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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUnited States Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis visited Beijing at the end of June for his first meeting with Chinese State Councillor and Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe. He was also granted an audience with Chinese President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping. At a welcoming ceremony Wei pronounced that the visit would help ease tension and promote mutual trust. But later Xi told Mattis that China\u0026rsquo;s attitude is \u0026lsquo;firm and clear in terms of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, that we would not lose a single inch of the lands we inherited from our ancestors, while we would not take a single penny of others\u0026rsquo; possessions\u0026rsquo;. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMattis had suggested he would be seeking \u0026lsquo;open dialogue\u0026rsquo; \u0026ndash; he subsequently invited Wei to make his first visit to Washington. Earlier in the week, a Chinese defence spokesman said Beijing hoped China and the US could \u0026lsquo;meet each other halfway and work together to make the bilateral military relations an important stabilising factor for relations between the two countries\u0026rsquo;. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis may be the case. Mattis\u0026rsquo; visit, the first by a US Secretary of Defense in four years, marks a resumption in high-level dialogue at a time of increasing tension between the countries. Defence relations have tended to be the most strained aspect of the bilateral relationship in recent years. But, as a trade war unfolds and the countries\u0026rsquo; strategic and economic dialogue appears to have stalled, the defence relationship has taken centre stage. Comments by Mattis and People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army (PLA) officers at the recent IISS Shangri-La Dialogue \u0026ndash; Asia\u0026rsquo;s leading security summit \u0026ndash; shed light on the likely shape of discussions in Beijing.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMattis warns against militarisation of South China Sea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMattis and Wei will have held stark conversations about the South China Sea, where China has deployed anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers and H6K strategic bombers in recent months. The initial US response, Mattis told the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue on 2 June, was to rescind the Chinese navy\u0026rsquo;s invitation to the Rim of the Pacific exercise. Mattis also revealed his intent to travel to Beijing at China\u0026rsquo;s invitation in pursuit of \u0026lsquo;a constructive, results-oriented relationship\u0026rsquo;, seeking \u0026lsquo;cooperation whenever possible\u0026rsquo;. But he did not beat about the bush: he said that China\u0026rsquo;s policy in the South China Sea stood in stark contrast to the pursuit of openness driving US strategy, and called into question China\u0026rsquo;s broader goals. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn Beijing, Mattis\u0026rsquo; message to Wei will likely have been simple: the US is ready to welcome Chinese cooperative behaviour, but further militarisation will have consequences. Mattis\u0026rsquo; options are limited but could involve further freedom of navigation operations and shows of force, both on and in the skies above the South China Sea. But the scope of any escalation could widen to pull in other contentious issues such as the status of Taiwan. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere has been speculation that the recent Kim\u0026ndash;Trump summit could have opened the door for military trade-offs between the US and China, in light of Trump\u0026rsquo;s offer to cancel US\u0026ndash;South Korea joint military exercises. However, Mattis made it very clear at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that any discussion of the US troop presence in Korea is a matter for South Korea and the US, and is distinct and separate from negotiations with North Korea.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCycle of mistrust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe Chinese delegation leader at the dialogue made statements about the South China Sea that did not inspire any confidence that China was prepared to \u0026lsquo;meet halfway\u0026rsquo;. In response to Mattis\u0026rsquo; comments, Lieutenant General He Lei said China\u0026rsquo;s deployment of defensive facilities on islands in the South China Sea was \u0026lsquo;legitimate and necessary\u0026rsquo; and that US freedom of navigation operations were in fact the source of militarisation there. Unfortunately, the Chinese delegation\u0026rsquo;s comments were met with incredulity by many delegates, especially the assertion by the PLA that the South China Sea had \u0026lsquo;calmed down visibly\u0026rsquo; as a result of efforts by China and ASEAN.