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\u003cp\u003eBerthed at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base last week, the warship JS Izumo cut a sharp silhouette. Commissioned in 2015, the Izumo’s career is a reflection of Japan’s success as a regional power.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Japan’s biggest surface combatant, the Izumo weathered opposition from countries such as China, which accused Japan of launching an aircraft carrier prohibited under its pacifist constitution. Japan insists the Izumo is a helicopter destroyer, and hence legal under its reinterpreted constitution, which permits the deployment of assets for Japan’s defence.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSince then, it has been fairly plain sailing for Izumo and its sister ship, the JS Kaga. The Izumo and the Kaga have in the past three years gone on months-long deployments in the Indo-Pacific, asserting the fundamental right of Japan – and other trade-dependent countries – to open sea-lanes of communication. The freedom of navigation, as well as economic prosperity and the securing of regional stability, is a key pillar of Japan’s “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy”.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis year, the highlight of the Izumo’s Indo-Pacific deployment was in early May, when six ships from Japan, India, the Philippines and the United States carried out exercises in the South China Sea. The exercise was seen as an overt signal to China, underscoring the fact that Japan, the US and like-minded countries could bring naval power to bear in the South China Sea, as China continues its \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3009809/how-chinas-military-upgrade-and-trade-tensions-are-challenging\u0022\u003econtroversial military build-up\u003c/a\u003e in the area.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndia, Japan and the US are also part of the Quad, or quadrilateral security group, which meets and consults on vital defence and security issues. The Quad, which includes Australia, is also behind this free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJapan has also been indefatigable in playing a regional role in economics. In the wake of Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Tokyo played a major role in putting together the 11-nation \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/2180601/cptpp-looking-good-news-east-asia-and-its-looking-better\u0022\u003eComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership\u003c/a\u003e. It also sought to offer a more sustainable connectivity solution to a region in the form of Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, seen as a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/business/money/article/3007873/great-game-belt-and-road-global-competition-resources-strategic\u0022\u003enot-so-subtle counter\u003c/a\u003e to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe capstone of Japan’s regional assertions would come on June 1, when Acting US Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan formally presents America’s Indo-Pacific strategy at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe beauty of the Quad’s Indo-Pacific strategy is that it does not seek to nail China down on specific issues. For example, the assertion of the freedom of navigation does not specifically single out China. For now, however, the strategy buckles under the weight of its own contradictions. The four Quad members do not see eye to eye on the issue of China.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAmong the four, the US is the most strident on the threat posed by China. It has called China a “\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2160339/trump-increasingly-takes-aim-malign-power-china\u0022\u003erevisionist power\u003c/a\u003e” and is embroiled in a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3011169/us-china-war-attrition-over-trade-could-slow-global-economic\u0022\u003edamaging tariff trade war\u003c/a\u003e with China. India, while feeling threatened by Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, refuses to be drawn into any anti-China coalition.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJapan has criticised China’s activities in the South China Sea but has also \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2169863/what-abes-china-trip-means-belt-and-road-and-what-japan-has-gain\u0022\u003esought to cooperate\u003c/a\u003e with China on high-quality infrastructure and connectivity projects. Australia is a long-time US ally, but China is its biggest trading partner and a mammoth market for exports of commodities such as iron ore and coal.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy to take off, it needs Asean’s endorsement. But this is unlikely as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations refuses to choose between this strategy and the other regional vision: China’s belt and road.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAsean has largely taken a cautious, measured approach. Except for Indonesian President Joko Widodo, every Asean leader attended the \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/topics/belt-and-road-2019-forum\u0022\u003eBelt and Road Forum\u003c/a\u003e in Beijing in May. Despite expressing misgivings about a \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2166693/chinas-belt-and-road-colonialism-mahathir-not-all\u0022\u003e“new version of colonialism”\u003c/a\u003e in Asia, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir signed a fresh deal to proceed with the China-backed \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3005831/malaysia-decide-today-stalled-china-backed-east-coast-rail\u0022\u003eEast Coast Rail Link \u003c/a\u003eproject in April, after renegotiating the value of the project.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is understood that the Indo-Pacific strategy to be unveiled by the US at the Shangri-La Dialogue would be focused on security issues, and not the other two pillars – governance and economics. This might not sit well with Asean. Under its leader Indonesia, Asean is coming up with its own Indo-Pacific concept, focused less on security issues, and more on themes such as economic growth, connectivity and cooperation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMore importantly, Asean refuses to be drawn into any Indo-Pacific configuration which focuses on a putative China threat. Speaking in January last year, Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi said the Asean approach would be a “strong positive cooperation” in the Indo-Pacific, and not based on “suspicion or, worse, the perception of threat”.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLast year, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, making reference to the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, said: “There\u0027s never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas, but they are like sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean.”\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe unveiling of the US Indo-Pacific strategy at the Shangri-La Dialogue means the strategy is alive and kicking, and the US and its partners advocating the strategy will continue to engage with Indo-Pacific states. With the continued push for this strategy, and China’s emphasis on the belt and road, the market for regional visions and architecture will continue to be contested. The Izumo will have to keep on sailing, even into contested waters.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis op-ed was originally published by \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3010999/america-and-japans-vision-indo-pacific-free-chinese-threat\u0022\u003eSouth China Morning Post\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_fa3pXJ91MEISpkRSbruNQ"))});
\u003cp\u003eThe ‘free and open Indo-Pacific strategy’ most stridently championed by the US is to some extent supported by members of the Quad security bloc, but Asean refuses to be drawn into any configuration which focuses on a putative China threat\u003c/p\u003e
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