|
\u003cp\u003eAnnouncing the outcome of a \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/modernising-defence-programme-update\u0022\u003enew military modernisation programme\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e this week, UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson hoped to deliver on a previous pledge to ‘ensure that defence can make its \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-01-25/debates/002ED98B-7B42-424B-8213-7EC5650664BC/ModernisingDefenceProgramme\u0022\u003efull contribution to our national security on a sustainable basis\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e’. The Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) will indeed result in incremental improvements around the edges of UK military capability, but it will not increase the deployable combat capabilities of the armed forces in a significant way.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThreats identified by the UK National Security Council, such as domestic terrorism, cyber attacks and Russia’s military and ‘hybrid’ challenges have materialised more rapidly than envisaged in the period in which the MDP was drawn up. Compared with Russian and Chinese military capabilities, UK forces lack volume and have critical weaknesses, which the MDP does not address.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eImportant decisions – namely on how to balance the gap between future ambitions and a defence budget that has insufficient funds to implement them – have been put off until a 2019 government comprehensive spending review.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWhat is in the new Modernising Defence Programme?\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWilliamson announced in the MDP that he has no plans for further cuts to military capability. He confirmed the ‘planning assumption’ that by 2025 the UK should be able to deploy a modernised Joint Force of up to 50,000 personnel on an expeditionary operation. He also reconfirmed the force composition of an Army mechanised division, a carrier task group equipped with F-35 aircraft, an air group and special forces.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe MOD will spend £160 million on a new Defence Transformation Fund and will seek a further £340m from the Treasury in the 2019 government spending review. This would fund a new series of programmes focused on harnessing cutting-edge technologies for a range of issues, such as tackling increasing threats to submarines and using artificial intelligence. The existing Defence Innovation Fund will increase from £20m per year to £50m. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWilliamson also announced that the readiness of key defence platforms – such as major warships, helicopters, intelligence-gathering systems and attack submarines – would be increased. Money would also be re-prioritised to increase weapons stockpiles and counter increasing threats to the security of the UK nuclear deterrent. New \u0027Spearhead\u0027 innovation programmes will be launched to apply new technology to areas including underwater threats to submarines, intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance capability, and Army command and control. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe MDP also aspires to strengthen and invest more in Joint Forces Command and military cyber capabilities, and better utilise robotic and autonomous systems, machine learning and artificial intelligence. Overseas training and exercises are to be adjusted to increase the armed forces’ global footprint, including military attachés. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMajor capability and funding challenges unaddressed \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe announced initiatives, together with the re-affirmation of the target for Joint Force 2025, will be cautiously welcomed by the UK armed forces and defence industry, and it is prudent that modernisation funding be prioritised. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut the MDP does not, for example, accelerate the much-needed modernisation of the Army’s many obsolete armoured vehicles dating from the 1960s and 1970s, nor does it redress Army brigades’ numerical inferiority in artillery compared to their Russian counterparts. Nor does it accelerate the introduction of the Royal Navy’s new frigates, nor reverse the considerable reduction in amphibious capabilities made since 2010. It also fails to increase the very small size of the air defence capabilities of all three services. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWilliamson announced that the government had allocated defence another £1.8 billion over the previous year. This has made the short-term programmes affordable, particularly the investments in increasingly expensive nuclear capabilities. However, this was also evidence that the MOD’s core resources will be underfunded by £1bn a year. If so, by 2029 the MOD would be up to £10bn short of the funding needed to deliver Joint Force 2025.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe announcements made in the MDP do not appear to acknowledge the full magnitude of the financial challenges that the MOD faces. The July 2018 government \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721978/IPA_Annual_Report_2018__2_.pdf\u0022\u003eMajor Projects Review\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e said there is considerable risk in many future equipment projects, with almost half being graded amber (‘successful delivery is in doubt’) or red (‘successful delivery appears to be unachievable’). The latter red categorisation includes future nuclear reactors, \u003cem\u003eAstute\u003c/em\u003e submarines, \u003cem\u003eProtector\u003c/em\u003e UAVs and the modernisation of the \u003cem\u003eWarrior\u003c/em\u003e infantry fighting vehicle. Many of the programmes at risk are key to delivering the modernised capabilities required by Joint Force 2025. