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\u003cp\u003eOn 30 September 2018, the United Kingdom’s defence secretary, Gavin Williamson, announced that the UK is to step up Royal Marines cold-weather training in Norway and will launch a UK ‘defence arctic strategy’. Why is the UK doing this now, and what can the new strategy deliver?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe UK is not alone in refocusing on the Arctic, and that is perhaps part of its motivation. But from London’s particular perspective, there are essentially three factors at play. Firstly, there is an assessment that climate change is increasing the region’s economic importance. Secondly, the post-2014 transformation of the relationship with Russia has refocused UK defence and security assessments, including on threats in and emerging from the ‘High North’. Thirdly, and leading on from that, there is the increased requirement for NATO to deter Russian military threats against its member states more broadly.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eClimate-change opportunities\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClimate change is already reducing the size of Arctic sea ice. There is a lively, ongoing debate on the precise timing and extent of this, but also a broad consensus that it offers to greatly increase the utility of polar shipping routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route across Russia’s north coast. Climate change will also allow natural resources in the Arctic to be more easily exploited. The amount of Russian energy resources in the Arctic – both those currently being exploited and potential resources – means that the economic stakes are highest for Moscow.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChina is also interested in the potential of using Arctic routes to shorten and speed up transits for its trade, as well as exploiting Arctic fisheries and untapped natural resources. However, for all the actual and potential Arctic actors, exploiting resources and new transit routes in the High North depends on peace, security and industrial confidence in relevant international rules and norms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRussia, NATO and the High North\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRussia has strengthened its ability to deploy and project military power in the Arctic and from it into the North Atlantic, and in any confrontation over resources in the region. NATO naval commanders have been particularly vocal in their concerns over greatly increased Russian submarine activity in the last few years.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNorway in particular sees itself as vulnerable to a variety of Russian threats. The Norwegian defence strategy depends upon reinforcement by NATO allies. Oslo considers that the strategic importance of reinforcement by UK forces is second only to that of reinforcements from the United States. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) military partnership includes Finland and Sweden. These two Arctic nations are both concerned by Russia’s growing strength in the Arctic, particularly the concentration of advanced precision offensive and defensive capabilities around the Russian port of Murmansk and in the Northern Fleet. On top of that, NATO has recognised the importance of reinforcement of Europe in a crisis by forming a new maritime/North Atlantic-orientated joint-force command in Norfolk, Virginia. In addition, NATO is just gearing up for its huge \u003cem\u003eTrident Juncture\u003c/em\u003e exercise – its biggest in years, with more than 45,000 personnel – hosted by Norway and simulating Article 5 defence of an Alliance member.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eImplications for the UK defence strategy\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe new NATO moves have been strongly supported by the UK. The UK is not an Arctic nation, but this activity is all happening on its doorstep; this is one reason why these issues appear suddenly to have grabbed the attention of the country’s political establishment. Geography means that the UK has a key military role in countering any potential Russian threats to Norway, and also threats that deploy from the High North towards UK waters and airspace. All these factors suggest that the UK’s defence strategy and activity play a role in reassuring its Arctic allies and partners. For example, it did not go unnoticed in Oslo when leaks emerged late in 2017 that the Royal Navy’s two remaining specialist amphibious landing ships and 1,000 Royal Marine posts might be cut. Another element of Gavin Williamson’s recent announcement was that he is ‘protecting’ the amphibious ships from being cut. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePart of the challenge for the UK government, though, is that all these aspirations form part of a competing set of declared global defence and security ambitions. The question is how to deliver it in a cost-effective way. The threat of a military confrontation in the Arctic is currently low, but were it to occur any response would currently be a challenge for UK forces, particularly in the Arctic winter.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis is because what had been a relatively high level of UK training and exercising in the Arctic has greatly reduced since the end of the Cold War. This was particularly apparent in terms of submarine operations under ice (revived this year after a gap of more than ten years with the deployment of HMS \u003cem\u003eTrenchant\u003c/em\u003e on \u003cem\u003eIce Exercise 18\u003c/em\u003e) and winter deployments to northern Norway by UK amphibious forces. The announced increase in Royal Marines cold-weather training in Norway will be a useful foundation for increased UK military engagement in the region. The intention appears to be to incorporate this training more with Norway’s own planning – UK training deployments should move from simply taking part \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the host country to training \u003cem\u003ewith\u003c/em\u003e its armed forces and relevant civil agencies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRoyal Air Force Eurofighter \u003cem\u003eTyphoon\u003c/em\u003e combat aircraft are planned to deploy in 2019 to Iceland for air-policing tasks. The UK and Norway are also forging links over their future common operation of P-8 \u003cem\u003ePoseidon\u003c/em\u003e maritime-patrol aircraft. With the JEF and its championing of the Northern Group (including the Baltic states, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states, Poland and the UK), the UK has already been signalling its intention to focus more on this region. But for its Arctic allies and partners – Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden – the key when the new strategy emerges will be whether there is evidence that the UK’s declarations of engagement in the region will be translated into long-term and sustained commitments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the \u003ca href=\u0022http://go.iiss.org/2gnVMys\u0022\u003eIISS Military Balance+\u003c/a\u003e, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_WkRqsDEeb0OsIxQ3Rwm4g"))});
\u003cp\u003eClimate change and the threat from Russia are refocusing the UK’s defence strategy on the Arctic.\u003c/p\u003e
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