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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhen US President Donald Trump \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reviving-national-space-council\u0022\u003erevived\u003c/a\u003e the National Space Council in mid-2017, his policy direction for the high-level advisory committee charged with overseeing US space activities was not entirely clear. But when Vice President Mike Pence, who also serves as Chairman of the Council, \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-future-u-s-military-space/\u0022\u003eannounced\u003c/a\u003e on 9 August that the Trump administration intends to \u0026lsquo;establish a Space Force as the sixth branch of the armed forces\u0026rsquo;, it became undeniable that outer space may soon take on a more competitive character. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThese recent developments, along with those in other countries such as China, raise the spectre of conflict in yet another domain and warrant a new analytic platform to identify and assess global concerns. Accordingly, the IISS Observatory, a monthly forum for space policy analysis, will feature expert views from government, military, industry and academia. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA National Aeronautics and Space Council was originally \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/national-space-council-donald-trump/520725/\u0022\u003eestablished\u003c/a\u003e in 1958, and then re-established (and renamed) in 1989, to centralise authority over space policymaking for the United States. Currently, a handful of federal agencies manage the nation\u0026rsquo;s space efforts, among them NASA, the Department of Defense, and more recently, as space exploration has bled into the private sector, the Departments of Commerce and Transportation. In theory, President Trump\u0026rsquo;s reinstatement of the Council will enable more efficient coordination of space efforts across the civilian, military and intelligence spheres. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003eShifting space policy landscape\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSome commentators offer that Space Force is Trump\u0026rsquo;s \u003ca href=\u0022https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/10/space-force-is-trumps-answer-to-new-russian-and-chinese-weapons/\u0022\u003eresponse\u003c/a\u003e to military advances in other countries, including measures that allegedly \u0026lsquo;\u003ca href=\u0022https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/\u0022\u003eweaponise\u003c/a\u003e\u0026rsquo; outer space. The December 2015 establishment of China\u0026rsquo;s military space enterprise, the People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army\u0026rsquo;s (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF), serves as the primary example. Tasked with the development and execution of the PLA\u0026rsquo;s space capabilities, the SSF was \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2058.html\u0022\u003ecreated\u003c/a\u003e as part of a significant reorganisation of the Chinese military that prioritises the advancement and integration of the country\u0026rsquo;s space efforts. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe SSF is unique in \u003ca href=\u0022https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/chinas-strategic-arsenals-in-a-new-era/\u0022\u003esupporting\u003c/a\u003e not only the PLA\u0026rsquo;s role in space, but also its cyber and electronic warfare capabilities \u0026ndash; a conjunction that probably forecasts the synergistic nature of future conflict. The PLA has invested heavily in new \u003ca href=\u0022https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-chinas-space-program-continues-to-mature-rapidly/\u0022\u003ecountermeasures\u003c/a\u003e, such as an anti-satellite (ASAT) programme with non-kinetic weapons that have the potential to incapacitate foreign satellites.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe US is also eyeing Russia, the other major space power, in this regard. Senior diplomats have raised \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/satellites/2018/08/14/state-department-concerned-over-russian-satellites-behavior/\u0022\u003econcerns\u003c/a\u003e in international fora about Russia\u0026rsquo;s active and public pursuit of ASAT weapons. At a Conference on Disarmament meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, for example, the US \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/285128.htm\u0022\u003enoted\u003c/a\u003e that Russian satellite behaviour is often \u0026lsquo;inconsistent\u0026rsquo; with Moscow\u0026rsquo;s claims and highlighted that verification \u0026ndash; in the traditional arms-control sense \u0026ndash; is challenging because of the difficulty in determining \u0026lsquo;an object\u0026rsquo;s true purpose simply by observing it on orbit\u0026rsquo;.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn his speech, Vice President Pence implied that emerging \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/09/politics/pence-space-force-2020/index.html\u0022\u003ethreats\u003c/a\u003e from possible adversaries such as China and Russia were the proximate cause for creating a Space Force \u003ca href=\u0022https://spacenews.com/new-pentagon-memo-lays-out-action-plan-to-establish-space-force-by-2020/\u0022\u003eby 2020\u003c/a\u003e. Pence described the \u003ca href=\u0022http://fortune.com/2018/08/09/trump-space-force-pence/\u0022\u003eUS$8 billion initiative\u003c/a\u003e as an adaptation to the new reality of space as a contested war-fighting domain that necessitates the development of new space capabilities. According to its Trump administration architects, Space Force will allow the US to maintain its \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/preserving-u-s-dominance-while-slowing-the-weaponization-of-space/\u0022\u003eprior dominance\u003c/a\u003e in space \u0026ndash; a questionable yet certainly parochial claim. A new military service branch responsible for US outer space operations would \u003cem\u003einter alia\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/621127192/when-it-comes-to-a-new-space-force-only-congress-has-the-power-to-create-it\u0022\u003esynchronise command\u003c/a\u003e of existing satellite systems, which presently include a constellation of reconnaissance, navigation, missile-warning and communications platforms under different agencies.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_K6uw3vPKLE6olO5VVwVig"))});
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIs the ‘weaponisation’ of outer space inevitable? And what would it mean for global security? Introducing our new monthly space policy digest, Sean Kanuck and Alana Vogel explain why such questions matter now more than ever.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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