|
\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was arguably the single-most successful arms-control treaty ever to be agreed. It was in place for 32 years and was designed to \u003c/span\u003e‘strengthen strategic stability’. As of 2 August – following the \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/\u0022\u003eUS withdrawal\u003c/a\u003e – that pillar of arms control no longer exists.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe treaty removed a class of dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, with ranges between 500 and 5,500km, that had been propelling an ‘arms race’ between the US and the USSR in the European theatre.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe treaty has collapsed after claim and counter-claim by the US and its allies and Russia, over the vexed issue of whether Russia had breached the terms of the treaty. The most significant allegations were that Russia’s development and testing of the 9M729 (SSC-8 \u003cem\u003eScrewdriver\u003c/em\u003e) dual-capable ground-launched cruise missile seriously violated the range threshold of the INF, and later that this system had been deployed operationally. In response, Moscow launched a series of far less categorical accusations regarding US missile-defence sites in Europe, unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missile targets\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe collapse of the INF Treaty is concerning in and of itself, but against the background of other arms-control failures, it is doubly so. Washington’s withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and Russia’s 2004 decision to shelve its early 1990s goals to reduce tactical nuclear holdings were each important indicators of a deteriorating arms-control environment.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChanging strategic environment\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBut the failure of the INF marks a new low. Its collapse increases strategic instability, particularly in Europe, at a time when tensions between NATO and Moscow are redolent of the Cold War. That NATO needs to respond to the deployment of the 9M729 may be a given, but the nature of the response will need to be carefully calibrated. Moscow’s perceptions of NATO’s behaviour are viewed through a prism of distrust that sees containment and encroachment in the Alliance’s every move. From Washington’s perspective, leaving the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a defensive shift, reflecting a different security environment, but it was likely a prompt for some of the Russian developments – including the 9M729 – that continue to erode arms control.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe INF Treaty was agreed between the US and the Soviet Union. The latter collapsed in 1991 under the weight of its own economic and ideological contradictions, while the former has emerged as a sometime reluctant and occasional hegemon. A new nationalism in Russia views the West’s behaviour in the 1990s as triumphalist and disrespectful. Moscow’s behaviour today is intended to redress what it sees as this ‘slight’. And not only does the US have to contend with a more assertive Russia, but Washington is also having to manage China’s emergence as a ‘global power’. The latter is the US pre-occupation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis poses a particular conundrum for arms control, exemplified by the INF. The Treaty was negotiated in a different, and particular, strategic environment with leaders of the two power blocs: ‘convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security’. A tentative attempt to expand the purview of the INF from a bilateral to a multilateral arms-control instrument came to naught in 2007. And in 2019 US President Donald Trump indicated his ‘interest’ in involving China in treaties such as the INF.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBeijing’s response was a flat rejection, and understandably so. Most of its ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles rest within the 500–5,500km range prohibited by the INF. As such, it appeared to be being asked to give up a great deal for little benefit.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTime for dialogue\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn the face of these growing arms-control challenges, the IISS is set to embark on a new research programme to help governments find new ways to strengthen strategic stability once again. The IISS Missile Dialogue Initiative will consider emerging missile technologies applicable to strategic systems, their implications for stability, and the prospects for meaningful, security-enhancing mechanisms for control. The programme will draw on a global expert community to identify and discuss the challenges together. The programme is supported by the German Foreign Ministry, and a Berlin conference later this year will serve as the launch of this three-year project.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eArms control is not an end in itself, and a poorly negotiated treaty could threaten rather than enhance stability. Rather, the function of arms control is to improve the collective security environment – it cannot be a zero–sum game. Considering this calculus and exploring possible answers will be central to the IISS Missile Dialogue Initiative.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_IopiKMr0ugLalz0nojBw"))});
The demise of the INF Treaty on 2 August signals a new low and increases strategic instability, write Douglas Barrie and Timothy Wright.
|