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn October 2018 \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Equipment-Plan-2018-2028-Summary-.pdf\u0022\u003eassessment\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by the National Audit Office (NAO) concluded that the forecast cost of the MOD’s equipment plan exceeded the budget by £7bn, with a risk of this increasing to £14.8bn if all of the identified risks were to materialise. With 84% of the equipment funding gap lying in the 2019–23 time frame, the NAO identified that policy decisions were urgently required. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn earlier \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nao.org.uk/report/delivering-the-defence-estate/\u0022\u003ereport\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from the NAO also identified that there was an £8.5bn shortfall in funding to the Defence Estate, including barracks, training areas, airfields and naval bases. The government has also indicated that, should its dispute with the EU over the UK’s participation in the \u003cem\u003eGalileo\u003c/em\u003e satellite navigation programme be unresolved, the UK would develop a similar national capability. Despite this claim, no money has been allocated for this potential project in the latest announcement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePersonnel strength has continued to fall across the services, with under-manning of trained personnel increasing by 1.6% in 2018, and with the overall deficit increasing to 5.6%, compared with 4.3% in 2017. This represents a decline in regular forces strength of \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-armed-forces-monthly-service-personnel-statistics-2017\u0022\u003eover 6,000 personnel\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e since 2015. There are deficiencies in the numbers of pilots, intelligence specialists and engineers, and especially nuclear engineers. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the Royal Navy, manning appears to be the limiting factor on readiness, with repeated media reports of warships laid up for lack of crews. These shortages result in part from pay being below comparable civilian levels. Without a significant improvement in pay, allowances and accommodation, the chances of the armed forces approaching full staffing are remote. The MDP fails to address these issues. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHard choices deferred again\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWilliamson is correct to say that the government has increased defence spending over the past year. Yet most of this money was to cover considerable cost increases in existing nuclear programmes. The proposed future increases in UK defence spending would only bridge a small proportion of the MOD’s accumulated funding gaps. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe ‘inconvenient truths’ of unaffordable equipment and estate plans, new equipment projects already at risk and increasing under-manning, all combine to create a ‘perfect storm’ of very difficult choices for the MOD. Unless it receives a significant increase in funding, further cuts to UK armed forces’ conventional capability will be required. The MDP as announced does not make solving these very difficult challenges any easier. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSpeaking in Parliament, Williamson said: ‘I will do all in my power to make sure that the UK remains a Tier One military power in the decade ahead’. While he acknowledges the need to ‘create financial headroom for modernisation’, the details of how to achieve this very considerable challenge are conspicuously absent. The programme will not make a substantive difference to the volume of UK core combat capabilities, nor will it alter the severe financial challenges the MOD and the armed forces face. If these are not tackled, further significant reductions of conventional military capability are inevitable. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClosing a funding gap of approximately £10bn would require major reductions to military capabilities. The manpower of the armed forces would have to be reduced and force structures cut. New equipment programmes for which a contract has not been signed would likely be delayed, reduced in size or cancelled. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApparently credible leaks in autumn 2017 suggested that measures then under consideration by the MOD included significant reductions to the size of the Army and modernisation of its armoured vehicles, cuts to frigate and destroyer numbers, abandoning amphibious capability, a reduction in numbers of F-35 fighters to be purchased, and the removal of at least one type of battlefield helicopter. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAny of these cuts would reduce the capability of Joint Force 2025, particularly its effectiveness against Russian forces. In combination, they would greatly reduce the UK armed forces’ ability to meet the country’s NATO commitments, let alone conduct expeditionary operations further afield. The effect of such cuts on UK hard power would call into question Williamson’s assertion of the \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/07/military-capability-and-international-status\u0022\u003eUK military’s ‘Tier One’ status\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and the government’s aspiration that after the UK leaves the EU, the armed forces will play a major role in delivering the ‘Global Britain’ brand. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003cspan\u003eSenior defence officials appear to assume that the funding gap and necessary hard choices will be tackled in next year’s government spending review. Yet, with Prime Minister Theresa May pledging significant extra funding for the National Health Service, the chances of significant extra funds for defence are small. Brexit could well depress the UK economy, putting further pressure on public expenditure and thus the defence budget. This increases the urgency of tackling the UK defence’s funding crisis. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_pX0jhMbrkexT3mUk4vWw"))});
\u003cp\u003eWhile providing some improvements around the edges of military capability, the UK’s Modernising Defence Programme will not increase the deployable combat capabilities of the armed forces in a significant way and puts off important policy decisions for 2019.\u003c/p\u003e
|
|
