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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran attempted and failed to lift the \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePayam-e Amirkabir\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan\u003e satellite into orbit using a \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e rocket on 15 January. Israel\u0026rsquo;s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu \u003ca href=\u0022https://apnews.com/080c9e1b97594b8bbfa1620ded912131\u0022\u003eresponded\u003c/a\u003e to the news by stating that the purportedly \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026lsquo;innocent satellite\u0026rsquo; launched by Iran was in reality \u0026lsquo;the first stage of an intercontinental missile\u0026rsquo;, which he claims is in violation of international agreements. Not to be outdone, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUS Secretary of State Mike Pompeo \u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1085270967977426944\u0022\u003etweeted\u003c/a\u003e, \u0026lsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn defiance of the international community \u0026amp; UNSCR 2231, #Iran\u0026rsquo;s regime fired off a space launch vehicle today. The launch yet again shows that Iran is pursuing enhanced missile capabilities that threaten Europe and the Middle East.\u0026rsquo; \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran\u0026rsquo;s failed launch was neither a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, nor was it an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) being tested under the guise of a satellite launch. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran\u0026rsquo;s space programme\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran\u0026rsquo;s interest in space research dates back to 1967, long before the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Active research and development aimed at creating satellite-launch vehicles (SLVs) did not begin until around 2000, and Iran\u0026rsquo;s first attempt at orbiting a small satellite took place in February 2008, with the two-stage \u003cem\u003eSafir\u003c/em\u003e SLV. The launch failed, although Iran finally succeeded on its third attempt a year later. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran unveiled a mock-up of the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh \u003c/em\u003ein 2010. After a series of delays, the first two launches of the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e took place in April 2016 and again in July 2017, with each ending in disappointment. The third attempt on 15 January also failed. Iran\u0026rsquo;s Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, \u003ca href=\u0022https://en.mehrnews.com/news/141570/Defense-ministry-hails-Iran-s-successful-space-mission\u0022\u003eindicated\u003c/a\u003e that the first and second stages of the space mission were completed successfully, but that the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e\u0026lsquo;s third stage failed to accelerate the \u003cem\u003ePayam\u003c/em\u003e satellite to orbital speed.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e is a three-stage rocket. Its first stage weighs about 75 tonnes, and is powered by a cluster of four \u003cem\u003eNodong\u003c/em\u003e engines and four small steering engines. The second stage relies on four low-thrust engines originally designed for steering the now-obsolete Soviet submarine-launched missile, known as the R-7 or SS-N-6. The third stage consists of a newly designed, Iranian-produced solid-fuel motor weighing less than a tonne. Apparently, this new motor either failed to separate from the second stage and ignite, or it malfunctioned during operation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDifferences between SLVs and long-range ballistic missiles\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe technologies and components employed by satellite launchers, including the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e, and long-range ballistic missiles are similar. Both use powerful rocket engines, high-strength and lightweight airframes, inertial navigation and guidance units, stage- and payload-separation mechanisms, as well as tracking and telemetry systems to support development and operations. Despite these similarities, accusations that Iran\u0026rsquo;s use of \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e to launch satellites is a cover for ICBM development are misguided.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFor example, ballistic-missile carry payloads must survive the rigours of re-entry into the Earth\u0026rsquo;s atmosphere, requiring development of robust thermal- and mechanical-protection systems. SLVs, including the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e, carry payloads that operate in space, and that are not subjected to challenging re-entry dynamics. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSatellite-launch vehicles and long-range ballistic \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/07/reduce-risk-iran-develop-icbm-nuclear\u0022\u003emissiles employ distinctly different trajectories\u003c/a\u003e to fulfil their respective missions. SLVs perform well when using low-thrust, long-action time engines, whereas ICBMs must climb to higher altitudes to maximise achievable range. This requires upper stages equipped with high-thrust engines. The \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo;s configuration, featuring low-thrust engines in the second and third stages, is consistent with a rocket optimised for satellite launches, not ballistic missile trajectories.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePerhaps the least obvious difference between the two systems lies in their operational requirements. Prior to lift-off, SLVs including the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e are prepared over a period of many days, if not weeks. Components and subsystems can be checked and rechecked. If a technical glitch emerges during the countdown, the launch can be delayed until it is fixed. Similarly, SLV launches can wait for ideal weather conditions. Whereas ballistic missiles, like any weapons system, must be poised to operate without delay and under all conditions. A missile\u0026rsquo;s operational demands impose a more rigorous validation scheme that includes an extensive test-flight programme consisting of at least a dozen launches before being declared combat ready. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFinally, the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e, like other SLVs, can be prepared for launch over an extended period, at\u0026nbsp;a fixed and known location without fear of being interdicted by an adversary.\u0026nbsp;Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, are expected to be targeted by foes so must rely on mobility, concealment and prompt preparations to avoid pre-launch destruction. Reducing the size and weight of an SLV is not a critical design parameter, as they need not be deployed on mobile-launch platforms. The \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo;s first stage, which is more than 17m long, 2.4m wide and weighs more than 75 tonnes, is ill-suited for mobile deployment as required by most ICBMs. