|
\u003cp\u003eAfter a near two-decade hiatus, the Russian Navy has again \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGdqhDviCHc\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ecommissioned\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e a fully-fledged blue-water surface combatant. The \u003cem\u003eAdmiral Gorshkov,\u003c/em\u003e commissioned on 28 July, is the first of six Project 22350 frigates to be built by Severnaya Verf. Originally due to be delivered in 2009, the \u003cem\u003eGorshkov\u003c/em\u003e was to be the first in a class of 20.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe story overall is a far from happy one. Funding delays, technical problems and the conflict with Ukraine have since beset the programme. \u003ca href=\u0022https://iz.ru/news/500810\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eErratic financing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e and a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://iz.ru/news/540466\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eone-year funding gap\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e (2011–12), in particular, pushed construction deadlines to the right and caused costs overruns amounting to perhaps more than double the original estimates.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems problems\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe development and delivery of the A-192M \u003cem\u003eArmat \u003c/em\u003enaval gun and the accompanying 5P-10 \u003cem\u003ePuma\u003c/em\u003e fire-control radar took longer than expected, making subsequent design and system revisions difficult. The development of a new air-defence system, 3K96-2 \u003cem\u003ePoliment-Redut\u003c/em\u003e (SA-N-X-28), has taken much longer than expected and even now may not be entirely functional. Indeed, delays with \u003cem\u003ePoliment-Redut\u003c/em\u003e may have been a consideration in the firing of the head of Almaz-Antey \u003ca href=\u0022https://iz.ru/news/626730\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ein 2016\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe frigate class was planned to be powered by the \u003ca href=\u0022http://www.turborus.com/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eM55R\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e combined diesel and gas power plant, consisting of two Russian 10D49 diesel engines, provided by Kolomensky Zavod, and two Ukrainian–Russian M90FR gas-turbine engines, built by Zorya-Mashproekt and NPO Saturn.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Ukraine embargoed Russia in 2014, only the power plants for the first two ships had been delivered. A fire on board first of class \u003cem\u003eAdmiral Gorshkov\u003c/em\u003e in \u003ca href=\u0022https://flotprom.ru/2015/181758/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003elate 2014\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e meant that it had to take the engines of the second of class, causing significant delays to both vessels. Russian company NPO Saturn has since \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://flotprom.ru/2016/%D0%9E%D1%81%D0%BA5/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ebeen tasked\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e with building Russian copies of the M90FRs. Should this take longer than planned, the Russian Navy can expect further delays, as well as maintenance and spare-parts problems, for the \u003cem\u003eAdmiral Gorshkov\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eRussia’s naval strategy\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe ‘Shipbuilding Industry Development Strategy for the Period up to 2035’, published by Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade in July 2018, advocated the construction of ‘multipurpose and strategic nuclear submarines’ and small littoral ships as part of a ‘\u003ca href=\u0022http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/docs/#!strategiya_razvitiya_sudostroitelnoy_promyshlennosti_na_period_do_2035_goda\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003emosquito fleet\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’. This is in contrast to the naval strategy document signed by President Vladimir Putin a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20(1).pdf?sr=b\u0026amp;si=DNNFileManagerPolicy\u0026amp;sig=i110Z1rxZVzKbB%2BdHJ1CZuTxvwL3N7W34%2FLpksgT1Bs%3D\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eyear before\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that spoke of global operations and fielding the ‘second most combat capable’ navy in the world.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe scaling back of ambitions suggested in the 2018 document will make uncomfortable reading for many Russians. And there is a question over the extent to which Moscow can achieve its strategic objectives with a ‘mosquito fleet’. Although Russia has had trouble with larger shipbuilding programmes, it has had more success with corvettes, missile boats and conventional submarines, many of which are armed with the \u003cem\u003eKalibr\u003c/em\u003e-NK/PL (SS-N-27/SS-N-30) family of missiles. First used in combat in October 2015, from a corvette in the Caspian Sea, the 2,000km+ 3M14 (SS-N-30A) \u003cem\u003eKalibr\u003c/em\u003e cruise missile allows small platforms to make significant contributions to operations in Russia’s ‘near seas’.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_pbaUnbjGVEuCGtRJjCYPvg"))});
After decades of delays, Russia\u0026rsquo;s latest frigate has finally arrived. But the Russian Navy may be changing its course into the future.
|