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn the months ahead the US will inevitably conduct further freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These may serve as the trigger, in Beijing\u0026rsquo;s narrative, for China to deploy fighter jets and bombers on its new bases on the Spratly Islands at the centre of the sea. As action-reaction dynamics in the South China Sea fuel mistrust between US and China, and as Beijing continues to saturate the region with naval and maritime paramilitary forces, Mattis will have underlined to Wei the need for adherence to protocols such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChina steps up pressure on Taiwan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile the South China Sea will have been a key focus of discussions for Wei and Mattis, an intentional show of force by China near Taiwan, another long-standing core concern for Beijing, overshadowed the American\u0026rsquo;s visit. On 27 June the Global Times reported that PLA Eastern Theatre Command had been conducting combat exercises involving guided missile destroyers and the PLA Air Force in and around Taiwan since 17 June. The Chinese fleet, according to reports by the Global Times, had operated within Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s air defence identification zone, remaining there for a week. This was the PLA Navy\u0026rsquo;s second island encirclement exercise in a month.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUntil two years ago, Beijing\u0026rsquo;s strategy towards Taiwan was to bind its economy to that of mainland China so inextricably that the Taiwanese independence movement would fade into irrelevance. The election of incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 exposed serious failings in this approach. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEight-year thaw brought no military breakthroughs\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe current cross-strait predicament is in stark contrast to the rapprochement that took place during Ma Ying-jeou\u0026rsquo;s 2008\u0026ndash;16 tenure, when economic integration created unprecedented engagement between Taiwan and the mainland. Underpinning this was the mutually agreed adherence to the \u0026lsquo;1992 consensus\u0026rsquo; between the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s Kuomintang Party that there is only \u0026lsquo;one China\u0026rsquo;. Remarkably, this rapprochement occurred during a time when the PLA modernised extremely rapidly and continued to build up its missile arsenal directed at Taiwan.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDespite reaping the benefits of cross-strait trade and investment, neither side embarked on military confidence-building measures. The US, under the auspices of the Taiwan Relations Act, has continued to provide Taiwan with arms that it deemed sufficient to offer a credible deterrent against any aggression by the PLA. However, many analysts believe Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s defensive capability seriously atrophied during the period in question, tipping the cross-strait military balance in favour of China. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAs China\u0026ndash;US tensions continue to rise, the US could offer more expansive and sophisticated arms sales to Taiwan or more visible military interactions with the island. Playing the Taiwan card has generated immediate vitriol from Beijing \u0026ndash; especially when rumours circulated in June that US National Security Adviser John Bolton would pay a visit to Taiwan to attend the opening of the new \u003cem\u003ede facto\u003c/em\u003e US embassy in the country, the American Institute in Taiwan.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eXi bids to isolate Taiwan, show of force possible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eApproaching the mid-point of President Tsai Ing-wen\u0026rsquo;s administration, the future of relations with mainland China has come under increased scrutiny. Beijing, deeply suspicious of Tsai and mindful of the Taiwanese electorate\u0026rsquo;s drift away from support for eventual reunification with the mainland, has intensified a campaign of political pressure on the country. Its first move was to shut down the formal links for cross-strait dialogue. After cutting off dialogue, China has renewed its campaign to reduce the number of remaining countries that officially recognise Taiwan, complicating Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s international affairs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMeanwhile, China has launched a political influence and interference campaign courting the opposition to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. There is a danger of a new cross-strait crisis, driven by intensified nationalism in mainland China. Many believe that with Xi Jinping\u0026rsquo;s concentration of power in China, he may become emboldened to use a show of force to demonstrate that China will not tolerate Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s inexorable drift away from unification with China. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDuring China\u0026rsquo;s National People\u0026rsquo;s Congress in March, Xi warned Taiwan that \u0026lsquo;any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to failure and will meet with the people\u0026rsquo;s condemnation and the punishment of history\u0026rsquo;. The recent exercises by China around Taiwan are quite possibly a prelude to further escalation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_GWpAs80y0kqA85x8pbXfjQ"))});
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA high-profile US–China meeting offers grounds for optimism, but both countries remain critical of the other’s goals and behaviour in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, an emboldened Xi Jinping has moved to increase political and military pressure on Taiwan.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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