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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAt the end of March 2019, the US Army issued a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity\u0026amp;mode=form\u0026amp;tab=core\u0026amp;id=993bcbdb0931b8779a7e0315d1099b66\u0026amp;_cview=1\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003eRequest for Proposals\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e (RFP) for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). This follows the army\u0026rsquo;s Future Combat System (FCS) and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) projects that were intended to provide a follow-on to the \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003e, but which were cancelled. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFuture Combat System\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe FCS was the US Army\u0026rsquo;s most ambitious programme. Begun in 1999, it aimed to replace, not just the \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003e but the army\u0026rsquo;s entire fleet of armoured vehicles with a \u0026lsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45519.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003efamily of networked, manned and unmanned vehicles, and aircraft\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026rsquo;. The army would also develop a new doctrine to go with them. With an emphasis on rapid global deployability, the FCS would maintain the level of lethality needed to defeat advanced enemies but with lighter vehicles designed around a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7461/08-02-army.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003esingle chassis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn what then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said was \u0026lsquo;the hardest decision [he] had to make\u0026rsquo;, the FCS was cancelled in 2009. The \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003earmy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e had hoped that \u0026lsquo;lower weight, greater fuel efficiency and, above all, near-total situational awareness would compensate for less heavy armor\u0026rsquo;. However, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular the widespread use of roadside bombs, convinced enough people in the Pentagon that the FCS design would not produce a survivable vehicle for combat against non-state actors, let alone against another state.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe development of a number of technologies, including those required to create the network of systems, also \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09793t.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003etook too long\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. The sheer size of the FCS programme meant that the army found project management and oversight difficult. In total, the army spent US\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696537.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e$21.4bn\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e on the entire FCS development with not a single \u003cem\u003eBradley \u003c/em\u003ereplaced.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGround Combat Vehicle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHowever, \u003cem\u003eBradley \u003c/em\u003estill needed replacing. Work began on the GCV in 2009, which continued much of the work done by the FCS programme. Like the \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003e, the GCV was intended to transport infantry across the battlefield, as well as provide fire support.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe US Army mechanised infantry platoon consists of three nine-person squads and a commander. As the \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003e can take only seven dismounts, this has meant splitting squads across four vehicles, which US Army commanders have \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44044-GCV-1column.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003elong disliked\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e due to the way it hinders communication and coordination across those units. There is also no room for transporting extra personnel.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBecause of this, each GCV was intended to carry a full squad of nine dismounts and each platoon was to have four GCVs to allow for extra capacity. But adding room for two extra soldiers had significant knock-on effects in terms of size and cost. The \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003e weighs 33 to 39 tons, whereas the GCV design was approaching 50 to 65 tons. A Boeing C-17 transport aircraft can carry two \u003cem\u003eBradley\u003c/em\u003es, whereas it would have only been able to transport one GCV. This would mean that deploying a sizeable force would be more expensive and take longer. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe programme staggered on until it was cancelled in 2014. The US Department of Defense (\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/2015%20Summary%20Base%20Budget%20Documents.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003eDoD\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e)\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e had found that the \u0026lsquo;design concepts were not optimized for the future Army\u0026rsquo;. Budget constraints had also led to the army \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2014/10/15/army-explores-its-armored-vehicle-options/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003eprioritising upgrades\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e to existing platforms. However, it is debatable whether such a heavy and expensive vehicle would ever have made it into service in large numbers with a military focused on global expeditionary operations.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhat has changed with the OMFV?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eStatements made by the US \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.army.mil/article/211236/preparing_for_future_battlefields_the_next_generation_combat_vehicle\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: windowtext;\u0022\u003eArmy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, as well as information included in the RFP, indicate that, unlike the FCS and GCV, the OMFV will be based on an off-the-shelf design. This should reduce risk and cost, particularly if the design is already in production somewhere else.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhereas the GCV needed to carry nine dismounts, the OMFV should \u0026lsquo;possess sufficient volume \u0026hellip; to carry at least six\u0026rsquo;. While this would help achieve the requirement of fitting two OMFVs inside a C-17, it would mean a mechanised infantry platoon of 28 would now require five vehicles. Unless the US Army is planning to change the size of its platoons, it would mean buying more OMFVs to maintain the same size force, thereby increasing costs. That said, as six soldiers is the minimum requirement for dismounts, the path of least resistance would be for the OMFV to carry seven.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlso of note is the stipulation that the OMFV \u0026lsquo;should eventually operate with no more than two crewmen\u0026rsquo;. The \u003cem\u003eBradley \u003c/em\u003ehas a gunner, driver and commander. A switch to a two-person crew would mean retraining personnel to adapt to new roles, but would reduce overall personnel needs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOpen-source statements concerning protection and firepower requirements are deliberately vaguer, and will depend to a large extent on US Army assessments of opponent capabilities and likely future threats.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHaving spent 20 years working on this problem, the army has already funded a raft of technology-development programmes that will feed into the OMFV, and has had the opportunity to learn from previous mistakes and successes.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUsing an existing design should reduce risks, but procuring an infantry fighting vehicle for a service with as many requirements and missions as the US Army will not be easy. The challenges of developing a vehicle with increased automation, with the potential to replace the driver and commander, are also significant.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe DoD plans to award two contracts to develop and test prototypes in 2020. Where the FCS was too light, the GCV was too heavy. The US Army must be hoping that the OMFV will be just right.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022font-weight: bolder; text-align: start;\u0022\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_Q0ZGxXh2pUujOSsqYxStA"))});
\u003cp style=\"text-align: justify;\"\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn the past 20 years, the US Army has spent almost US$24 billion on two projects to replace the \u003cem\u003eBradley Fighting Vehicle\u003c/em\u003e, but with no results. As it launches a third effort to develop and procure a successor, will it be any different this time? \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e
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