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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019%20CHINA%20MILITARY%20POWER%20REPORT%20(1).PDF\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e2019 edition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e of the annual report by the US Department of Defense (DoD) on Chinese military and security developments describes the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force expanding both in terms of its inventory and capability. But it also poses some significant unanswered questions relating to detail and the DoD’s assessment of the make-up of the force.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGenerally, the DoD report conforms with open-source assessments, including by the IISS in its \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance-plus\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMilitary Balance+ database\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, of the development of the Rocket Force as part of the current reorganisation of the PLA. However, as others \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/05/chinareport2019/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ehave noted\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e as well, it contains some notable revisions to assessed holdings of both launchers and their associated missiles compared to the 2018 report (see table), which deserve a closer look. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: red;\u0022\u003e\u003cimg alt=\u0022\u0022 src=\u0022/-/media/images/comment/military-balance-blog/2019/may/china-military-capability-table-866.jpg?h=376\u0026amp;w=866\u0026amp;hash=81006B2098FECB22885D9F1AEDCA4B9DB63F5B9F\u0026amp;la=en\u0022 style=\u0022height: 376px; width: 866px;\u0022 /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNumber changes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe most obvious launcher number changes are for ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which have in effect doubled, and those for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which have nearly tripled. Launcher totals for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) have both seen slight increases, whilst short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers remain essentially static. The totals for the missiles themselves are even more diverse, including a five-fold increase in IRBMs and a potential decrease in MRBMs and SRBMs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhat might be behind these adjustments? The missile changes are probably easier to explain than the launchers: the report appears to have shifted to a simpler, formula-based approach to calculating missile totals. For ICBMs, the report seems to now allocate one missile per launcher regardless of type; for IRBMs the multiple is 1–2 missiles per launcher, with 1–3 missiles for MRBM launchers and 3–6 for SRBMs and GLCMs. If such a change has indeed been adopted, the 2019 missiles totals are probably not directly comparable with their predecessors; a disappointment for open-source observers of the Rocket Force.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eExplaining the changed launcher totals is somewhat trickier. As noted in \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2019\u0022\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe Military Balance 2019\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, the PLA Rocket Force has been in the process of forming multiple new missile brigades as part of the PLA’s ongoing reorganisation; open-source evidence suggests that at least eight had been formed by early 2019. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNew missile brigades\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAssuming that the new brigades are organised and equipped in the same fashion as the existing ones (not necessarily a given), the increased launcher numbers in the report imply that two of these brigades have been equipped with ICBMs (assuming a standard 12 launchers per brigade), three with IRBMs (18 launchers per brigade), two with MRBMs (12 launchers per brigade) and one with GLCMs (27 launchers per brigade).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOpen-source evidence to tie individual missile brigades to specific new missile types is limited. One possibility is to infer roles and equipment from geographical location. The three new formations associated with locations in central China, such as Hanzhong and Luoyang, are close to existing ICBM formations and are most likely equipping with new road-mobile ICBMs, such as the DF-31A(G). However, at least one might be tasked with bringing the new DF-41 ICBM into service.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere are some potential candidates for new IRBM brigades too. The 621 Brigade, previously an MRBM brigade based at Jianshui, Yunnan province, near the Vietnamese border, has relocated several hundred kilometres deeper into China, to Yibin, Sichuan province, suggesting that it has traded-up for a longer-range missile, most likely the DF-26 IRBM. Other brigades in northern and southern China, particularly those at Dalian, Liaoning province, and Danzhou, Hainan Island, have also been speculatively associated with a new IRBM role. Open-source evidence on this is, however, very limited. A key question, therefore, is whether the increase in assessed IRBM formations in the new DoD report adds weight to the analysis on these units.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe DF-26 is the only IRBM known to be in service with the Rocket Force at present. However, the DoD report states that the Rocket Force ‘continues to grow its IRBM inventories, including that of the DF-26’. Does this phrasing imply that there are additional IRBM designs either in advanced test status or being fielded? In the section on regional missiles in the \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e2019 US Missile Defense Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, a single reference is made to a previously unpublicised Chinese missile designated ‘CSS-X-22’ (more properly ‘CH-SS-X-22’). While this designation is most likely associated with the DF-17 medium-range hypersonic glide-vehicle system \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etested in 2017\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, it could theoretically be a new IRBM design too (no range is specified in the Missile Defense Review itself). In either case, the ‘X’ in the system designation means that the missile is assessed to still be in development, and therefore not in operational service at present.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\n\u003cspan\u003eThe question of operational status is probably one of the most significant factors in squaring the numbers included in the DoD report with what can be observed in open sources. Many of the base facilities for the new brigades appeared still to be under construction in late 2018/early 2019. Other units appear to remain co-located with existing SRBM and MRBM brigades. While there are reports that at least some of these formations \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-05/05/content_232939.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ehave some level\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e of operational capability already, it is doubtful that they all have full operational capability. Perhaps one of the key conclusions to draw from this latest DoD report is that it underscores that fact that, for everyone, monitoring and assessing the detail of what is undoubtedly a significant and substantial transformation of the PLA Rocket Force is challenging.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022MsoNormal\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military\nBalance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and\nanalysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector,\nacademia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data\ninstantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cu5:p\u003e\u003c/u5:p\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cu5:p\u003e\u003c/u5:p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_4i0BTqj0HE2aGK3UW0y0hA"))});
\u003cp\u003eThe US Department of Defense’s latest report on Chinese military and security developments has drawn attention to the substantial transformation of the PLA Rocket Force. Henry Boyd takes a closer look at the assessments included, asking what might be behind the DoD’s revisions to the 2018 edition of the report. \u003c/p\u003e
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