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Q\u0026A: Iran’s missile strike on Syria  智库博客
时间:2018-10-02   作者: Clement Therme  来源:International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom)
\u003ch5 style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eWhat was the message behind the strikes?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eIran’s main message was to its own people. This targeted strike was designed to reinforce the state’s narrative that the aim of its regional military action is to fight ‘terrorism’, in this case that of Islamic State. It is not the first time it has targeted Islamic State – similar action took place after terror attacks in Tehran in June 2017.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003e Iran is accusing both Islamic State and separatists supported by external powers (especially the US and Saudi Arabia) of engaging in a terrorist campaign. So there is also a political effort to portray countries that are conducting a media campaign against Tehran’s regional policies as supporting ‘terror’ inside Iran. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eBut the internal political dimension is Tehran’s main priority, due to the state failure to provide security in Ahvaz. The strikes were a show of force primarily designed to reassure Iranians that the Islamic Republic can fight Sunni jihadist groups inside and outside its territory. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5 style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eDo Iran and other regional powers want war?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eIran is not seeking an open war with Saudi Arabia or Israel. This is despite the anti-Zionist rhetoric of both the Islamic Republic and Lebanon’s Hizbullah. Meanwhile, Oman and Kuwait are trying to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia, to avoid an escalation of what is currently a proxy war into a direct military confrontation. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eBoth Iran and Saudi Arabia have to overcome economic challenges and offer their people greater levels of prosperity. The cost of war in Yemen is very high for Saudi Arabia, and the price paid by the Iranian people for the military interventions of the Revolutionary Guards outside Iran is also often denounced by protesters inside the country. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5 style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eBashar al-Assad seems close to winning the war in Syria. What’s next for the parties involved?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eIran and Russia do not seem genuinely interested in bringing military hostilities to an end, because they will struggle to fund the reconstruction process. At the same time, however, they are leading the diplomatic process – mainly because of their military presence inside Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration’s new Iran policy will likely see Russia maintain its diplomatic strategy of entente with all countries in the region – Iran, Turkey, Israel and the Gulf’s oil-rich kingdoms. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eMoscow will no doubt continue to use its relationship with Iran as leverage in its dealings with Washington. To do so, it must reinforce and develop its cooperation with Tehran, both in the wider region (fighting against ‘terrorism’) and in crucial strategic areas, such as civil nuclear activities and military cooperation. Faced with a Trump administration that appears anxious to drive a wedge between the two countries, Russia is more likely to resume the role of mediator that it played during tensions between Iran and the West at the time of George W. Bush’s presidency.  \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThen, Russia opposed American threats to use force against Iran in order to solve the nuclear question, as well as Washington’s policy of unilateral sanctions against Tehran. What has changed since Russia embarked on its military intervention in the Syrian war in 2015 is the bilateral effort by Moscow and Tehran to fight ‘terrorism’ – specifically Sunni jihadist groups, especially ones Tehran labels \u003cem\u003etakfiri\u003c/em\u003e (those who ex-communicate other Muslims).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5 style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThe US says it is trying to contain Iran by re-imposing sanctions and withdrawing from the country’s nuclear deal (the JCPOA). Is this likely to work?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eCurrent US policy mirrors that of the Bush administration (2001–09), which failed to produce Washington’s desired outcome. If the official goal of behaviour change through economic sanctions is not fulfilled, President Trump could implement a policy of regime change. The risk of military confrontation will be very high, especially in Iraq and in Afghanistan.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eMike Pompeo’s \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/05/pompeos-12-demands\u0022\u003e12 conditions\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003e will probably not become a basis for negotiation, unless the Iranian political elite feel the regime’s survival is at risk. The main hurdle before the eventual opening of a diplomatic channel between Washington and Tehran is a formal one: the Islamic Republic prefers a secret channel, and the US a summit between President Trump and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But the Supreme Leader has not left his country since assuming his role in 1989.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_kW7cikQti0aF2cCvhTZRg"))});
Iran has fired missiles into eastern Syria, responding to a deadly attack on a military parade in the Iranian city of Ahvaz.

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