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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eWhile badged as \u0026lsquo;China\u0026rsquo;s National Defense in the New Era\u0026rsquo;, Beijing\u0026rsquo;s latest Defence White Paper in some ways reads more as a report card on the status of People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army (PLA) reform than a strategic policy document. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThere is much that will be familiar to seasoned readers of Chinese Defence White Papers in the latest version released on 24 July. However, there are also notable developments. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eAs with the 2015 document, there is a focus on regional challenges to China\u0026rsquo;s national security \u0026ndash; highlighting that, above all, China remains for now a regional military actor and not yet a global one. And the United States is predictably castigated as the source of regional and global instability through its military alliances, deployment and intervention, hegemony and \u0026lsquo;significantly increased\u0026rsquo; defence expenditure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe 2015 paper \u0026lsquo;explained\u0026rsquo; China\u0026rsquo;s military strategy and outlined the direction that military reforms would take. The strategy outlined in 2015 still holds today, with specific attention paid to China\u0026rsquo;s No First Use nuclear policy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eProgress in military reform efforts\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eWhere the White Paper departs from its predecessors is in documenting where progress has been made in reform efforts and, more importantly perhaps, where they have fallen behind schedule. Delays in the plans for army \u0026lsquo;mechanisation\u0026rsquo; by 2020 are singled out, while the PLA is \u0026lsquo;in urgent need of improving its informationization\u0026rsquo;. There is a particular focus on numbers of training events, exercises and drills under \u0026lsquo;realistic combat conditions\u0026rsquo;, again emphasising the work that has been done since 2015 to prepare the PLA to fight and win wars. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe White Paper also reflects calls in the 2015 document to strengthen the use of innovative technologies and promote science and technology development, keeping up with the \u0026lsquo;Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics\u0026rsquo;. But innovation in the 2019 document also refers to the ways the PLA is now governed and managed, with regards to the progress made in reforming leadership and new command systems, improving joint operations command systems, strengthening party building and reforming military institutions. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe overall sense is that, in the past three years, the PLA has slowly but surely become a more professional war-fighting institution, having let go of the personnel and peripheral functions that have been a hindrance to this goal.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eWhat is also fresh is a section dedicated to \u0026lsquo;reasonable and appropriate defense expenditure\u0026rsquo;, arguing that China spends less on its military than the US, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany or France. The document lists the costs that are included in China\u0026rsquo;s defence spending calculation, though unsurprisingly does not provide breakdowns further than personnel, training, and sustainment and equipment expenses. And the statistics do not match the figures provided by China\u0026rsquo;s Ministry of Finance, but instead are taken from the National Bureau of Statistics\u0026rsquo; Statistical Yearbooks. The picture of actual expenditure, though slightly clarified, still remains murky.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eWhat is left out of the White Paper?\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eAlso of interest is not only what is included but more so what has been left out of the 2019 White Paper. Since 2015 there has been significant open-source reporting on China\u0026rsquo;s development of advanced equipment and platforms. In the White Paper, only one example is given for each service branch: the Type-15 tank for the Army, Type-052D destroyer for the Navy, J-20 fighter for the Air Force and DF-26 for the Rocket Force. There is no mention of developments relating to hypersonic cruise missiles or glide vehicles, uninhabited aerial vehicles or the air-launched or sea-launch nuclear-capable missiles that China is continuing to develop. Similarly, nuanced discussions on the organisation of the Strategic Support Force and Rocket Force are missing. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe Belt and Road Initiative is not mentioned in the document, though attention is paid to using the People\u0026rsquo;s Armed Police, newly governed now by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, in its role to combat terrorism, and using the PLA to protect China\u0026rsquo;s overseas interests through international security cooperation. Any use of this language as definitive proof that China has future plans to militarise the Belt and Road Initiative is, however, reading quite far between the lines.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe Taiwan issue\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eChinese sovereignty over the South China Sea is emphasised, with mention of the \u0026lsquo;progress\u0026rsquo; being made by claimant countries. However, the sharpest comments are reserved for Taiwan. While the 2015 White Paper discussed the Taiwan issue with some detail, this year\u0026rsquo;s edition particularly mentions that the \u0026rsquo;fight against separatists is becoming more acute\u0026rsquo;, stubbornness on the part of the DPP-led Taiwanese authorities and refusal to recognise the 1992 Consensus. This language is not unsurprising, as we heard it at President Xi Jinping\u0026rsquo;s 2019 New Year\u0026rsquo;s address and at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in June this year. But it underscores that Taiwan is not becoming any less of a flash point in the region.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003eThe latest White Paper paints a picture of a PLA that is on its way to modernising (though perhaps more slowly than Beijing would have liked) and has spent significant effort at reasonable financial cost to meet its 2020, 2035 and 2050 reform targets. It continues to portray China as a defensive actor, but one that has clear red lines drawn around territorial and sovereignty issues. While it goes into more granular detail in selective areas, a possible attempt at being more transparent, its tone on issues around Taiwan and the South China Sea may still be too harsh to overcome doubts that the PLA is, as the new document declares, a \u0026lsquo;staunch force for world peace, stability and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind\u0026rsquo;.\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_drsnKlTX2EqvkhmteHRAoA"))});
The latest Chinese Defence White Paper released on 24 July paints a picture of a People’s Liberation Army that is on its way to modernising, documenting where progress has, or has not, been made in military reform efforts, Meia Nouwens explains.
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