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\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe PLA’s \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003emodernisation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e schedule is more than symbolically tied to the ‘Two Centenaries’ (\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e两个一百年\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e)\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003egoals of President Xi Jinping\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. The anniversary of the CCP’s founding is the first centenary, while the second, in 2049, will mark 100 years since the People’s Republic of China itself was founded. A more capable PLA is a fundamental part of the ‘China Dream’ (\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e中国梦\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e) \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e– a wide-ranging development and \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003emodernisation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e ambition for the Chinese nation promoted by Xi. The PLA has therefore been assigned a threefold series of waypoints for its own progress – in 2020, 2035 and 2049.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMechanisation and informationisation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBy 2020, the PLA is meant to have met the goals of achieving basic \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003emechanisation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e (\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e机械化\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e) and making significant progress towards informationisation (\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #333333;\u0022\u003e信息化\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #333333;\u0022\u003e)\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. This timeline was publicly laid out in the \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249949_2.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003e2008 Defence White Paper\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, and was recently reiterated in \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/10/27/content_281475922905044.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eXi’s speech\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The PLA has never made public what exactly it means by either term, but the former is broadly understood to address modernising equipment inventories, whilst the latter addresses the widespread adoption of digital systems in a networked environment.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe twin objectives reflect the fact that the post-Cold War PLA has been playing catch up with other major military powers, and the US in particular, in terms of equipment capability and how to conduct modern military operations. Seeking to narrow this gap quickly, it is trying to pursue both objectives \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.81.cn/theory/2018-11/14/content_9366166.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0022Hyperlink0\u0022\u003emore or less simultaneously\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlso in 2017, Xi appeared to indicate that the modernisation goals had been met. At the 1 August Army Day parade that year, he seemed to \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/01/c_1121416045.htm\u0022\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0022Hyperlink0\u0022\u003eannounce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that the PLA had already achieved mechanisation, and had made rapid progress towards informationisation. The authors of the latest white paper, however, take a more cautious line. In spite of good progress, the PLA ‘has yet to complete the task of mechanization, and is in urgent need of improving its informationization’.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eExamining facts on the ground suggests that, particularly with regard to mechanisation, Xi’s rhetorical flourish appears overly optimistic and the white paper’\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003es caution \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eperhaps \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eoverly pessimistic. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePLA Army progress\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe PLA Army proper (i.e. the ground forces) remains the most likely point of failure for the 2020 objectives. Although the most recent reorganisation has reduced the army’s overall size below 1,000,000 personnel, it still retains roughly twice as many active duty personnel as the US Army. Equipping such a force exclusively with modern equipment is an enormous undertaking. It is an even greater challenge given that the navy, air force and rocket forces are receiving priority over the army for their own ambitious programmes.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile the army has ambitions to standardise its equipment across its newly restructured combined arms brigades, with \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0022Hyperlink0\u0022\u003eheavy, medium and light roles\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e redolent of the US brigade combat team structure, for now a significant number of formations are still dependent on legacy platforms and systems. This ‘\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003epartial mechanisation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e’ of the army has \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.economist.com/briefing/2012/04/07/the-dragons-new-teeth?fsrc=nlw%257Chig%257C4-5-2012%257Ceditors_highlights\u0026amp;fsrc=nlw%257Chig%257C4-5-2012%257C1303226%257C36448386%257C\u0022\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0022Hyperlink0\u0022\u003elong been seen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e as a major complicating factor in the PLA’s pursuit of effective informationisation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOf the 5,800 main battle tanks listed in service in the IISS Military Balance+ database, only about 60% could be classified as modern; around 2,000 are still based on the obsolescent ZTZ-59 (a licence-built version of the Soviet T-54). The Type-15 (ZTQ-15) light tank referenced by the white paper has indeed now entered service, but only with one, or maybe two, brigades so far. For other armoured vehicles, the picture is worse: of the approximately 50 heavy and medium combined arms brigades in the PLA (excluding amphibious formations), only around 20 are currently equipped with the latest tracked (ZBD-04/-04A) or wheeled (ZBL-08) infantry fighting vehicles.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn short, completely replacing the PLA Army’s legacy platform inventory – presumably a key component of true mechanisation – would require the addition of thousands of new armoured vehicles and artillery pieces over the next two years. This is highly unlikely to occur, even if army modernisation was to receive a higher prioritisation than it has had in the past. A more realistic outcome might be to expect at least 50% of all PLA Army armoured vehicles, artillery and air-defence systems to be modern by 2020.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile such a result might be less politically palatable than full modernisation, it is important to remember that even a partially modernised PLA Army still represents an impressive capability. Even the 20 ZBD-04/ZBL-08-equipped brigades noted above already outnumber the 17 total Armoured and \u003cem\u003eStryker\u003c/em\u003e Brigade Combat Teams in the active duty US Army. Meanwhile, China’s neighbours, such as India, Russia and Taiwan, are all facing their own issues in relation to ground-forces modernisation. Given that the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force in particular are much further ahead than the army in terms of equipment modernisation, the 2020 deadlines may therefore represent more of a presentational concern than a practical one for the PLA.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime. The Military Balance+ includes data on China’s armed forces, equipment, defence economics, defence procurements, military exercises and deployments.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_HjF02RXtkkSyKABwUIaFw"))});
China’s 2019 Defence White Paper, published on 24 July, suggests that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be in danger of missing modernisation targets scheduled to be achieved before the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021.
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