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More Iranian sanctions for what purpose?  智库博客
时间:2019-04-12   作者: Mark Fitzpatrick  来源:International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom)
\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-left: 0px; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eIn an op-ed in the\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eWall Street Journal\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;with a Trumpian title (\u0026ldquo;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.wsj.com/articles/build-an-iranian-sanctions-wall-11554246565\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eBuild an Iranian Sanctions Wall\u003c/a\u003e\u0026rdquo;) on April 2, Mark Dubowitz acknowledges that the principal purpose of the Trump administration\u0026rsquo;s pressure campaign against Iran is to foster the regime\u0026rsquo;s collapse. Left unsaid is that regime change is also Dubowitz\u0026rsquo;s own\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/25/trump-iran-foreign-policy-regime-change-239930\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003ethinly cloaked\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2012/01/17/economic-regime-change-can-stop-iran-bomb/\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003egoal\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;for Iran. Blocking any future administration from returning to the 2015 nuclear deal is his newest justification for piling on more sanctions. Unwise in so many ways, it could also provoke Iran into violating the deal itself and thereby start a spiral to war.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eHere is his stated premise: Further penalizing Iran on grounds of support for terrorism, human rights violations, and any other malign behavior would create so much economic pain that Iran would have to capitulate. It would give in to all 13 of the\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003edemands\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/pompeo-adds-human-rights-to-twelve-demands-for-iran\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eimposed\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;to date by the Trump administration, including that it abandon uranium enrichment forever, end missile testing, stop supporting Hizballah, and improve human rights (presumably measured by a different yardstick than that used for Saudi Arabia). Dubowitz apparently would also add a 14th demand by sanctioning Iranian corruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eThe demands on Iran are unattainable because they require unconditional surrender. Those who know the Islamic Republic and the people of Iran know they will not capitulate on every front like this. They may improve human rights (a\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1418209/1788_1511271879_iran.pdf\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003egoal\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;of President Hassan Rouhani unrelated to foreign pressure), but Iranians are surely aware that no improvement will be sufficient for those in Washington who are unalterably opposed to the Islamic Republic. Iran may continue to cut back financial support to Hizballah, but it will not cut off an organization that is so integral to its foreign and defense policy. The United States cannot even persuade Europeans to take sides against Hizballah. How can Washington expect Tehran to denounce the group that it has fostered?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eThe other reason the leverage argument fails is that sanctions are easy to apply and hard to remove. Indeed, this difficulty is the very reason Dubowitz argues that terrorist designations and other measures be imposed now, to impede the negotiation flexibility of future administrations. The Trump administration\u0026rsquo;s April 8\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-revolutionary-guard-corps.html\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003edesignation\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/apr/08/part-3-what-will-irgc-designation-actually-do\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eadds little\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;to the sanctions pressure already being applied against the Guard Corps and puts U.S. servicemembers operating in the Middle East in somewhat greater danger due to Iran\u0026rsquo;s\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/434471/Iran-names-U-S-CENTCOM-terrorist-organization\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eretaliatory designation\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;of U.S. Central Command as a terrorist organization. Worse, multiplying sanctions as Dubowitz advises also impedes Trump\u0026rsquo;s own options and those of any Republican successor.