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\u003cp\u003eThe goal of establishing a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is little closer to fruition than when it was first proposed by Egypt and Iran in 1974. Several key elements of such a zone are far riper for adoption, however. If promoted by visionary leaders, four breakthroughs could be made toward the goal of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFour possible initiatives\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA first breakthrough could be the establishment of a nuclear-weapons testing-freeze zone in the Middle East. No state in the region is positively known ever to have tested nuclear weapons, and none has any strategic or political need to keep open an option to do so. A collective decision by states in the region to forego nuclear testing would be a boon to peace and security. It would also be a huge boost to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty by bringing on board Egypt, Iran and Israel, three of the eight states whose ratification is required for its entry into force. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA second achievement could be a decision to extend to all regional states some of the key provisions of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the accord in serious jeopardy due to the US withdrawal and campaign of pressure on Iran, multilateralising its provisions could be the most effective way of ensuring that its non-proliferation benefits are both sustained and multiplied. Aspects of the JCPOA that would be reasonable to extend to all states include the limit on uranium enrichment beyond 3.67%, the foregoing of plutonium reprocessing and the ban on certain activities that are applicable to nuclear-weapons development, such as the use of computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices and the design of multipoint-explosive detonation systems, as spelled out in Section T of the JCPOA. Verification measures of the accord that could be usefully applied region-wide include implementation of the Additional Protocol; the 24-day deadline for adjudication of access disputes; monitoring of centrifuge production and storage, the procurement chain and all uranium-ore concentrate; and the use by the International Atomic Energy Agency of modern safeguards techniques.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA third success within reach would be region-wide access to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). With 193 parties, the CWC is the arms-control treaty closest to being universally accepted. Among the four non-parties, South Sudan does not count as a holdout because, as a newly formed state, it simply has not had the time or capacity to sign. The three real holdouts include two – Egypt and Israel – that have absolutely no need to possess chemical weapons and for which use would go against their moral code. Yet they are uniquely associated with a notorious state – North Korea – that has no such compunctions. It is not a good club for them to be in.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA fourth achievement might address the issue of delivery vehicles. As the preferred means of delivering a nuclear payload, ballistic missiles are often considered to be an integral part of a weapon system. But not all ballistic missiles are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, particularly not the heavy warheads common to new nuclear aspirants. Therefore, not all missiles need be restricted. In any case, a complete ban is wholly unrealistic. Regional missile-control limits might apply to missile systems that exceed a certain distance (say, 2,000 kilometres) or that were clearly designed to carry nuclear weapons (for example, systems imported from countries such as North Korea that developed them for this purpose). The Missile Technology Control Regime threshold of considering any missile that can fly more than 300 km with a 500 kg warhead to be nuclear capable is not the only relevant criterion. Space-launched vehicles that clearly are for civilian use, for example, may be exempted from a ban based on range limits. Transparency measures should accompany such limits, as well as a ban on transfers from external players and on transfers of missiles within the region. The latter is of immediate importance given the threat to civilian aviation by missiles fired by non-state actors in Yemen.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eConcern about ballistic-missile proliferation in the Middle East is often focused exclusively on Iran’s ongoing development of an arsenal that now includes 13 different systems, with others potentially to follow. Yet seven states in the Middle East possess ballistic missiles with a range of at least 300 km, and Hizbullah reportedly has 100,000 or more rockets of various ranges up to 250 km – or possibly more. It is highly improbable that Iran would accept any limits on its missile programme unless they also applied to its regional neighbours. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTime for a success story\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEgyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi is well placed to promote such an initiative. The traditional leader of the Arab countries, Egypt is one of the few states in the region that maintains diplomatic relations with every other state. In addition, Sisi personally is on good terms with the leaders of all the major outside powers, including US President Donald Trump, whose Middle East foreign policy is in dire need of a success story. A US-backed Sisi initiative could provide this.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIt is timely that President Sisi has taken up the mantle of president of the African Union. This is relevant because 2019 is the ten-year anniversary of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty coming into effect. Known as the Pelindaba Treaty, it prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition and testing of \u003ca href=\u0022https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_explosive_device\u0022 title=\u0022Nuclear explosive device\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003enuclear explosive devices\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in the territory of treaty parties. Egypt signed the treaty, but is one of a handful of African countries not yet to have ratified it. An initiative by Sisi to promote the above steps toward a WMD-free zone in the Middle East would also be a step toward firming up the Pelindaba Treaty and Africa’s nuclear-weapons-free status. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA breakthrough in any of these four areas would be great. A breakthrough in all four would be truly breathtaking.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr /\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis commentary is drawn from Mark Fitzpatrick\u0027s remarks at an International Expert Panel during the Third NPT PrepCom in New York on 8 May 2019, organised by Bernd W. Kubbig (Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East) and Marc Finaud (Geneva Centre for Security Policy), and funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_M1fu27FbU6SLd7vBLcF5w"))});
\u003cp\u003eIf world leaders backed some achievable arms-control initiatives in the Middle East, genuine progress could be made toward establishing a WMD-free zone in the region, writes Mark Fitzpatrick.\u003c/p\u003e
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