|
\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIt is no surprise that US-EU transatlantic relationships have been strained since the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States. The European Union views its diplomatic relations with Iran and particularly the JCPOA as a foreign policy success. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFrance, Germany and the United Kingdom have refused to adhere to President Trump’s demands to withdraw from the Iranian Nuclear Deal and \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/17/iran-europe-trump-nuclear-deal-1173455\u0022\u003ehave applauded\u003c/a\u003e it for its success in constraining Iran’s nuclear program. But while governments expressed their support for the JCPOA, the European private sector – fearing US sanctions – withdrew from the Iranian market. This lack of European economic sovereignty has \u003ca href=\u0022https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/96256/iran-eu-trade-dips-66-in-november-2018 \u0022\u003ecreated a gap\u003c/a\u003e between Brussels\u0027 bureaucratic elites and government discourse in favour of the nuclear deal and the economic reality of trade between Iran and Europe.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTransatlantic common ground?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTransatlantic convergence remains, however, much stronger than it appears on the Iranian issue, even though Brussels defended the nuclear deal using similar rhetoric to Russia and China. Brussels and Washington agree on the danger of Iran’s ballistic programme and Iranian regional policy, and they are both concerned about the human rights violations in the Islamic Republic. Brussels does not disregard Washington’s concerns on Iranian activity in the region, they are merely questioning the method through which Washington attempts to contain Iran. Paris, for example, believes the US-Saudi-Israel view of Iranian foreign policy as ‘hegemonic’ and ‘destabilising’, but they believe that dialogue, not conflict, is the best way to address this problem. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDiplomatic dialogue may seem like an attractive alternative to the US’ containment policy, but solutions proposed by European governments to bypass US sanctions and maintain dialogue with Iranian moderates appear to be more of a political symbol rather than a valid business alternative. The so-called\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/31/eu-implements-new-iran-trade-mechanism.html \u0022\u003eInstrument in Support of Trade Exchanges\u003c/a\u003e (INSTEX), the new Iran trade mechanism proposed by the EU have not succeeded in normalising economic relations to the extent promised, partly due to rising tensions between Iran and the US and partly due to the \u003ca href=\u0022https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/updated-blocking-statute-support-iran-nuclear-deal_en \u0022\u003eautonomy of the private sector\u003c/a\u003e from EU member states and European supra-national administration.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIndeed, this mechanism does not provide legal protection for European companies that are using it. INSTEX is therefore not operational for most of European companies willing to invest in the Iranian market, which reinforces Iran\u0027s mistrust towards an existing European political will that could lead to economic benefits for Iran. This denial of economic realities shows the bureaucratic impotence of both Member States and the European Union, which is perceived in Iran as an undesirable consequence of the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in May 2018.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLimits to friendship\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis Iranian leadership’s understanding of the limits of European action in the economic sphere leads to two political effects: first, some of the opponents and critics of the conservative factions urge non-elected political-religious elites to negotiate directly with President Trump in order to find a solution to the country\u0027s economic problems. But at the top of the theocratic state, decision-makers such as Ali Akbar Velayati, the diplomatic adviser of the Supreme Leader, prefers to adopt a policy that is increasingly oriented towards the East (especially China and India) and Russia. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis impasse is twofold: firstly, there is an institutional hurdle. Indeed, given the supremacy of the Supreme Leader in the decision-making process, one has to consider his ideological refusal to start a direct negotiation with the United States and the limited economic benefits that Iran is receiving as a result of Khamenei’s strategy of rapprochement with the Russian, Chinese and Indian economies. This stalemate in Iranian foreign policy does not mean, however, that Iran will not implement its threats of killing the nuclear deal and using its intelligence and security networks in the Middle East to challenge US military presence in the region. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis escalation scenario would lead to a waning of any European diplomatic role on the Iran issue, because Brussels’ strategic proximity to the United States remains – despite rhetorical clashes – a decisive factor in shaping European policies towards the Middle East. Russia appears, once again, as the main mediating power in the Middle East and the block to a military conflict between the USA and Iran. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLast but not least, the European Union was certainly an important partner in the nuclear negotiations, but not the main one. It was under the diplomatic leadership of the Obama Administration that the negotiations were first concluded in 2013, in Geneva and, then in Vienna, in 2015. The return of the United States’ policy towards a more ideological Iranian diplomacy at least implicitly aiming to bring regime change shows the limits of European policy in the Middle East.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCrisis response\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAt the same time, EU Member States\u0027 alliances with Saudi Arabia and Israel prevent the EU from publicising and officially declaring an independent European position on Iran. Furthermore, several diplomatic crisis between the EU and Iran hamper any prospect for cooperation. These include the jailing of Iranian-British hostages in Iran, the diplomatic crisis following the alleged Iranian attack project foiled in Denmark in October 2018, or the failed plot in Paris in June 2018, probably organised by the security services of the Islamic Republic to disrupt President Rouhani\u0027s European visit. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis set of crises strains Europe\u0027s ability to offer a way out of the JCPOA diplomatic crisis, which gives free rein to Russian diplomacy on this issue. In the end, it is indeed European economic impotence that is the main factor behind its declining diplomatic influence on the Iranian issue. However, Iran\u0027s economic problems remain mainly linked to endogenous factors such as corruption and the refusal to implement international standards, whether in terms of financial transparency (FATF negotiations) or intellectual protection. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe persistence of a revolutionary ideological fervour provides an excuse for the Iranian deep state to challenge any attempt by the elected institutions to offer a real opening to improve the well-being of the Iranian people. Yet this is an indispensable condition for any successful integration of the Iranian economy into the world market.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis article was originally published in \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/politique-francaise-et-internationale/les-relations-iran-europe-au-defi-de-ladministrati.html\u0022\u003eTelos\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\u0022ftn3\u0022\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_q3jhJo82Wkim1u3cU6elA"))});
\u003cp\u003eThe limits to European action in the face of US economic pressure, alongside several diplomatic crises between Iran and Europe, strains Europe\u0027s ability to offer a way out of the JCPOA impasse.\u003c/p\u003e
|
|
