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\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia’s relationship with Myanmar – the only Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) country with which it shares a land border – is a significant foreign policy priority for the government of Narendra Modi.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eNew Delhi views the nation as a key part of its ‘Act East’ policy, which was announced by Modi during the 12th ASEAN–India Summit in Myanmar in 2014. India believes it can use Myanmar to strengthen trade links and increase engagement with the regional grouping – but sees Myanmar as a neighbour first, and an ASEAN member second. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eThe two countries have enjoyed growing bilateral high-level engagement recently, most notably when Modi visited Myanmar in September 2017, only the second bilateral prime ministerial visit by India to the country in 30 years. India’s foreign minister, deputy national security adviser and foreign secretary have all separately visited Myanmar in the last six months. State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi visited New Delhi in January 2018, one of ten ASEAN leaders who were the chief guests at India’s 2018 Republic Day parade.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022color: #000000; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003eBilateral security relations\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cbr style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022 /\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia’s foreign ministry has separate \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/divisions.htm\u0022\u003edivisions\u003c/a\u003e for ‘Bangladesh and Myanmar’ and ASEAN, which means the country’s diplomats deal with matters relating to its relations with Myanmar as a neighbour separately to those relating to Myanmar as an ASEAN state.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eSecurity and defence relations between the two countries focus primarily on border security and counter-terrorism. The first-ever \u003ca href=\u0022https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-myanmar-joint-military-exercise-to-begin-on-nov-20-in-meghalaya/articleshow/61703643.cms\u0022\u003eIndia–Myanmar Bilateral Military Exercise (IMBAX-2017)\u003c/a\u003e, took place over six days in November 2017, and focused on peacekeeping operations. India’s concerns over border security were emphasised in a June 2015 \u003ca href=\u0022https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-story-of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/\u0022\u003e‘surgical strike’\u003c/a\u003e in Myanmar by the Indian army’s special forces unit, which killed at least 60 insurgents from the Myanmar-based Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), in response to the killing of 18 Indian soldiers by the NSCN-K.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia also plays a role in Myanmar’s own internal peace process, acting as a signatory witness to Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ceremonies in \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/29482/official+spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+indias+presence+at+the+signing+of+national+ceasefire+agreement+in+myanmar\u0022\u003eFebruary 2018\u003c/a\u003e and October 2015. India hosted Myanmar’s top general for a week-long visit last July, during which he met Prime Minister Modi. India’s defence minister witnessed operations along the India-Myanmar border on \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1533930\u0022\u003e29 May\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eMaritime cooperation between the two countries has also gained importance, with the Indian and Myanmar navies conducting their \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/indian-navy-%E2%80%93-myanmar-navy-mn-bilateral-exercise\u0022\u003efirst-ever bilateral naval exercise\u003c/a\u003e, IMNEX-18, in March in the Bay of Bengal. The Myanmar navy also participated in the biennial, multilateral \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/milan-2018/page/0/1\u0022\u003e\u003cem\u003eMilan\u003c/em\u003e naval exercise\u003c/a\u003e off the coast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in early March.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIn 2017, the two countries signed an agreement to enhance \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28921/list+of+mousagreements+signed+during+state+visit+of+prime+minister+to+myanmar\u0022\u003emaritime security cooperation\u003c/a\u003e in areas such as humanitarian assistance. India is also developing \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28699/question+no1794+kaladan+project\u0022\u003eSittwe port\u003c/a\u003e in Myanmar’s Rakhine State and implementing the US$484m Kaladan transport project, which will connect Rakhine State with India’s northeastern state of Mizoram.