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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWith the drive for North Korean detente stuck in reverse, it is time to re-energise diplomacy. Although Pyongyang is currently more keen on firing projectiles than probing engagement, it is not uncommon for states intent on changing the diplomatic dynamics to simultaneously employ both lips and teeth. \u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eA minor but meaningful step that North Korea could make in the latter category would be to follow through with its offer to allow international verification that its nuclear test site is inoperable.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eWhen US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang in October 2018, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ‘\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/world/asia/pompeo-north-korea-visit.html\u0022\u003einvited inspectors\u003c/a\u003e to visit the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled’. Implementing this promise would be a useful step forward for all parties.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e‘No way to know’\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eFor North Korea, inviting inspectors, even retroactively, would boost the otherwise paltry public-relations benefit that it received for \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-expected-to-close-nuclear-test-site-despite-squabbles/2018/05/24/37968082-5f0e-11e8-8c93-8cf33c21da8d_story.html?utm_term=.dcc924643e80\u0022\u003edynamiting the test tunnels\u003c/a\u003e last May. In the absence of certified experts – the untrained journalists that North Korea invited to witness the explosions do not count – there is no way to know how thoroughly the tunnels were collapsed and whether the damage could be reversed. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eFor the US and other concerned outside parties, verification of the test-site closure would set an important precedent for further dismantlement measures and yield useful data about North Korea’s nuclear programme. For these benefits to be maximised, the inspection should be carried out by the impartial and reputable Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Under-appreciated and often overshadowed by its fellow Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the CTBTO is uniquely qualified for the task. Whereas the IAEA’s role is to safeguard nuclear material, the CTBTO’s mandate is to detect nuclear tests. The \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-11/features/nuclear-test-ban-verifiable-denuclearization-north-korea\u0022\u003emonitoring assets and expertise\u003c/a\u003e the organisation has developed for this purpose are ideal for a Punggye-ri verification mission.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eIn addition to gauging the tunnels’ status via seismological monitoring, magnetic and gravitational-field mapping, ground-penetrating radar and other tools, the CTBTO, if given the mandate, could help paint a picture of what was tested at Punggye-ri during the six explosions conducted there between 2006 and 2017 from gamma-radiation monitoring, environmental sampling and multispectral imaging.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eWe know that the first test was of a plutonium device, after which a CTBTO atmospheric-radionuclide monitoring station in Canada detected elevated amounts of the noble gas xenon. After the third test in 2013,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: black;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: black;\u0022\u003emonitoring stations in Japan and Russia detected xenon isotopes 55 days later, but by then \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethe xenon had deteriorated too much to determine whether the device was based on plutonium or highly enriched uranium. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFor the other four tests, North Korea was able to prevent egress of noble gases.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe final test on 3 September 2017 is of particular significance given its large yield (estimated at between 140 and 250 kilotonnes) and North Korea’s claim that it was of a thermonuclear device. If invited to inspect the site, the CTBTO itself would not go so far as to verify this claim, but the data it collected would enable others to make such assessments. Diplomatic efforts to denuclearise North Korea would be enhanced if more were known about how far the country has progressed in its nuclear-weapons development.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMoscow in \u003cem\u003enyet\u003c/em\u003e mode\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile a CTBTO visit to Punggye-ri would be in the interests of all concerned states, Russia has raised an odd objection. Moscow is not keen on allowing the CTBTO to conduct ‘on-site inspections’ before the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) comes into effect, fearing that the full functioning of the organisation in this manner would remove an incentive for US ratification of the treaty. But a visit to confirm the collapsed tunnels would be very different in character from an on-site inspection, the purpose of which is to verify whether or not a nuclear explosion has taken place. And it would be a helpful confidence-building measure that could contribute to bringing North Korea into the treaty and thereby hastening its entry into force.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRussia should welcome CTBTO verification at Punggye-ri as being in line with President Vladimir Putin’s call, during his summit with Kim in Vladivostok in April 2019, for \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-arrives-in-russian-far-east-ahead-of-first-ever-summit-with-kim-jong-un/2019/04/24/a2d941f8-65c6-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html?utm_term=.8baef034167e\u0022\u003emultilateral involvement\u003c/a\u003e in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Since Russia objects to a purely bilateral US–North Korea negotiation, it should prefer international verification at Punggye-ri over the default option of US government experts alone conducting the inspection.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA CTBTO verification visit to Punggye-ri would serve an additional purpose of familiarising North Korean officials with the organisation. North Korea might then take up CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo’s invitation to become an observer to the treaty, like Cuba, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The CTBTO could also be given an ongoing monitoring role in North Korea. These could be steps toward codifying Pyongyang’s testing moratorium by adhering to the CTBT. While North Korea would need concrete benefits as a quid pro quo for signing the treaty, doing so would not undercut its security. After the last nuclear test and a November 2017 successful test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, North Korea announced that it had accomplished its mission to build n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003euclear forces. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #111111;\u0022\u003e‘\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/20/north-korea-says-it-will-suspend-nuclear-and-long-range-missile-tests.html\u0022\u003eWe no longer need any nuclear test\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #111111;\u0022\u003e or test launches of intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’, Kim said last April.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAllowing verification at Punggye-ri is not the most important step that North Korea could take to demonstrate its diplomatic bona fides. But in terms of ‘bang for the buck’, it is a move that could produce the most concrete benefits for the lowest price. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_lkIOU32LiUaDFjMfUTog"))});
\u003cp\u003eIf North Korea keeps its promise to invite international inspectors to verify the dismantling of its nuclear test site, says Mark Fitzpatrick, Pyongyang would demonstrate some diplomatic bona fides at little to no cost.\u003c/p\u003e
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