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\u003cp\u003eRussian influence and presence in the Middle East and North Africa may have fluctuated over the past 50 years – from its zenith in the late 60s and early 70s when it dominated Egypt, and counted Syria, South Yemen and Iraq as clients, to its virtual disappearance after the collapse of the USSR – but it never gave up on the region, and retained its expertise and contacts book. From the rubble of the Arab Spring it has been rebuilding its regional influence to a new high. The hard fact is that Russia is now a regional power. And a hard power at that. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eStrategy or luck?\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTaken at face value, many of the gains Russia has made across the region seem to be the result of seized opportunities. Central to Russia’s regional resurgence has been the intervention in Syria. That was as much an emotional imperative for Vladimir Putin to ensure the survival of his protégé Bashar al-Assad (or at least not to allow the West to dislodge him) as it was part of a strategic plan. Similarly, the seizure of power in Egypt by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a military strongman, was a windfall for Putin. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut the wider view of Russia in the region reveals an underlying strategic design. Its strategy in the Middle East is part of its strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. That in turn is part of the wider southern strategy, which includes the Black Sea and, in particular, Ukraine and Crimea. Russian interests have always been best served in that wider region by embracing the role of a warm-water power. The transit of the Russian aircraft carrier \u003cem\u003eKuznetsov\u003c/em\u003e through the English Channel in 2016 en route to the Mediterranean, belching black smoke, raised a few sniggers. But don’t be fooled. Being a warm-water power is as much about the airpower, port facilities and influence on the littoral as it is about the fleet. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRussia is doing well on all of these fronts. It has bases for its ships and air force, allies (including, for the time being at least, Iran and its confederacy of proxies) and, crucially, recent experience of fighting and winning a war in the region. In Syria, Russian armed forces extensively tested new weapons and techniques in theatre with positive results. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, they fought and won within a regional coalition, an unusual experience anywhere for Russia. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe shift in the balance of power that this represents should not be looked at solely in terms of the territory and lines of communication that Russia and its allies control. There has also been a shift in who commands the critical capabilities. In addition to Russia’s indigenous ability to fight expeditionary wars and dominate the grey zone, the partnership with Iran gives Moscow access to two capabilities that increasingly deliver strategic advantage in the region’s conflicts: the ability to fight through proxies; and the ability to use ballistic missiles to shape the geopolitics. Iran is the arch practitioner of both and is on Russia’s team. \u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_jskVzR5SkuhKd5aALE7dA"))});
\u003cp\u003eThere should be space in the Middle East for legitimate Russian influence. But the hardness of the power it projects, and sanctions in others, is problematic.\u003c/p\u003e
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