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022color: #000000; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003eEconomic relations have an ASEAN-wide focus\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cbr style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022 /\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIn sharp contrast to these bilateral security and defence relations, India’s major economic and connectivity projects with Myanmar have an ASEAN-wide scope. India, Myanmar and Thailand are jointly developing a \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/29652/question+no2252+trilateral+highway\u0022\u003e1,360km highway\u003c/a\u003e – to be operational by \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hdV9E00I5CwSrKmSheAu6M/IndiaMyanmarThailand-Trilateral-Highway-by-2019-Nitin-Gad.html\u0022\u003eDecember 2019\u003c/a\u003e – designed to link the three countries and improve connectivity between India and ASEAN states. The highway may eventually be \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29535/IndiaVietnam+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+President+of+Vietnam+to+India+March+03+2018\u0022\u003eextended\u003c/a\u003e to connect India with Vietnam through Cambodia and Laos. India is also undertaking a US$77m rural connectivity project to \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/29543/question+no175+indoasean+summit\u0022\u003eprovide basic internet access to villages in Myanmar\u003c/a\u003e, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, a scheme that could be replicated in other ASEAN countries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia’s connectivity projects with Myanmar also include the \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/28229/question+no2423+road+projects+with+neighbouring+countries\u0022\u003eBangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor\u003c/a\u003e, currently under joint study. India and China \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1556973.shtml\u0022\u003eagreed\u003c/a\u003e to ‘speed up’ economic cooperation in the BCIM corridor during April’s informal summit between \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2018-2623/may-c4af/wuhan-summit-edges-india-and-china-towards-a-new-strategic-understanding-8c9a\u0022\u003eModi and China\u0027s President Xi in Wuhan\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eHowever, questions remain over whether the corridor will be implemented, with China insisting that it be a \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/09/c_137167483.htm\u0022\u003e‘key channel’\u003c/a\u003e of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and India \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/may/01/whispers-on-india-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-1808576.html\u0022\u003eemphasising\u003c/a\u003e that the BCIM predates the BRI. The BCIM corridor has not been mentioned in any Indian foreign ministry statement – not even in its account of the Modi–Xi summit – since \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/advanced-search-list.htm?keysrch\u0022\u003eJune 2017\u003c/a\u003e, shortly after India declined to attend China’s BRI summit.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022color: #000000; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003eIndia attempts to balance Myanmar and Bangladesh over Rohingya crisis \u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cbr style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022 /\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia aims to balance relations between two of its neighbours, majority Buddhist Myanmar and Muslim Bangladesh, which are strained by the fate of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Since August 2017 nearly \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/296-long-haul-ahead-myanmars-rohingya-refugee-crisis\u0022\u003e700,000 Rohingya Muslims\u003c/a\u003e – an ethnic category that is not recognised by the Myanmar government – have fled the Myanmar armed forces’ brutal military operations, causing a major humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Bangladesh. India views the Rohingya crisis from both a humanitarian and \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rohingya-issue-has-to-be-seen-from-security-angle-says-ram-madhav/article19729013.ece\u0022\u003esecurity perspective\u003c/a\u003e. Modi has said that India shares Myanmar’s concern of \u003ca href=\u0022https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-india/modi-says-india-shares-myanmars-concern-about-extremist-violence-idUKKCN1BH0L7?il=0\u0022\u003e‘extremist violence’\u003c/a\u003e in Rakhine State.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia – which talks of ‘displaced persons from Rakhine State’ in official statements, due to Myanmar’s sensitivities over the term Rohingya – underlined the need for the ‘\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29889/Visit+of+External+Affairs+Minister+to+Myanmar+May+1011+2018\u0022\u003esafe, speedy and sustainable\u003c/a\u003e’ return of the Rohingya refugees during the Indian foreign minister’s visit to Myanmar in mid-May. In December, India committed \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/29230/transcript+of+weekly+media+briefing+by+official+spokesperson+december+21+2017\u0022\u003eUS$25m of development assistance, to be transferred over five years\u003c/a\u003e, to help the ‘restoration of normalcy’ in Rakhine State, and the return of the Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. This followed the signing of an agreement between India and Myanmar for a \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29186/visit+of+foreign+secretary+of+india+to+myanmar+december+20+2017\u0022\u003edevelopment programme in Rakhine State\u003c/a\u003e. India is currently building pre-fabricated housing for refugees returning there.