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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlthough he has not succeeded in reducing North Korea’s nuclear threat, United States President Donald Trump deserves credit for continuing to pursue a diplomatic strategy combining economic pressure with engagement. Sanctions continue apace, yet the latter half of that strategy is stalled, as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducts an extraordinary series of missile tests, including the introduction over the past month of \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethree new systems\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e – to coincide with the South Korea–US summertime joint military exercises. Not that the defensive exercises are any justification for missile tests banned by the UN, but when they end in September, the current missile testing may also end. Trump will then have another opportunity to drive for detente. While continuing to press for ending North Korea’s nuclear programme, he should use the time to at least build a lasting mechanism for crisis stability.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0027Security guarantees\u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhen – and let us hope it is when and not if – Pyongyang resumes the working-level bilateral talks that North Korean \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: black;\u0022\u003eChairman Kim Jong-un\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eand Trump \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-dmz.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eagreed to at Panmunjom\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e on 30 June, the US side will continue to seek a definition of the denuclearisation end state and a roadmap for reaching it. The US also wants a verified freeze on development and production of all weapons of mass destruction. For starters, however, it may aim for a confirmation and expansion of Kim’s moratorium on missile launches to include all range categories and not just the intermediate and intercontinental system testing that Kim announced in April 2018.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn exchange, the US will need to address North Korea’s insistence on ‘security guarantees’, a vague objective that Pyongyang has prioritised over sanctions relief ever since the failed 27–28 February summit in Hanoi. Lifting sanctions is ‘trivial’, Kim said in a policy \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-security-guarantees-are-key-solving-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-64766\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003espeech\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e on 12 April, demanding instead an end to what North Korea calls the US ‘hostile policy’. What this means is unclear, but North Korea has consistently called for a peace agreement to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement and for US force reductions on and near the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, Pyongyang has demanded the US not \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-aircraft/north-korea-calls-south-koreas-f-35-jet-purchases-extremely-dangerous-action-idUSKCN1U60BJ\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etransfer \u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eF-35 stealth fighter jets\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #313132;\u0022\u003e to the Republic of Korea (ROK).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe US should not reduce force levels unless North Korea itself does so commensurately. The F-35s, for example, could be on the table if North Korea dismantled missiles that threaten the South and if the ROK agrees. In the meantime, moves toward a peace treaty would be a more proportionate quid pro quo for a missile launch moratorium. This need not mean initiating negotiations on a treaty; rather, it should start with some of the many steps that might form part of a peace process, such as a \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/08/call-end-korean-war\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003epolitical declaration of an end to the war\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, as Trump toyed with before the 12 June 2018 Singapore summit.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDurable communication channels\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eEstablishing a peace process will require durable communication channels. Trump has wisely engaged in unconditional diplomacy with North Korea, including the unusual exchanges of ‘\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-said-he-got-a-beautiful-letter-from-north-koreas-kim-jong-un\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ebeautiful letters\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’. The communications have been halting, however, as Pyongyang changed its players and prioritised summitry over substantive working-level talks. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTo regularise communications, it would be useful for the US and the DPRK to establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals. Having a ready channel for communications enhances crisis stability and would be valuable whether or not tied to any arms control measures. Talking with the adversary should not be regarded as a ‘gift’ to be bestowed in exchange for concessions. An agreement on formalising diplomatic arrangements can be usefully packaged and sold as a reciprocal step forward.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePosting US diplomats in Pyongyang would also be a tangible way to underscore a security assurance. What greater guarantee of no nuclear attack on the North Korean capital than to have American officials on potential ground zero? \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe DPRK and the US have tried before to exchange liaison offices. It was to have happened under the 1994 Agreed Framework, but floundered over disagreements on administrative arrangements, such as whether US personnel could transit the demilitarised zone separating North and South Korea. Exchanging liaison offices was also envisioned as part of the normalisation of relations called for in the 19 September 2005 \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/joint0509.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eJoint Statement of the Six Party Talks\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe liaison office idea was also \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.foxnews.com/world/what-us-liaison-office-in-north-korea-could-mean\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ediscussed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e at the Hanoi summit, but came to naught when Trump failed to get the greater denuclearisation deal he sought. Given the unlikelihood of a large deal, the US should at least seek smaller steps that have intrinsic value of their own. Exchanging diplomats would be a low-cost move, with no negative repercussions for military readiness or sanctions enforcement. It would be welcomed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and undoubtedly supported by the American body politic. It would be politically easier for Trump to achieve than any Democratic Party successor. If he is looking for a diplomatic success story, it is a no-brainer.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_FwiBsnGYkWG1M6Um23XLw"))});
While continuing to press for the denuclearisation of North Korea, Donald Trump should build a lasting mechanism for crisis stability, Mark Fitzpatrick argues.
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