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\u003cp\u003eOn 12 August the five states surrounding the Caspian Sea – Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan – \u003ca href=\u0022http://dolat.ir/detail/311355\u0022\u003esigned\u003c/a\u003e a new convention on its legal status. The document aims to end more than a quarter of a century of legal uncertainty around the body of water, including whether it is a sea or a lake – a crucial distinction affecting how its territory and resources are divided. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut the agreement has provoked fierce criticism of Iran’s elected officials and revolutionary authorities by Iranians, at home and abroad. The outcry betrays a broader unease about the country’s willingness to placate Moscow at the expense of its own national interests. Growing US pressure is set to leave Iran more reliant on support from non-Western powers such as Russia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eIran set to reduce Caspian claim\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCritics from across Iranian society are angered by the convention’s confirmation of a principle agreed between the five nations in 2013, that each state will receive territorial waters extending 15 nautical miles from its coastline, with a fishing monopoly extending a further 10 miles. The rules regarding the exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon resources are still not determined – but Iran has the shortest littoral coastline of the five states, and the principle could see Tehran renounce its claim to significant parts of the sea.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOpponents of Iran’s political system say the agreement, signed in the Kazakh city of Aknau, has seen the country’s clerics fail to defend its national interests. Authorities have rejected comparisons between the Aknau deal and the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, seen by nationalists as a humiliation in which Iran lost territories in the area of the Caspian.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCriticism springs from the nationalist myth that Iran controlled 50% of the Caspian Sea before the fall of the Soviet Union. This perception has forced Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to publicly reaffirm Iranian claims for a 20% share of the sea. Since 1991, Iran has supported the condominium regime – under which the sea would be recognised as a lake, and as a result its resources used in common by the five states surrounding it. Another option formerly acceptable to Tehran would have seen all five given an equal share of the sea (20% of its territory and resources). \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eConcession to Russia\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn social media, critics argue that Iran is conceding its rights in the Caspian Sea in exchange for Russian support against US economic sanctions. Moscow was the driving force behind the diplomatic success of the Aknau agreement – one of its main achievements was a ban on any military presence on the sea by non-signatories. Russia abandoned its shared support with Tehran for the condominium regime at the end of the 1990s, pressing instead for a resolution based on the principle of exclusive economic zones. This solution would hand Iran no more than 13% of the disputed water.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe first Iranian attempt to fall in line with Russia’s Caspian Sea policy was made in 2007 by Manouchehr Mottaki, then minister of foreign affairs in the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Facing increasing US and multilateral economic sanctions, the Iranian government proposed reducing its claimed share from 20% to 11.3%. This diplomatic concession was widely criticised by reformist factions inside Iran.\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIran has never controlled more than 11.3% of the Caspian Sea. Even during the Soviet period, when the sea was a Soviet-Iranian lake, Iran was not able to project a military force beyond its littoral zone. However, criticism of the Aknau agreement is motivated more by concerns over Iranian foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution than specific worries about the Caspian.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eTrump pressure will increase dependency on China, Russia and India\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSince 1979 the Iranian foreign policy motto has been ‘Neither East, nor West, Islamic Republic’. But in recent decades the country has looked to the East far more than the West. Faced with the economic consequences of Western containment, Iran put aside its historic rivalry with Russia, and included the country in its Asian Triangle policy alongside China and India. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIran’s inclusion of Russia in its Eastern vision is a political manoeuvre made by Iranian Islamists in general, and the Supreme Leader in particular. In light of the Trump administration’s new US policy towards Iran, Tehran is likely to increase its economic cooperation with non-Western countries such as Russia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn bidding to achieve foreign policy independence, the Islamic Republic has become more dependent on Russia, but also often appears to be hurting its own national interests. Criticism over the Aknau agreement confirms the growing difficulty faced by the Islamist establishment in trying to sell its international policy to the Iranian public. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe resilience of Iranian nationalism may limit the political elite’s project of rapprochement with Moscow. It is possible that Iran’s parliament, or the Supreme Leader, will not ratify or sign the new convention – to avoid being accused of not defending the interests of their country.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_N7wFdq3kiUSZ5LO5U8ngw"))});
Iran\u0027s downsizing of its Caspian Sea claim has enraged nationalists.
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