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\u003cp\u003eThe navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have traditionally been small and focused mainly on coastal defence. But some of them have begun to develop an expeditionary maritime capability, with implications in the region and beyond. They have been spurred on by a general sense of an increased maritime security threat around the region, including from Iran, and, in part, by the requirements of the conflict in Yemen.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003eUnited Arab Emirates\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOf the six GCC nations, the United Arab Emirates has the largest and most significant sealift capability. Since the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemen conflict in 2015, the UAE has been supplying its own forces there by sea, as well as ferrying in those of other nations. Much of this sealift capability is based in the port of Assab in Eritrea, where the UAE Navy currently maintains a typical deployment of at least two corvettes and eight amphibious vessels. A new Emirati naval base is being constructed 11 km to the northwest of Assab, next to the city’s international airport, part of which is also used by the Emirati armed forces. The UAE’s military footprint will be further expanded by the construction of a new naval base at Berbera in Somaliland, a breakaway region seeking independence from the central Somali government in Mogadishu. Whilst the UAE certainly has the funds to acquire relatively high-end equipment, the navy is constrained by its size. Numbering just a few thousand sailors, the UAE Navy would have difficulty finding crews for new frigates, fleet-replenishment vessels and large amphibious platforms and to sustain operations beyond the Horn of Africa.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\u00225\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: #f2f2f2;\u0022\u003eGCC: blue-water surface combatant and expeditionary naval platforms\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCountry \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrigates \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLanding ships (LS)* \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e Landing craft (LC)*\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFleet-replenishment ships\u003c/strong\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003eBahrain\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 1 Sabha (ex-US \u003cem\u003eOliver Hazard Perry\u003c/em\u003e)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 7 LCM\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003eKuwait\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 1 LCM\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003eOman\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cem\u003e 3 Al-Shamikh\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 1 LST (serviceability in doubt)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003eQatar\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003eSaudi-Arabia\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 3 \u003cem\u003eAl Riyadh \u003c/em\u003e(\u003cem\u003eLa Fayette\u003c/em\u003e mod)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 3 LCU\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003e 2 x \u003cem\u003eBoraida\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cem\u003eDurance\u003c/em\u003e mod)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 4\u003cem\u003e Madina\u003c/em\u003e (F-2000)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 2 LCM (est.)\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003eUnited-Arab Emirates\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003e 1 \u003cem\u003eAbu Dhabi\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003e 2 LST\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 10 LCT\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\u00222\u0022\u003e -\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e 5 LCM\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\u00225\u0022\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e \u003cspan style=\u0022font-size: 10px;\u0022\u003e* Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are open vessels. Landing ships tend to be much larger and are typically more capable of ocean-going operations. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022font-size: 10px;\u0022\u003eLCT - landing ship tank; LCM - landing craft medium; LCT - landing craft tank; LCU - landing craft utility\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background-color: #ffffff; color: #656565;\u0022\u003eA table showing the naval power of GCC countries. Credit: IISS\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_DQdJ9E3DCUOmzlszc7MIpg"))});
\u003cp\u003eSeveral Gulf navies are buying new ships and bases \u0026ndash; but will need to find the crews and strategies to make good use of them.\u003c/p\u003e
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