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\u003cp\u003eSince President Donald Trump took office in 2017, the United States has significantly expanded the use of airstrikes in counter-terrorism operations. While continuing an Obama-era policy, Trump has loosened restrictions that his predecessor put in place. This relaxing of the rules of engagement is \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/2017-a-record-year-for-us-counterterrorism-strikes.php\u0022\u003eaffecting operations across the board\u003c/a\u003e, from Afghanistan and Libya, to Pakistan and Yemen. In \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/2017-a-record-year-for-us-counterterrorism-strikes.php\u0022\u003e2017\u003c/a\u003e, the US conducted more airstrikes in Somalia than the previous eight years combined.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnder the framework set out by former president Barack Obama, called the \u003ca href=\u0022https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism\u0022\u003ePresidential Policy Guidance\u003c/a\u003e (PPG), use of lethal force outside of areas of active hostilities was only legal if the target was a ‘\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-trump-ponders-changes-lethal-force-policy-constraints-what-you-need-know\u0022\u003econtinuing and imminent threat\u003c/a\u003e’ to the US and if there was ‘near certainty’ of no civilian casualties. Action required \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-trump-ponders-changes-lethal-force-policy-constraints-what-you-need-know\u0022\u003ehigh-level\u003c/a\u003e White House approval. Areas outside of active hostilities mean those beyond active US battlegrounds, which included Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are seen as areas of active hostilities for US forces. In practice, this policy was interpreted \u003ca href=\u0022https://lawfareblog.com/areas-active-hostilities-and-authority-authorize-attacks-without-white-house-involvement\u0022\u003eflexibly\u003c/a\u003e, but it did impose important constraints on the use of lethal targeted force.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eEscalation of airstrikes in the Horn of Africa\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html\u0022\u003eTrump administration\u003c/a\u003e has adopted its own rules of engagement known as the Principles, Standards, and Procedures (PSP). It makes two key policy changes. First, it lifts constraints requiring proof that a target is an ‘imminent threat’ and thus allows for attacks on a broader range of terrorist targets, including junior-level militants. Second, it \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html\u0022\u003erelaxes\u003c/a\u003e approval constraints on US field commanders and weakens high-level vetting requirements. The consequence of these shifts is an \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-12-19/counterrorism-strikes-double-trump-first-year\u0022\u003eincreased\u003c/a\u003e use of targeted airstrikes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUS \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/defense-secretary-mattis-to-meet-with-sen-mccain-after-subpoena-threat-over-niger-attack/2017/10/20/7a4a12de-b5bf-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.1a73f9f6c05a\u0022\u003eDefense Secretary James Mattis\u003c/a\u003e, in an October 2017 briefing to members of the Armed Services Committee, underscored that commanders in the field now have greater decision-making authority and latitude to deploy lethal force against suspected terrorists. Notably, Mattis placed a greater emphasis on Africa as a counter-terrorism theatre, suggesting a more aggressive counter-terrorism effort on the continent.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, is a striking example of this shift in strategy. In 2017, the US carried out \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-2017\u0022\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e confirmed strikes using a combination of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and piloted aircraft – with up to \u003ca href=\u0022http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/12/14/strategic-gridlock-in-americas-second-somalia-war/\u0022\u003eseven\u003c/a\u003e strikes within a single week. In the first six months of 2018, \u003ca href=\u0022https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=0\u0022\u003e16 strikes were confirmed\u003c/a\u003e, compared to \u003ca href=\u0022https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=54581062\u0022\u003e14 strikes\u003c/a\u003e in 2016 and \u003ca href=\u0022https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=54581062\u0022\u003e11 strikes\u003c/a\u003e in 2015. President Trump’s March 2017 \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.html\u0022\u003edirective\u003c/a\u003e declaring Somalia as an area of active hostility expanded the scope for military strikes. The \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.html\u0022\u003ePentagon\u003c/a\u003e, however, does not publicly acknowledge all strikes and operations in the country, making it difficult to know \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/2017-a-record-year-for-us-counterterrorism-strikes.php\u0022\u003eexact