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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn an effort to bring Iran’s oil exports down to zero, the Trump administration announced on 22 April that it would not be renewing waivers of its sanctions on countries purchasing oil from Iran. For its part, Tehran has \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/952909/%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ewarned\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that if it is unable to export oil, it may pursue actions that endanger oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTaken together with Washington’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation earlier this month, as well as the decision by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to replace his long-serving IRGC commander with a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards-leader.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003emore hawkish successor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, there is a growing sense of uncertainty in US–Iran relations. Importantly, there is an increasing risk of accidental confrontation for US military forces operating in one of the most volatile, yet economically vital regions in the world.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMarking the first time that this instrument has been applied to a state actor, the terrorist designation is yet another lever in the Trump administration’s policy of exerting ‘maximum pressure’ on the Iranian regime, the unarticulated goal of which seems to be \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/05/trump-is-barreling-toward-war-with-iran-congress-must-act-stop-him/?noredirect=on\u0026amp;utm_term=.ea18bbecba40\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eregime change\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. It begs the question as to how much weight the administration has given to the multiple challenges such an outcome would create for US military forces in the region.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhy the designation is dangerous\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe IRGC is unlikely to respond to the terrorist designation with military acts against US forces in the region, as some foreign experts have \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/04/trump-iran-revolutionary-guard-terrorist-organization/586663/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ewarned\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. Nevertheless, the new status could potentially put US forces in harm’s way or drag the US into yet another open-ended war in the Middle East if some routine encounter should inadvertently escalate because of the new designation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran has, however, applied a terrorist designation of its own to \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/04/iran-fto-designation-irgc-trump-reciprocation-reaction-tehran.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCENTCOM\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e and \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/953178/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%AF\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eall the forces and organisations under its command\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, meaning that any engagement between the US and IRGC could be viewed as an engagement between so-called ‘terrorist’ groups, rather than the legitimate armed forces of two governments – a situation with significant implications in terms of international law. For example, if the IRGC, which routinely patrols the Strait of Hormuz, were to decide to harass or turn back oil carriers from other Gulf nations in response to the suspension of the oil waivers, it could be considered that, as a terrorist organisation, it is involved in terrorist activity, thereby inviting a kinetic response from the US or its allies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThese mutual designations have not yet impacted military-to-military contact instructions between the US and Iran, namely the rules of engagement, but with the legal basis in place, this could change at any time. The real danger to US forces in the region is not the threat of an Iranian retaliation – it is in fact the uncertainty created by these designations.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAny interactions between US and Iranian forces will potentially carry a different burden than before. Should an encounter take place, whether accidental or intentional, and whether in \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/08/designating-irgc-terrorist-organization-will-make-us-relations-with-iran-more-difficult-heres-how/?utm_term=.8fd53c41f217\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIraq\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, Syria or in the crowded waters of the Gulf, neither side has likely developed clear rules of engagement that consider the new status of each force. This creates a dangerous uncertainty, exacerbated by the lack of direct channels of communication between the two states. Ultimately, it risks a spiral of tensions that would be difficult to reign in.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAccidents in any theatre can result in escalation. The uncertainty around engagement after these designations is critical because it raises questions about the operations of US forces, with specific on-the-ground implications, particularly for the fight against ISIS and also for the frequent naval encounters between the US and IRGC.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUnintended implications\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been difficult and complex, with numerous players that are not traditionally allies fighting in tandem to defeat the organisation. The struggle has been one in which ‘the enemy of my enemy’ cannot necessarily be considered a friend.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOrganisations already designated by the US as terrorist entities – such as Hizbullah, the IRGC, numerous Iranian-sponsored militia groups and the Russians – have all at times been part of the fight against ISIS, as of course have US and coalition forces. Fighting on the same side, without fighting together and without actually being on the same side has been enormously complicated, especially for US and coalition air forces providing air support when the lines between friend and foe are often difficult to discern.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDespite the complexity, the US and its de facto coalition partners, the IRGC, Hizbullah and the Russians, combined to defeat ISIS without inadvertently getting into a fight with each other. Direct coordination between the US and Russia was crucial to this effort, as were the continual efforts of the Iraqi government to understand which forces were fighting where. While US and coalition air power apparently never provided direct support to Iranian-backed forces, neither did it attack them, as far as is known.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOutside of the fight against ISIS, American military forces and the IRGC have many daily encounters, ranging from normal operations to some more significant exchanges. American military leaders acknowledge that there are regular communications with IRGC vessels, for example, in open waters as they need to signal when ships cross paths or come near each other. But now, these exchanges would require the US military to interact with forces deemed to be part of a terrorist organisation, making their nature far more uncertain.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere have also been more significant exchanges, such as an \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-navy-crew-release.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eincident\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e in 2016 when the IRGC seized two American patrol boats. In that particular instance, while the seizure of American boats by the IRGC could have sparked a larger conflict, the situation was de-escalated in a series of phone calls between Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry. Today, the same incident would be unlikely to end as peacefully, both because there are no communication channels in place and because of the new designations by both sides.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhat comes next?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe unintended threats to regional dynamics and US forces are clear – but what specific on-the-ground results are supposed to follow from this designation? If it is designed to continue to put ‘maximum pressure’ on the Iranian regime, apparently in ways additional sanctions could not, how does the administration expect that to happen? Does it expect that US military forces will seek out and destroy IRGC units in the same way they sought out and destroyed ISIS? Will IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani be as \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-pressure-iran-branding-its-guard-terror-group-n992011\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003esought\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e after as the leader of ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? Will US Navy ships be ordered to attack the IRGC vessels that they regularly encounter in the crowded Gulf?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNeither the actual ramifications of a more aggressive policy with respect to the IRGC nor the desired end game are apparent in the new designation. The withdrawal of waivers for nations still importing oil from Iran is the next step in the campaign against Iran and will increase pressure on the Iranian economy – and the IRGC by association.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003cspan\u003eIt is unclear how the administration sees the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation as contributing to regional stability. However, it is clear that the uncertainties that the designation creates are likely to increase the risk of accidents and escalation in an already volatile region, potentially dragging the US into another open-ended war. It is vital to initiate efforts to open de-escalatory channels of communication in order to prevent accidents from spiralling into something more dangerous. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_gXS51ulw3UfKqbhdD3JTQ"))});
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe real danger behind Washington\u0026rsquo;s decision to categorise Iran\u0026rsquo;s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organisation is not an Iranian retaliation, but rather a new sense of uncertainty on the ground.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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