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\u003cp\u003eThe pace of development of China\u0026rsquo;s People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has attracted global attention. Meanwhile, one particular target of PLAN planning, Taiwan, is struggling in its efforts to find counters to its neighbour\u0026rsquo;s growing capabilities, particularly its ambition to recapitalise its small flotilla of submarines.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTaiwan enjoys the dubious distinction of possessing the world\u0026rsquo;s oldest operational submarines, two ex-US\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eGuppy\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;II-class boats that now form the\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eHai Shih\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;class. These entered Taiwanese service in the 1970s (having originally been laid down in the Second World War). Its youngest submarines, two\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eHai Lung\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;boats, modified Dutch\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eZwaardis\u003c/em\u003e-class submarines, were introduced in the late 1980s. While the latter are not yet obsolete, even these require replacing in the next five to ten years.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGiven these entry-into-service dates, Taipei\u0026rsquo;s need to begin soon to replace its four diesel-electric submarines is all too clear. What is less so is exactly how it goes about doing it.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eIndigenous Defense Submarine programme: ambitions and challenges\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTaipei\u0026rsquo;s Indigenous Defense Submarine programme is meant to meet this requirement. But, while the ambition is admirable, whether the country has the cash or the capacity to support a genuinely indigenous programme remains to be seen. The country has been forced to look at a national programme in no small part because its ability to access Western submarine designs has been constrained by indirect political pressure from Beijing.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe United States has in the past either turned down or, in the case of the George W Bush administration, failed to deliver on submarine requests from Taiwan. The submarine programme is also part of a broader project to further develop the country\u0026rsquo;s defence-industrial base.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn 2014, in her role as Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, now President Tsai Ing-wen approved a strategy to develop Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s defence industry, including development of an indigenous submarine. The first of eight domestically built, diesel-electric-powered attack submarines (SSKs) was to be completed in eight years and commissioned into service in a decade. But there are multiple hurdles to achieving this.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe broader plan to develop Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s defence-industrial base was allocated NT$85.7 billion (US$2.8bn). The design phase for the submarines, projected to last between 2016 and 2020, was expected to cost altogether NT$2.99bn (US$100 million) (see Table 1).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\u0022highlight_panel\u0022\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022font-size: 16px;\u0022\u003eTable 1. Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s Indigenous Submarine Programme: design-phase costs \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCost\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNT$\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUS$\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003eTotal costs of first design phase (2016\u0026ndash;2020)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e2.99bn\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e100m\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003eFirst design-phase costs in 2018\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e576m\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\u0022text-align: center;\u0022\u003e19m\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\u00223\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022font-size: 10px;\u0022\u003e\u0026nbsp;Source: Taiwan FY2018 budget,\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1\u0022\u003ewww.dgbas.gov.tw\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire programme, however, would likely require a significant increase in Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s defence budget. The government announced recently that it would\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/08/07/2003698098\u0022\u003eincrease its defence spending up to NT$346bn\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;(US$11.3bn) for 2019. But while Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s military-procurement spending in recent years has been just under US$3bn per year, it has been estimated that the first four submarines alone could\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-worst-fear-can-america-turn-taiwan-submarine-power-25374\u0022\u003ecost up to US$5bn\u003c/a\u003e. This could absorb a large part of Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s annual procurement expenditure, leaving little for the other programmes, such as indigenous trainer aircraft.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to budgetary issues, there also appear to be gaps in Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s maritime defence-industrial base. According to the\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance-plus\u0022\u003eMilitary Balance+\u003c/a\u003e, of the 38 categories of vessel that the Taiwanese armed forces currently operate, 23 are from Taiwanese designs. But, of these, none are major combat ships, such as frigates or destroyers.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a domestic frigate programme, and the stealthy\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eTuo Jiang\u003c/em\u003e-class catamaran missile corvette, the first of which was commissioned in 2014. However, there have been reports of design problems with the latter. Added to that, submarine design and manufacture require different, and in some ways even more demanding, skill sets. And, despite research activities in this field since at least 2002, Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s defence industry reportedly has gaps in\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/04/07/taiwan-struggles-to-acquire-5-types-of-submarine-tech-for-local-program/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003efive key technological areas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. While there has been much speculation as to what these could be, the focus is on: propulsion (diesel-electric and/or air-independent propulsion); combat-management systems; weapons; sensors; and acoustic suppression.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact, the capacity to successfully design and construct a modern SSK, as opposed to building a foreign origin design under licence, is one that only a handful of countries can currently claim. The path to membership of this exclusive group is not an easy one, nor one that can seemingly be followed \u0026ndash; or necessarily even maintained \u0026ndash; entirely alone.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eThe South Korea\u0026nbsp;KSS route\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSouth Korea\u0026rsquo;s three-stage KSS programme provides a contemporary roadmap \u0026ndash; albeit over a\u0026nbsp;journey of some three decades\u0026nbsp;\u0026ndash; as to how this may be achieved. Although South Korea has an established commercial shipbuilding industry, it had previously only produced and operated midget submarines. In 1987 it struck a deal with then West Germany\u0026rsquo;s Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) for the\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eChang Bogo\u003c/em\u003e-class SSK (Type-209/1200 variant). All but the first of nine boats were locally assembled.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe second stage (KSS-II) was the construction of a later HDW design, the Type-214, with all nine boats split between shipyards of Daewoo (DSME) and Hyundai (HHI) in South Korea and only key parts supplied from Germany. The last of these boats was launched in 2017. The country\u0026rsquo;s growing expertise in this field has led to an increasingly domestic product, which it could then build for export. The first two of three submarines for Indonesia have been handed over by South Korea (with a third to be built \u0026ndash; with significant external assistance \u0026ndash; in Indonesia). This led to the final stage (KSS-III) \u0026ndash; a follow-on indigenous design, with three of these advanced boats under construction at shipyards in South Korea.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSouth Korea\u0026rsquo;s decades-long\u0026nbsp;effort to develop a national capability underscores the difficulties in building domestic submarines, and the need for substantial foreign support during the process. For Taiwan, given Chinese threats against potential suppliers, the US appears to be the most likely partner, despite the previous failed negotiations. The current US administration appears more willing to accommodate Taiwan, regardless of Beijing. In June 2017, Washington approved the\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-tecro-united-states-mk-48-mod\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003esupply and integration of Mk.48 heavy torpedoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;into Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s existing Dutch-built submarines, having previously agreed to include UGM-84L\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eHarpoon\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;anti-ship missiles. Then, in April 2018, alongside a policy shift aiming at increasing arms exports, the Trump administration\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/04/09/us-state-department-oks-license-for-submarine-tech-sales-to-taiwan/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003egranted the marketing licence required to begin to explore the sale of submarine technology to Taiwan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. While the US remains the most likely lead partner, it is probable that in areas such as propulsion additional foreign partners will be sought. In which case, Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s indigenous submarine programme might follow other countries\u0026rsquo; pathways and become a not-so indigenous development.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the \u003ca href=\u0022http://go.iiss.org/2gnVMys\u0022\u003eIISS Military Balance+\u003c/a\u003e, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_0fLKseLc10K0dQ90s6rBTA"))});
Taiwan has renewed efforts to recapitalise its submarine fleet. But pressure from China on potential partners could make finding the foreign support it needs difficult.
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