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSatellite-launch activities do offer Iran\u0026rsquo;s engineers an opportunity to accumulate experience and generate data that could aid efforts to develop long-range ballistic missiles. However, the results have limited application to ballistic missiles. Only a fraction of the overall missile development challenges can be addressed when operating an SLV. Other criteria \u0026ndash; most notably re-entry technologies, operational requirements and launch-crew training \u0026ndash; cannot be adequately addressed while operating the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIf Iran seeks to transform the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e into a long-range missile, engineers would still need to flight test it as a ballistic missile a dozen or more times before it could be deemed a dependable, operationally viable and accurate weapon. For these reasons and others, the trend of other countries has been to convert ballistic missiles into satellite launchers, not the reverse. Further, satellite-launch activities have not decisively contributed to the development of a long-range missile. The \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e is no exception. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePurpose over capability\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAdopted in July 2015, UNCSCR 2231 endorses the controversial Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or nuclear deal with Iran. Unlike the JCPOA, Resolution 2231 addresses Iran\u0026rsquo;s missiles and their potential role in delivering nuclear weapons to distant targets. The resolution states: \u0026lsquo;Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.\u0026rsquo; \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAs argued in a new IISS book, \u003cem\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022/publications/adelphi/2019/uncertain-future-the-jcpoa-and-irans-nuclear-and-missile-programmes\u0022\u003eUncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran\u0026rsquo;s nuclear and missiles programmes\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, the resolution proscribes Iranian missiles based on their intended purpose \u0026ndash; those designed to carry nuclear weapons \u0026ndash; rather than their inherent capability. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSome of Iran\u0026rsquo;s current arsenal of ballistic missiles are indeed designed for nuclear delivery. The design heritage, performance characteristics, including throw-weight capacity, and the size of the payload compartments (i.e. re-entry vehicle or nosecone) of the \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3 and \u003cem\u003eKhorramshahr\u003c/em\u003e medium-range missiles exhibit clear signs of nuclear intent. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOther missiles, such as the \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-1 and -2, are based on the export versions of the Soviet-era \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e-B (R-17E) and \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e-C (R-17M) respectively. The export versions of the \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e missiles were specifically designed for conventional warheads. The nuclear version of the \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e-B (R-17) has measurably different external dimensions than the export versions. The \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e-based missiles imported by Iran from North Korea are clones of the R-17E and, therefore, are presumed to be designed for non-nuclear use. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFinally, Iran\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eQiam\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eSajjil\u003c/em\u003e and variants of the \u003cem\u003eGhadr\u003c/em\u003e missiles are all equipped with a tri-conic nosecone that is too small to house Iran\u0026rsquo;s prospective nuclear-implosion device described in documents captured and presented by Israel, rendering them designed to be non-nuclear capable. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e, as discussed above, is designed and optimised for use as an SLV, not as a ballistic missile, let alone one for delivering nuclear weapons. It could certainly be transformed to perform as a ballistic missile, but this would require a new design and configuration, and then it would have to be subjected to a flight-trial programme to validate its military utility. Clearly, the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e SLV does not violate the word or intent of UNSCR 2231.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSaving diplomatic capital\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile they do not violate UN resolutions, continued satellite launches using the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e do pose some risks. Successive launches provide training and experience to Iran\u0026rsquo;s missile experts that could contribute to a future ICBM development effort. The potential contributions, however, will not significantly shorten the time or reduce the expenses needed to create a militarily viable long-range missile. The US and its allies should prioritise their non-proliferation policies to address Iranian activities that could most directly lead to the creation of long-range missiles. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTo this end, the \u003cem\u003eKhorramshahr\u003c/em\u003e missile \u0026ndash; which uses propellants that are more energetic than those employed by \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eNodong\u003c/em\u003e systems \u0026ndash; is of much greater concern. The higher energy propellant combination allows engineers to reduce significantly missile size and mass, which in turn could form a basis for a road-mobile, nuclear-capable ICBM. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSimilarly, if Iran restarts development of the two-stage, solid-fuel \u003cem\u003eSajjil \u003c/em\u003emissile, which has not been flight tested in eight years, and begins employing large, solid-fuel boosters on its SLVs or missiles, the international community would be right to protest, as such developments could be exploited to fashion a nuclear-tipped ICBM. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn short, diplomatic capital should not be diluted by protesting Iran\u0026rsquo;s use of the \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e SLV, but should instead focus on Iranian actions that pose the greatest risk to international security. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_OECeozb1R0S2ogReNprlfA"))});
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe US and its allies should be careful not to overstate the risks posed by Iran\u0027s latest attempt at a satellite launch, argues Michael Elleman. He offers a detailed analysis of the technology behind the launch and the programmes upon which policymakers should instead focus their attentions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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