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\u003cp\u003e\nIn the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Venezuela, Russia has sided with desperate incumbents against Western powers that back popular movements for political change. For some observers, this is simply a matter of Russia looking after its commercial interests or poking Western states in the eye. Yet to accept either explanation is to miss an important aspect of this era of heightened geopolitical competition: Putin’s Russia has a view of international relations, and the rights of state and citizens within it, that is fundamentally different to the West’s. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nThe differences are not as stark as the Cold War dichotomy of communism versus liberal capitalism. But they are real, and Western states do themselves a disservice if they fail to see that Putin and others are promoting an alternative model of international relations to a receptive audience in many parts of the world.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSplit decisions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the case of the DRC, where President Joseph Kabila had dragged out elections for an extended period, vote tallies suggested that opposition challenger Martin Fayulu had won nearly 60% of the vote, with fellow oppositionist Felix Tshisekedi second on 19% and Kabila’s proxy, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, in third place. The Catholic Church concurred. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nWhen official results were posted giving Tshisekedi victory with 38%, amid rumours that he and Kabila had agreed to share power, several Western states called for a recount. Russia by contrast recognised the result and Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, criticised ‘France, the US and other former colonial powers’ for seeking to interfere. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nShortly thereafter Juan Guaidó, the head of Venezuela’s legislature declared himself interim president amid the country’s accelerating political and humanitarian crisis. The US, Canada, Brazil, Colombia and the UK recognised him swiftly, and EU states lined up to follow. Russia’s prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, described it as a ‘quasi coup’ orchestrated from abroad; the foreign ministry darkly noted the threat of foreign military intervention. Soon after, it was reported that Russian military contractors had arrived in Caracas to defend Maduro. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eWestern values promotion\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn both cases, there is a group of Western states eager to uphold the principles of fair elections, the rotation of power, law-governed states, civil-society activism and freedom, and transparency. They believe in independent institutions and the separation of power (something that Maduro has gone to great lengths to destroy in Venezuela). \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nThese states observe such standards at home and, in the case of flagrant violations abroad, are willing to consider punitive diplomatic or multilateral action. They are not always consistent in calling out violators or in the level of effort they apply to punish them, but as a general rule, Western states seek to encourage or impel others to play by their rules. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nDonald Trump’s election as US president cast into doubt the notion of the West as a cohesive, values-promoting group. Yet he has been as firm (or firmer) as any of his recent predecessors on the question of democracy in Venezuela.\u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eState primacy without qualification\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nRussia, China and a few other powers have a different approach. They hold that external powers have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Thus they turn a blind eye to vote-rigging, the suppression of protests or the takeover of independent institutions such as legislatures, courts or the media. And they resolutely resist the idea that the international community should interfere in the domestic affairs of any state on such grounds. Theirs is a more traditional interpretation of international relations. It asserts the primacy of a government over its population, without qualification.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nThe Cold War was a clash of rival systems backed up by military blocs. Today’s Russia does not practise or proselytise communism, still less does it lead a modern-day equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. Yet there is a distinct ideological dimension to the current geopolitical contest with Western states, as the Venezuela and DRC episodes show. They relate mainly to political, legal and diplomatic aspects.\u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e\nThis may not represent an ideological chasm of Cold War proportions, but it is nevertheless significant. There are many states in the world that are unstable, with sitting governments eager to pursue development and fearful of the consequences of losing power. For them, Putin’s pitch has attractions. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResonance of Putin’s message\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Russian leader has first-hand experience of political turbulence of the kind that few Western leaders can match, but aspects of it will resonate with many leaders in the developing world. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nThe state Putin served as an intelligence officer disintegrated. Russia in the 1990s suffered from a rise in lawlessness, separatism, de-industrialisation and humiliation. With a fair slice of luck (in the form of recovering oil output and rocketing oil prices) and considerable determination, he reconstituted the state. Along the way he crushed opponents, weaponised the legal system, and institutionalised corruption. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nPutin was also subject to plenty of Western sermonising about democratic freedoms and human rights observance – none of which persuaded him that free elections, the rotation of power, independent courts and government institutions were the best way forward. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nPutin cleaves to the notion that there should be no interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state because he wants that to be observed in the case of Russia. Yet in pursuit of what is at heart a parochial interest, he is attempting to push international relations in a direction inimical to Western interests. \u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_ezT2MGeDxEKzB38BvDpWg"))});
Putin\u0027s political messaging stands in subtle opposition to Western foreign policy, but it is heard loud and clear by those being challenged by the West.
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