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eSuppose, for a moment, that Iran did make significant changes to its human rights behavior or stopped providing missiles to Houthi rebels, who are far less important to Iran\u0026rsquo;s deterrence posture than Hizballah. The United States should want to encourage more such positive moves by rewarding them. But Dubowitz\u0026rsquo;s prescription would make it hard to do so. The policy flexibility that Trump has employed vis-\u0026agrave;-vis North Korea, by exclusively focusing on the nuclear and missile threat, would be lost to any Iran policy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-left: 0px; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eKnowing this, the Iranians would have little incentive to moderate their behavior. With diplomacy less effective a tool, military options will rise in prominence as a means for resolving issues with Iran. Needless to say, the unrelenting sanctions policy would also sharpen U.S. conflicts with allies and partners, particularly in\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/world/europe/europe-trump-iran.html\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eEurope\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eAs shortsighted as the overall theme of Dubowitz\u0026rsquo;s argument is, certain of the specific measures advocated in the op-ed are astoundingly ill-conceived. Dubowitz calls, for example, for \u0026ldquo;paying more Iranians to go on strike through a covert fund run by the Central Intelligence Agency.\u0026rdquo; As others have\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/yarbatman/status/1113390331213619205\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003enoted,\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;this gives the regime strong reason to believe that the CIA is already funding labor union strikes in Iran. For an op-ed that purports to support such labor activists, associating them with U.S. intelligence paints a bulls-eye on their backs.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eThe op-ed is also flawed by factual mistakes that aim to paint Iran in the worst possible light, all the better to fan a U.S. policy of regime change. It is simply not true that Iran has \u0026ldquo;become more hostile since Mr. Rouhani\u0026rsquo;s election in 2013.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/sites/almonitor/contents/afp/2018/03/us-iran-maritime-military-navy.amp.html\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eAccording to\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;the U.S. Fifth Fleet, for example, Iranian fast boats\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-fast-boats-stop-harassing-u-s-navy-baffling-military-1516897301\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003estopped\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;harassing U.S. Navy ships in August 2017. It is also not true that \u0026ldquo;key restrictions on Iran\u0026rsquo;s nuclear and missile programs \u0026hellip; begin to lapse in 2020.\u0026rdquo; In reality, nuclear constraints only begin to loosen in 2023, per Article A.3 of\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003ethe agreement\u003c/a\u003e. And it is an exaggeration, at the very least, to suggest that new sanctions are needed to keep international firms from entering Iran. They already are deterred from doing so, and firms that started doing business in Iran after the nuclear deal was inked have largely withdrawn. There must be some other reason for adding new sanctions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eImposing new sanctions would also push Iran toward abandoning the nuclear deal. Knowing that pulling out would trigger economic penalties is a key reason Iran is sticking to its obligations under the deal even though Trump unilaterally abandoned America\u0026rsquo;s. For the United States to multiply sanctions anyway obviates this disincentive. This, of course, is a purposeful part of the plan: to goad Iran into missteps that would both sink the nuclear deal forever and pave the way for military conflict.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eWhile Dubowitz nastily denigrates pro-diplomacy Democrats as being \u0026ldquo;pro-Tehran,\u0026rdquo; it would be equally insulting to label all advocates of dialed-up sanctions as being \u0026ldquo;pro-war.\u0026rdquo; But as National Security Adviser John Bolton\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html\u0022 style=\u0022background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003emade clear\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;before taking up his current post, military action is the preferred outcome for a significant number of them. Pressing for massive new sanctions paves the way to that path whether Dubowitz wants it or not.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003eAs the CEO of an organization that purports to defend democracies, Dubowitz\u0026rsquo;s ideas for blocking a future president from carrying out election promises is a curious subversion of a democratic norm. If preventing diplomacy is such a good idea, Trump should campaign on it, and let the voice of the people decide.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022color: #0a0a0a; background-color: #fefefe; margin: 0px 0px 1rem; padding: 0px;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong style=\u0022color: #383838;\u0022\u003eThis article was originally published in \u003ca href=\u0022https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/more-iranian-sanctions-for-what-purpose/?utm_source=WOTR+Newsletter\u0026amp;utm_campaign=14898499cf-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_10_30_2018_11_23_COPY_01\u0026amp;utm_medium=email\u0026amp;utm_term=0_8375be81e9-14898499cf-83059175\u0022\u003eWar On The Rocks\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_uV140E3A6E2D7pmc7atfsg"))});
When yet more sanctions are always the answer, one has to ask why. Mark Fitzpatrick explains why the Trump administration\u0027s pressure campaign could push Iran toward abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal. 

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