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\u003cp\u003eIn a country where \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.epdc.org/country/centralafricanrepublic\u0022\u003eless than 2%\u003c/a\u003e of the population completes their secondary education, a diploma should be precious. And yet, on 19 March, students and graduates in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR), \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/societe/33425-bangui-l-acte-2-du-mouvement-contre-la-recompense-aux-tueurs-du-peuple.html\u0022\u003ecarried their diplomas\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e through the streets in a wheelbarrow and deposited them\u003c/span\u003e in front of the National Assembly. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe students were protesting about the formation of the country\u0026rsquo;s new political cabinet the day before. As a result of the CAR\u0026rsquo;s latest peace agreement between the government of President Faustin Archange Touad\u003cspan\u003e\u0026eacute;\u003c/span\u003era and 14 of the country\u0026rsquo;s armed groups, their members were rewarded with government positions. For the protesting graduates, their hard-earned qualifications now felt useless, since fighting rather than education had once again been rewarded with power. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eHow did it come to this?\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe CAR has experienced varying levels of conflict for much of its post-independence history. However, the latest phase of that conflict has been exceptionally deadly. It began in 2013 when a large coalition of rebels known as S\u003cspan\u003e\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e ousted the sitting President Fran\u0026ccedil;ois Boziz\u0026eacute; and took control of the capital Bangui. While the CAR conflict eventually became associated with religion, this was not true of its early stages. S\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka members were largely from northern CAR, as well as from neighbouring Chad and Sudan, which have largely Muslim populations, unlike the largely Christian southern areas of CAR. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAfter they took Bangui, the S\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka rebels \u0026ndash; who had little in common other than opportunism and their opposition to Boziz\u0026eacute; \u0026ndash; engaged in widespread looting and violence around the city, which even the S\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka leader and newly installed President Michel Djotodia couldn\u0026rsquo;t stop. Southern Central Africans gradually came to think of these attackers as Muslims or foreigners rather than political opportunists, and began to form their own militias \u0026ndash; the Anti-Balaka \u0026ndash; in response. Trying to quell the violence, Djotodia announced the disbanding of S\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka. Instead of laying down arms, however, fighters formed their own factions, and armed groups proliferated. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTwo changes of president and seven peace agreements over the following five years failed to halt the cycle of violence. On 6 February this year, a new agreement brokered by the African Union was signed. \u003c/span\u003ePast peace agreements in the CAR have come with incentives for the armed groups, such as the handing out of political positions, but have failed to address the drivers of violence such as marginalisation. It remains to be seen whether the new agreement will be a repeat of these failures or a turning point in the conflict. However, there is little to suggest this latest approach can offer substantial change.\u003cstrong\u003e \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eEfforts at inclusivity spark instability\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBrokered in Khartoum and then signed in Bangui, the latest agreement mandates an \u0026lsquo;inclusive\u0026rsquo; government, with power shared between the existing administration and armed groups. The cabinet for that government was announced on 3 March under Prime Minister Firmin Ngr\u003cspan\u003e\u0026eacute;\u003c/span\u003ebada. While four armed group representatives were offered ministerial positions, the core of the previous political cabinet remained in place. Some groups received no representatives, and the larger groups were clearly disappointed they had not been granted more positions. The results were predictable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHours after the new cabinet was announced, the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa (FPRC), one of the largest, most influential rebel groups in the country, announced its withdrawal from the agreement. The following day, it paralysed the northern city of Nd\u003cspan\u003e\u0026eacute;\u003c/span\u003el\u003cspan\u003e\u0026eacute;\u003c/span\u003e, forcing businesses to close and students to leave their classrooms. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eShortly afterwards, the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) barricaded the crucial economic route between Bangui and Beloko on the Cameroonian border, causing \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/economie/33429-economie-inflation-du-prix-des-produits-de-premiere-necessite-consequence-du-blocage-de-l-axe-bouar-beloko-par-le-fdpc.html\u0022\u003efood prices to rise\u003c/a\u003e in Bangui. Then, in a cynical show of unity, the FRPC and its former enemies, the Anti-Balaka, made a joint statement, demanding more ministries since they controlled the most territory.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eJust who is in charge?\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is an oft-repeated fact that armed groups control or contest around 80% of the CAR\u0026rsquo;s territory, leaving the government with little or no bargaining power. Realising the precariousness of the Khartoum agreement, the African Union convened the 18 March Addis Ababa summit, from which four more rebel leaders emerged with powerful positions. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFDPC\u0026rsquo;s Abdoulaye Miskine \u0026ndash; who ordered the Bangui\u0026ndash;Beloko road blockade after the cabinet was announced \u0026ndash; was offered the post of minister for modernisation, which he turned down. Three other rebel leaders, including key players from the ex-S\u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ka, are now special military advisers, and other armed groups obtained special advisory positions to the president and prime minister, while still more representatives were given prefectures and positions in charge of certain state projects. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe leaders of the CAR\u0026rsquo;s major armed groups occupy a privileged position \u0026ndash; they can ask for what they want and simply resume fighting if they do not get it. The peace deal has bought a limited calm at a high price, proving to armed groups that their methods work. This is not the first time that Bangui has sought to buy peace through power-sharing deals with armed groups, but it is a disheartening repetition of a formula that has already failed, with little to suggest that things will be different this time. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe pact is vulnerable not only to the changing demands of rebel groups. For even if group leaders declare their commitment to peace, they cannot necessarily deliver. Chains of command within rebel groups are weak and new factions emerge frequently. If the rank and file fighters do not benefit from a settlement, they have no reason to stop fighting. Marginalisation and exclusion are potent drivers of militancy. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSymbolism over substance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe recent focus on elite pacts has largely side-lined more localised and sustainable mediation initiatives. One of the main criticisms of the present agreement is its failure to build on the 2015 Bangui Forum, a national dialogue involving armed group members, as well as a diverse range of civil-society groups and local representatives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the Forum, key armed groups agreed to disarm, release child soldiers, and begin a national justice and reconciliation process. Though those agreements ultimately broke down, the Forum made a convincing case that localised peace agreements could reduce violence more effectively and give participants incentives to keep the peace, including establishing livelihoods beyond the realm of militancy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe focus on political inclusion in the latest peace agreement is more symbolic than substantial. The accord does seek to establish a truth, justice and reconciliation commission, but limits its powers by design. Armed groups are to be part of the \u0026lsquo;inclusive\u0026rsquo; council that will decide the mandate and powers of the commission, thus undermining any prospect of genuine accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMore localised approaches to mediation are still producing encouraging results, however. On 11 April, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/central-african-republic-six-armed-groups-sign-peace-agreement-in-bria/\u0022\u003eannounced\u003c/a\u003e that six major armed groups had signed a peace agreement two days before in the central city of Bria, committing to ending the fighting in Haute-Kotto region. This more piecemeal approach is not without risks and does not make headlines, but remains the best chance of reducing violence over the long term.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch efforts could be strengthened if they were integrated into a national strategy \u0026ndash; one that would incorporate \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/1701_Peace-by-Pieces.pdf\u0022\u003esmall victories into the bigger picture\u003c/a\u003e. However, such an approach can only work if armed groups are not given reason to believe that they might gain more by taking up arms again.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_VcGKS5IiZ0ekqUdBqWx3Cg"))});
\u003cp\u003eThe latest attempts by the government of the Central African Republic to reach an accommodation with armed groups are a disheartening repetition of a failed formula. The price of this limited calm will be high, warns Eleanor Beevor.\u003c/p\u003e
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