\u003cp\u003eOne of the monikers that Mr James Mattis, the US Secretary of Defence, has been slapped with is that of \u0022warrior monk\u0022 - a suitable epithet for a cerebral general who is also a legend in the fabled United States Marine Corps.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOne of General Mattis\u0027 famous quotes could well apply to his plenary speech at the 17th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue over the weekend: \u0022Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.\u0022\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn China, the Secretary was bold, but balanced. He said that Washington would cooperate with China \u0022wherever possible\u0022, and support China\u0027s choices in the region if it supported long-term peace and prosperity in the region.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut Mr Mattis also took on a colder and harder tone: China\u0027s militarisation of the South China Sea with electronic jammers, anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles was tied to Beijing\u0027s strategy to use military assets for \u0022purposes of intimidation and coercion\u0022.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHis comments drew a sharp retort from Lieutenant-General He Lei, the head of China\u0027s delegation to the security summit. Still, the force of the Sino-US exchange was blunted by the fact that the two men spoke at different times and at different locations during the dialogue.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMany issues were also discussed, ranging from the Rakhine situation in Myanmar, cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the need for coordination in the fight against terrorism.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAnd given that the dialogue occurred 10 days before the historic Trump-Kim summit, the US, Japan and South Korea were unanimous in stressing their desire for CVID - complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation - of North Korea\u0027s nuclear arsenals. The finer point was that the Japanese and South Korean defence ministers took different perspectives on how to achieve CVID.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDrawing on feedback from participants, Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore\u0027s defence minister, told reporters that the 17th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was \u0022one of the best\u0022. The statistics say it all - 561 delegates from 51 different countries attended, with a record number of defence ministers showing up, 13 of whom spoke in the bigger-scale plenary sessions. By far, the biggest theme to emerge was the discussion on the so-called Indo-Pacific strategy. A concept first raised by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the mid-2000s, the strategy seeks to link two vast oceans - the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean - and mould them under the overarching principles of rule of law, maritime security and shared prosperity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDelivering the keynote last Friday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put South-east Asia and Asean at the centre of the Indo-Pacific, and said that the grouping\u0027s unity was critical to regional security.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEchoing Mr Abe and former US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, who had spoken at the Dialogue in years past, Mr Modi said that all nations should have equal access to maritime and air spaces, and called for regional disputes to be settled under international law.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eThe Quad\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMr Modi has received some flak, particularly from the US, for not taking a harder line at a time when China\u0027s regional behaviour is becoming increasingly assertive. In particular, his focus on Asean centrality, and clear avoidance of the term \u0022Quad\u0022 (a term referring to the loose grouping of Australia, Japan, India and the US, which has drawn much derision from Beijing) was singled out.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThat said, however, Mr Modi\u0027s approach is sublime. For one, Asean member states are already concerned with the dilution of the grouping\u0027s centrality; an over-emphasis on the Quad would have stoked these fears.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition, avoidance of the term Quad enables India - and its other like-minded Quad partners - to fly under China\u0027s radar. Answering a question as to why the Quad was not mentioned, Mr Mattis replied, quite cheekily, that he had planned to use it in his seven-hour speech, only to cut the term out in order to trim down his delivery.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGoing forward, the Quad faces two challenges - offering a credible alternative to countries saddled with massive debt arising from their participation in China\u0027s Belt and Road Initiative as well as deterring China\u0027s militarisation of the South China Sea.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn the latter, Lt-Gen He spoke up resolutely against Mr Mattis\u0027 comments on the South China Sea, trotting out well-worn rationale to explain China\u0027s build-up in the area. Speaking over 12 minutes in a smaller-scale special session on military capability developments in the Asia-Pacific, he insisted it was entirely within China\u0027s rights to deploy military assets there, for national defence and to pre-empt invasion.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eFONOP exercises\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLt-Gen He\u0027s comments belie the fact that China, despite its inherent advantages of having heavily-fortified bastions in the South China Sea, faces pressure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Trump administration has conducted seven so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (Fonops) in the South China Sea since January last year. The most recent one in May was the first-ever Fonop involving two US Navy warships.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUS-style Fonops are in essence highly-technical legal instruments meant to challenge what Washington deems to be excessive maritime claims. They are not meant simply as displays of deterrence and military strength.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the past year, however, many countries - such as Australia, France, Japan and the UK - have stepped up what are called freedom of navigation-related patrols, which are exercises of high seas freedoms to strengthen the rule of law at sea.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSpeaking at the Dialogue, the French and British defence ministers announced that their countries would send their naval ships through the South China Sea this week to assert the shared right to freedom of navigation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt was regrettable that China was represented at a similar level as last year. Lt-Gen He is the vice-president of China\u0027s Academy of Military Science. In the 12 years between 2007 and last year, China\u0027s delegation was represented at the deputy chief of general (or joint) staff level eight times.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eStrategic bargaining\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThat said, if Sino-American relations are the bellwether of the regional temperature, it could well be said that Sino-American interactions, though gut-wrenching in recent months, could well pave the way for a stabler regional order.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProfessor Thomas Schelling, the late Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, said that strategic bargaining or coordination would typically lead two parties to come to a \u0022resting place\u0022 where their expectations converge. Under this rubric, one could see a quid pro quo emerging on three fronts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf China stops further militarisation of the South China Sea, the US and its allies would stop Fonops and other freedom of navigation-related activities.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChina has endorsed North Korea\u0027s \u0022phased and synchronous\u0022 - or gradual, action-for-action - process to achieve denuclearisation. The Trump administration, on the other hand, prefers a quicker process, with a timetable of between six months and a year. A quid pro quo would essentially split the difference.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLastly, the current Sino-American trade sanctions spat could be resolved if both sides met each other halfway and seek ways to enhance trade instead.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the Dialogue, Professor François Heisbourg , the chair of the IISS Council, noted that Secretary Mattis had at the 2017 Dialogue asked America\u0027s allies to \u0022bear with us\u0022 as the Trump administration found its footing. Asked Prof Heisbourg: \u0022How are you (Mattis) bearing up?\u0022\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHis reply: \u0022I hate it when someone quotes me from the year before… I\u0027m doing just fine, thank you. No problem.\u0022\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf the US and China manage to arrive at the quid pro quos, Secretary Mattis\u0027 answer will be pretty much spot-on. If not, one should expect more turbulence at next year\u0027s Dialogue.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThis article first appeared in \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/sparring-over-the-indo-pacific\u0022\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/sparring-over-the-indo-pacific\u0022\u003eThe Straits Times\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_cThZM8nP7EWx2NsJvNKHCw"))});
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"abstract-text\" style=\"color: #484848;\"\u003eAt the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue,\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\"color: #484848;\"\u003eJames Mattis and Narendra Modi\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;set the direction of regional security and relations with China.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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