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia’s engagement with Bangladesh over the crisis has included two meetings between Modi and Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina since October 2017, and visits to Bangladesh by India’s foreign minister and foreign secretary. India has also provided \u003ca href=\u0022http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28944/Operation_Insaniyat__Humanitarian_assistance_to_Bangladesh_on_account_of_influx_of_refugees\u0022\u003erelief materials\u003c/a\u003e for refugees in Bangladesh including food and mosquito nets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022color: #000000; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003eChina’s increased engagement\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cbr style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022 /\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eThe crisis in Rakhine State takes place at a time of growing Chinese investment in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-island/floating-island-new-home-for-rohingya-refugees-emerges-in-bay-of-bengal-idUSKCN1G603T\u0022\u003eIts engineers\u003c/a\u003e are developing a 13km flood-defence embankment in the Bay of Bengal, as a temporary arrangement to ease the pressure on refugee camps in the Bangladesh city of Cox’s Bazaar.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eFollowing a visit to both Bangladesh and Myanmar in November 2017, China’s foreign minister outlined a \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1512592.shtml\u0022\u003ethree-phase proposal\u003c/a\u003e to address the crisis: firstly, a ceasefire should be implemented in Rakhine State; secondly, Bangladesh and Myanmar should be encouraged to strengthen communication; and finally, the region should be developed economically. In September, to help ‘restore peace and stability’, Beijing donated \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1096305.shtml\u0022\u003eUS$150,262\u003c/a\u003e to assist the development of Rakhine State. China is Myanmar’s largest trading partner and \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1492339.shtml\u0022\u003esupports\u003c/a\u003e its position on the Rohingya crisis, and alongside Russia has shielded Myanmar from strong action by the \u003ca href=\u0022https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-un/rohingya-refugees-tearfully-plead-for-u-n-security-council-help-idUKKBN1I00JV\u0022\u003eUN Security Council\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eA Chinese state-owned firm also has a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-myanmar-port/china-to-take-70-percent-stake-in-strategic-port-in-myanmar-official-idUSL4N1MS3UB\u0022\u003e70% stake\u003c/a\u003e in the building of a US$7.3bn deep-sea port and \u003ca href=\u0022https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/\u0022\u003eUS$2.7bn\u003c/a\u003e special economic zone in Rakhine State as part of the BRI. This port project will provide an entry point for a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-china-oil/beset-by-delays-myanmar-china-oil-pipeline-nears-start-up-idUSKBN16S0XF\u0022\u003eUS$1.5bn oil and gas pipeline\u003c/a\u003e between Kyaukpyu and Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province. China and Myanmar have also agreed to develop an \u003ca href=\u0022https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Myanmar-and-China-to-cooperate-on-economic-corridor?page=1\u0022\u003eeconomic corridor\u003c/a\u003e between Kunming and Kyaukpyu, also as part of the BRI. Across the border, China has agreed to provide Bangladesh with \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/en/research/south-s-asia-s-security/bangladesh-economy-7e54\u0022\u003eUS$22bn\u003c/a\u003e of assistance until 2024.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022color: #000000; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003eCan India and China work together to help resolve the Rohingya crisis?\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cbr style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022 /\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia’s attempts to balance relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh amid growing Chinese influence in both countries is a key challenge for its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. Both India and China will have a keen interest in a special session at the \u003ca href=\u0022https://go.iiss.org/SLD18\u0022\u003eIISS Shangri-La Dialogue\u003c/a\u003e, Asia’s premier security summit, titled ‘The Security and Humanitarian Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’. Senior officials from Myanmar and Bangladesh will join the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and an official from the European Union External Action Service to discuss how to resolve the crisis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #000000;\u0022\u003eIndia and China both pledged closer cooperation following their informal summit in Wuhan earlier this year. The likely prospect is that India and China will pursue their separate approaches to the security and humanitarian situation in Rakhine State. These may bear similarities and could possibly lead to narrow convergences – as highlighted through their recent informal summit. However, it is unlikely that such convergences will outweigh the overall uneasiness between India and China.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003c/div\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_7EdCcpT880yXS1CT09WLvg"))});
\u003cp\u003eIndia has a deepening bilateral security relationship with Myanmar, and is taking steps to help address the crisis in Rakhine State. But Chinese influence in Myanmar is growing - and meaningful cooperation between Beiijing and New Delhi remains unlikely. \u003c/p\u003e
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