numbers\u003c/a\u003e. Reports suggest that there are around \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/19/troops-somalia-military-buildup-247668\u0022\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e US troops on the ground, although there is no confirmed figure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ciframe class=\u0022highcharts-iframe\u0022 src=\u0022https://cloud.highcharts.com/embed/B1XVucCW7/\u0022 style=\u0022border: 0; width: 620px; height: 418px;\u0022\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=54581062\u0022\u003eSource\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eUS counter-terrorism strategy in the region\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe US has a longstanding counter-terrorism presence in Somalia focused on rooting out al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group that poses a serious threat to the country’s weak central government. The Pentagon has stated that denying al-Shabaab a ‘\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1135338/\u0022\u003esafe haven\u003c/a\u003e’ is critical to mitigating potential attacks against the US or its citizens. The stability of Somalia and the region also affects US economic and energy interests, as the neighbouring Bab-el Mandeb Strait is a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/bab-elmandeb-strait\u0022\u003ecritical chokepoint\u003c/a\u003e for international energy flows and trade.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is also a threat in Somalia, and in \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/11/us-targets-islamic-state-loyal-fighters-in-somalia-with-airstrike.php\u0022\u003eNovember 2017\u003c/a\u003e the US launched its first airstrike against the group in the country. The US counter-terrorism strategy also relies on US special operations forces to \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/06/12/mattis-despite-recent-kias-in-africa-us-troops-arent-there-for-combat/\u0022\u003etrain and advise\u003c/a\u003e the Somali military in joint operations with African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, the high price of having US troops on the ground was demonstrated again in early June 2018, when a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/09/us-soldier-killed-four-wounded-somalia\u0022\u003especial operations soldier\u003c/a\u003e was killed by al-Shabaab. Airstrikes provide an alternative to a comprehensive ground-troop deployment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eConcerns around airstrikes\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere are reports of increasing \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/somali-citizens-count-cost-of-surge-in-us-airstrikes-under-trump\u0022\u003ecivilian casualties\u003c/a\u003e resulting from airstrikes, and \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/23/somalia-attack-wake-call-west\u0022\u003ehuman-rights\u003c/a\u003e groups have warned of the serious consequences for the local population. Some see President Trump’s strategy as favouring a military response over diplomatic approaches. A diplomat with the US Mission to Somalia resigned in \u003ca href=\u0022http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/09/u-s-diplomat-resigns-warning-of-state-departments-diminished-role-diplomacy-national-security-tillerson-africa-somalia-south-sudan/\u0022\u003eNovember 2017\u003c/a\u003e due to what she saw as the United States’ failure to ‘\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.daljir.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Shackelford_resignation-letter_Nov-2017.pdf\u0022\u003edemonstrate a commitment to promoting human rights and democracy\u003c/a\u003e’ and ‘ceding’ to the military the authority to drive policy. Since the previous US ambassador to the country stepped down in \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.voanews.com/a/us-ambassador-to-somalia-resigns/4060081.html\u0022\u003eOctober 2017\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, \u003c/span\u003ethe position has been left \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-military-escalation-in-somalia-is-spurring-hope-and-fear\u0022\u003eunfilled\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite these concerns, the shift in policy and the clear preference by the Trump administration for a more aggressive approach to counter-terrorism will likely mean a continuation of escalated airstrikes in theatres such as Somalia in the short to medium term.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/africa/commandos-africa-pivot-major-powers.html\u0022\u003ePentagon’s review\u003c/a\u003e of special operations deployments to meet the rising threats from Russia and China may see a significant cut in forces in Africa. As a result, the US military may rely on airstrikes to make up for the gap in force numbers in its counter-terrorism operations.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_LceE3f378UqPeReaF4fRTA"))});
US airstrikes in Somalia have significantly increased as a result of looser restrictions on the use of lethal force. Will these become an alternative for boots on the ground?
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