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\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis year, the French aircraft carrier \u003cem\u003eCharles de Gaulle\u003c/em\u003e berthed alongside Changi naval base in Singapore during the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. The ship\u0026rsquo;s attendance is a potent symbol of France\u0026rsquo;s intention to remain regionally engaged, and indeed to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific. Significantly, the \u003cem\u003eCharles de Gaulle \u003c/em\u003eis the centerpiece of a four-ship French task group (plus a submarine), reflecting a shift in the region\u0026rsquo;s maritime dynamics. As the blue-water capabilities of the main regional naval fleets mature, and other major navies refocus their deployments, task groups are again to the fore as a more potent and flexible means of exerting maritime influence.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere has been much preoccupation in the maritime domain with \u0026lsquo;grey zones\u0026rsquo; and the potential for hybrid competition at sea. But in the strategically turbulent waters of the Indo-Pacific, much of the focus of attention in terms of hard naval power has been on individual ship deployments and encounters, or small group missions such as the Chinese People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, now on its 32nd deployment.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHowever, with both the stakes and regional capabilities rising, task groups centred on a major warship or capital ship, with supporting vessels, offer the ability to display a higher level of strategic ambition and real operational potential, as well as more opportunities for engagement and partnership \u0026ndash; that is, naval diplomacy. However, task groups are also a potential source of increased tension.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChinese and US navies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe US Navy is no stranger to task-group deployments, with either full-blown aircraft carriers or large amphibious ships, but even it is changing the patterns of how it goes about such deployments. Although task groups are back in fashion beyond the Indo-Pacific region, as navies refocus on potential state-on-state challenges, they are likely to have most impact in the Indo-Pacific.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe one to watch remains China. Quite a few naval analysts probably lost money in bets over the non-appearance of China\u0026rsquo;s first domestically built aircraft carrier at the PLAN\u0026rsquo;s 70th birthday fleet review in April 2019. The prototype second-hand carrier, the \u003cem\u003eLiaoning\u003c/em\u003e, was there. But perhaps of more interest and significance was the fact that the review allowed the PLAN to show just how many strides it has made with all the other building-blocks it will need to deploy carrier-centred task groups.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn particular, on display was the first Type-055 cruiser, as well as the first of the Type-901 large replenishment ships. The US Navy still holds a big lead in terms of high-end task-group escorts, but China is doing its best to catch up. According to IISS analysis, the PLAN commissioned 11 of its latest Type-052D destroyers in the last five years (plus two of the earlier Type-052Cs) in addition to the advent of the first Type-055. By comparison, over the same period, the US Navy commissioned three of its latest (Flight IIA) \u003cem\u003eArleigh Burke-\u003c/em\u003eclass destroyers.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn May 2018, the PLAN declared an initial operating capability for the \u003cem\u003eLiaoning \u003c/em\u003eand the task group with which it has been training and developing skills. The second carrier (the first indigenous one) may not have taken its public bow in April, but it still seems set to be commissioned some time during 2019.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChina\u0026rsquo;s ambition to extend its reach and operational options remains evident. It earned Russia\u0026rsquo;s ire by copying the Su-33 \u003cem\u003eFlanker\u003c/em\u003e D as the basis for its Shenyang J-15 carrier-borne fighter. But Beijing appeared to differ from Moscow in its approach: from the outset, the J-15 was intended to be multi-role, while the Su-33 is an air-to-air fleet defender. Indeed, the J-15 has been shown on the \u003cem\u003eLiaoning\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo;s flight deck fitted with dummy anti-ship missiles along with air-to-air weapons, while there is also Chinese television footage of what appears to be a YJ-83 anti-ship missile being launched from a J-15. Irrespective of the extent to which PLAN training in the air-to-surface role has been undertaken, it is an indication of travel. And, despite continuing challenges, the debut of significant operational Chinese task groups, both closer to home and further afield, cannot be long delayed.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOther regional navies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMeanwhile, other regional navies have been transforming and adapting the way they can operate. The Royal Australian Navy is well on the way to reviving itself as a task-group navy \u0026ndash; a capability it has not had since the early 1980s \u0026ndash; centred on its two new \u003cem\u003eCanberra\u003c/em\u003e-class large amphibious ships. HMAS \u003cem\u003eCanberra \u003c/em\u003ehas just returned from the latest of Australia\u0026rsquo;s new regional engagement deployments, begun in 2017 and codenamed \u003cem\u003eIndo-Pacific Endeavour\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has also been making the most of its largest warships, the \u003cem\u003eIzumo \u003c/em\u003eclass, previously described by Japan as \u0026lsquo;helicopter-carrying destroyers\u0026rsquo; but in effect light aircraft carriers, in some high-profile group deployments, including into the Indian Ocean. Despite Japan playing down the significance of its decision to modify these ships to accept F-35B combat aircraft, this will only enhance their ability to lead task-group deployments in the future. South Korea has also reaffirmed its ambitions to create a blue-water capability that will include the ability to deploy task groups.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOn the way to Singapore, the \u003cem\u003eCharles de Gaulle \u003c/em\u003eexercised with the \u003cem\u003eIzumo \u003c/em\u003eand other Japanese and US warships. This activity looks like the shape of things to come. Task-group deployments allow for significant exercise engagements to demonstrate capability and partnership.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnglo-French task-group model\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWith the possibility that the United Kingdom\u0026rsquo;s new aircraft carrier HMS \u003cem\u003eQueen Elizabeth\u003c/em\u003e and accompanying warships may follow the \u003cem\u003eCharles de Gaulle\u003c/em\u003e and sail to Singapore and elsewhere in the region in 2021, future French and UK task-group deployments (perhaps with other European navies contributing) may be the model for increased European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. They may also be a way for London and Paris to offer a significant formation with which to cooperate with Indo-Pacific navies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe challenge for France and the UK is that such deployments require considerable resources. How often they will be able to repeat these missions is open to question, particularly given other operational demands. While the strategic pull to the Indo-Pacific may have increased, this is the first time the \u003cem\u003eCharles de Gaulle \u003c/em\u003ehas operated in the region since the early 2000s.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFor regional navies, will the shift towards task-group deployments be the catalyst for increased cooperation and improved strategic stability, or a point of further friction at a new level of naval competition?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_OGlCQ8FgpEWKodSE8NRyg"))});
During the 18th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, France’s aircraft carrier \u003ci\u003eCharles de Gaulle\u003c/i\u003e was berthed at Singapore’s Changi naval base. The carrier has been leading a French naval formation that reflects increased task-group deployments in the region, potentially increasing maritime tensions but also offering a chance for increased naval cooperation and European naval engagement in the region, explains Nick Childs.
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