whose nuclear ability has never been publicly acknowledged by Moscow) is often used in exercises – but short-range, conventional ballistic missiles have been a fixture of Russian theatre operations from Afghanistan to Georgia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eKeep it simple\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor observers who genuinely think that Russia has a low nuclear threshold and regularly practices theatre nuclear strikes, analysing its exercises can trigger cognitive dissonance: they can only reconcile the facts with their beliefs by choosing to see a nuclear strike, even though nothing indicates that this is the case.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis author remembers that in 2015, during a discussion with Western experts, an analyst confessed that having studied Russian large-scale exercises, he ‘could not understand’ why there seemed to be less and less emphasis on the nuclear dimension. Having unconsciously discarded the hypothesis that Russia was increasingly comfortable with its classical forces, he had forgotten the cardinal rule of research sometimes known as Ockham’s Razor: the simplest explanation is often the correct one.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo be sure, Moscow is deliberately ambiguous about the nature of the exercises of dual-capable forces it conducts: it does not say whether they are nuclear or conventional. It is probably a political strategy: Russia has seen that it makes us uncomfortable, and that it potentially complicates our thinking, our calculus and our planning. So Russia plays with it. As Olga Oliker, a prominent analyst of Russia, \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-doctrine\u0022\u003eputs it\u003c/a\u003e about nuclear arming the \u003cem\u003eIskander\u003c/em\u003e-M, ‘the Russians have realized that the prospect makes the United States and its NATO allies nervous’.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo reiterate the point, it would not make sense for Russia to hide a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons or a low nuclear threshold – because it knows that this is what scares us. Alternative explanations are unsatisfying: it is very dubious, for instance, that the absence of a nuclear element in recent exercises \u003ca href=\u0022https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Zapad-2013-Full-online-final.pdf\u0022\u003ereflects\u003c/a\u003e ‘concern over the unfavourable publicity’ that it would bring Moscow. (A possible explanation would be fear of pre-emption: but nothing indicates that this is the case.)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWorrying for the right reasons\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Oliker \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-doctrine\u0022\u003eputs it\u003c/a\u003e, ‘the evidence that Russia’s nuclear strategy is one of “de-escalation”, or that it has lowered its threshold for nuclear use, is far from convincing’. To be clear, this has no direct implications for the Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear posture: irrespective of what Russia’s nuclear policy is, NATO needs to have a credible deterrent. But the Russian nuclear threat narrative needs to be deconstructed. There are enough reasons to worry about Russia’s behaviour – from its reckless military provocations to its violations of arms control and disarmament treaties – to worry about its nuclear weapons for the wrong reasons.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKristen Ven Bruusgaard, another accomplished European analyst of Russian military affairs, \u003ca href=\u0022https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/\u0022\u003ehas it right\u003c/a\u003e: ‘The fixation with the alleged “lowered nuclear threshold” is a symptom of a larger challenge the West has not had to face for some time: a nuclear-armed adversary with mature capabilities and concepts designed to take advantage of Western weaknesses’.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_eDdKgcMUf0SZNcb2gRJXow"))});
Bruno Tertrais questions whether Russia is preparing to use theatre nuclear weapons and highlights the wider significance of its military exercises.
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