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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNorth Korea’s launch of a \u003cem\u003eHwasong\u003c/em\u003e-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 27 November 2017 was probably its \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/02/testing-north-korea\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e43rd\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e ballistic-missile test in two years – a remarkable tempo by any standard. It did not carry out another test for the next 522 days, until 4 May 2019, when two launches of a new, solid-fuel-motor, short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) took place, quickly followed by two more, five days later. While arguably provocative, the SRBM tests are being carefully portrayed by Pyongyang and may mark the North’s frustration with the lack of progress in talks with Seoul and Washington, rather than signal a collapse of the process.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe previous high tempo of test launches demonstrated a perhaps surprising range of North Korean missile developments. The 2016–17 test programme included successful shots of two ICBM designs that at least notionally had the ability to deliver a nuclear payload to the continental United States. Though by the standards of a traditional missile-development project, the ICBM designs remained woefully under-tested, and neither has yet been fielded.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAt this point, however, North Korea did engage diplomatically with South Korea and the US, with discussions including the possibility of halting Pyongyang’s efforts to field an ICBM. In April 2018, ahead of the summitry with Seoul and Washington, Pyongyang announced a moratorium supposedly covering nuclear and long-range missile tests ‘while in discussion with the US’, but in reality, it was extended voluntarily by Pyongyang to all ballistic-missile tests, irrespective of range.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cimg alt=\u0022\u0022 src=\u0022/-/media/images/comment/military-balance-blog/2019/may/north-korea-ballistic-missile-test-launches-2016-19.jpg?h=263\u0026amp;w=866\u0026amp;hash=81A77CFA93ABB209141BD57695E912B0BF7C5E11\u0026amp;la=en\u0022 style=\u0022height: 263px; width: 866px;\u0022 /\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eComplementing this ballistic-missile restraint was a reduced scale of conventional military activity, at least in the public eye. Notable by their absence were provocative military drills with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in attendance. Reining in its customary shows of force was likely an attempt to further smooth diplomatic efforts.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePyongyang’s increasing military activity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNevertheless, North Korea’s last \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/09/north-korea-missing-missiles-no-surprise\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003emilitary parade, in September 2018\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e was a \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: black;\u0022\u003ereminder that whatever the prospect of denuclearisation, it retains one of the largest conventional armed forces in the world. While outfitted predominantly with obsolete or obsolescent equipment, there are key pockets of modernisation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: black;\u0022\u003eThe parade\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e was followed in November the same year with the test of an unspecified ‘\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181116000452315\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etactical weapon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’. From the language used in North Korean reports, this did not appear to be a ballistic missile, but it was the North’s first publicly acknowledged weapons test in a year.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn April 2019, there was another \u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1118646565542010880\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etactical guided weapon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e test, and \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1118571337537265664\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKim Jong-un ‘guided’ an air force drill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e This again was something absent since 2017.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLimiting tests; testing limits?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePyongyang appears to be trying to calibrate its activities and test diplomatic ramifications, as well as weapon performance. The firings of the new tactical weapon/weapons placed an emphasis on its tactical nature, but there have so far been \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1063389951746867200\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eno imagery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e or technical details released.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe tests in early May of the solid-fuel-motor SRBM, which reportedly carries the US designation ‘\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190517003900325\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKN-23\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e were couched similarly, with state media pushing a low-key narrative. The missiles – though prominently displayed – were again ambiguously referred to as ’\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: black;\u0022\u003etactical guided weapons’\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. Nor were they specifically identified as tests of a new system, but subsumed in an account of wider \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003edefence\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e unit training drills for the Eastern (4 May) and Western (9 May) fronts. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe 4 May drills included long-range, 300mm rocket artillery, fired at similar ranges (more than 200 kilometres) and likely trajectories as the missiles. Hence, perhaps, South Korea’s initial uncertainty over what had been launched. This may in fact have been a North Korean attempt to deceive and/or conceal any potential failures. It could also be seen as part of Pyongyang’s wider efforts to portray these systems as simply extensions of existing tactical artillery forces.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNevertheless, while a corresponding missile design was debuted at a \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/961555850878955520\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFebruary 2018 parade\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, these were the first known flight tests of this solid-fuel-motor system, potentially presenting distinct new capabilities, should it reach operational status.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlthough the missile itself resembles the Russian 9K720\u003cem\u003e Iskander\u003c/em\u003e (SS-26\u003cem\u003e Stone\u003c/em\u003e) – and by extension, the South Korean\u003cem\u003e Hyunmoo\u003c/em\u003e-2 – it does not necessarily have similar capabilities. However, the two more distinct and longer-range (270 km and 420 km) firings that occurred on 9 May showed one similarity with \u003cem\u003eIskander\u003c/em\u003e: the use of flattened or depressed trajectories. Such trajectories make flight-path prediction and interception more challenging for \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.38north.org/2019/05/melleman050819/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003emissile defences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. The\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48212045\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e50 km altitude\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e reportedly reached could exploit potential gaps in the coverage of the existing \u003cem\u003ePatriot\u003c/em\u003e and THAAD missile-defence systems operating in South Korea. Furthermore, despite the SRBM’s portrayal as conventional system, a dual-use (nuclear) capability cannot be discounted.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSeoul and Washington’s responses\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIrrespective of South Korea’s initial uncertainty over the nature of North Korea’s May launches, the office of President Moon Jae-in was quick to declare a breach of the joint military accords signed at the North Korea–South Korea summit in September 2018. In contrast, the US administration has publicly \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1124670603179565056\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003edownplayed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e the significance of the launches to future talks, in particular because the \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/rep-david-cicilline-on-the-growing-battle-between-house-democrats-and-the-trump-administration\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etest moratorium’s focus is ICBMs\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that would threaten the US. While exposing the different priorities within the South Korea/US alliance, North Korea could also interpret Washington’s moderate response as a tacit green light for further tests below the ICBM threshold.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePredicting Pyongyang’s next move remains challenging, but the array of new ballistic-missile systems revealed since 2016 has had only very limited flight testing. While North Korea’s technical threshold for accepting such systems into service is lower than that of the established ballistic-missile powers, further testing and development work would provide greater confidence in and credibility for North Korea’s missile capabilities, before Pyongyang committed to production and deployment. However, Pyongyang’s decision-making on ranges and payload options for its next missile launch will also no doubt include a carefully calibrated political calculation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background-color: #ffffff; text-align: justify; color: #000000;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: justify;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background-color: #ffffff; text-align: justify; color: #000000;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_qXrHv9xa4kGAG6tJEIzLgg"))});
While Pyongyang’s recent launches of a new short-range ballistic missile may highlight uncertainty around the future of diplomatic negotiations with Seoul and Washington, North Korea’s decision-making will continue to include a carefully calibrated political calculation, writes Joseph Dempsey.
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