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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOn 2 August 2019, the spokesperson of the Yemeni army affiliated with the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://youtu.be/rdQW9V7An4M?t=649\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eannounced\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that they conducted over 50 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks into Saudi Arabia between May and August of this year. The latest, titled \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/MasirahTV/status/1162641656207855616\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOperation First Deterrence Balance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, occurred on 17 August and saw Ansar Allah successfully target an Aramco gas facility deep into Saudi Arabia using 10 UAVs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe group\u0026rsquo;s deployment of UAVs serves two key functions \u0026ndash; punishment and propaganda. But while the tactical advantage of using UAVs is limited, their symbolic value against the coalition and their territories is significant. Ansar Allah has succeeded in constructing an image of resilience against a vastly superior military adversary. As well as targeting the territory of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, Ansar Allah has found a low-cost way to punish its rivals by inflicting reputational and political damage.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOrigins of Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s UAV arsenal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnsar Allah does not have an air force. Its \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://yemen-press.com/news64154.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003efirst recorded use of UAVs\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e came in December 2015, when it flew a DJI \u003cem\u003ePhantom\u003c/em\u003e series quadcopter \u0026ndash; a \u003c/span\u003ecommercially available\u003cspan\u003e hobbyist system \u0026ndash; that it had allegedly stolen from a local television station. In January 2016, \u003c/span\u003estories emerged\u003cspan\u003e of Ansar Allah deploying a UAV in an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity in the province of Ma\u0026rsquo;rib. The same model of UAV seen in December was shot down while reportedly carrying out further ISR operations by forces loyal to the coalition-backed president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn 2017, the extent of the group\u0026rsquo;s UAV arsenal became clearer. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eIt claimed to have \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://cdn.almasdarnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/photo_2017-02-26_16-30-53.jpg\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eproduced systems indigenously\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e and \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ebegan\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9MFZQzWAPo\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eto emphasise\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e the range of armed UAVs at its disposal. In February of that year, Ansar Allah unveiled highly stylised \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://cdn.almasdarnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/1-25.jpg\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003einfographics\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eof UAV operations, detailing their technical specifications and sensationalising their effectiveness. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOf the systems featured, the inclusion of the \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://cdn.almasdarnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/3-6.jpg\u0022\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRased\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e \u0026ndash; a low-cost commercially available \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003eSkywalker\u003c/em\u003e X-8\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e \u003cstrong\u003e\u0026ndash; \u003c/strong\u003esuggested that the group\u0026rsquo;s claims to have indigenously produced these systems itself might be overblown.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe seizure by the United Arab Emirates Presidential Guard of a truck containing several unassembled \u003cem\u003eQasef\u003c/em\u003e-1 UAVs in November 2016 cast further doubt on the technological and design abilities of Ansar Allah. In January 2018, the United Nations Panel of Experts (PoE) on Yemen \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ereport\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022http://https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf\u0022\u003eed\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that this system is \u0026lsquo;virtually identical in design\u0026rsquo; to that of an Iranian \u003cem\u003eAbabil-T\u003c/em\u003e UAV. \u003cspan style=\u0022color: black;\u0022\u003eHowever, the report included a communiqu\u0026eacute; from Iran\u0026rsquo;s representation to the UN stating that it had \u0026lsquo;no policy to transfer to or manufacture arms in Yemen\u0026rsquo;. The PoE also emphasised the low-tech nature of the \u003cem\u003eQasef\u003c/em\u003e-1.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSuccessful UAV construction is highly dependent on a variety of externally sourced and individually procured materials, including satellite compasses originating from Indian-based entities and electrical components of Chinese origin. While its arsenal includes repurposed commercial UAVs, for Ansar Allah to produce truly indigenous systems, it will be heavily reliant on a global market as it seeks to source components.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePropaganda and tactical effectiveness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eAnsar Allah\u0026rsquo;s UAV use has allowed it to make greater strategic gains in Yemen than in the coalition\u0026rsquo;s territory. A \u003c/span\u003eJanuary 2019\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e attack on al-Anad air base resulted in the assassination of Major-General Mohammad Saleh Tamah, who was chief of the Yemeni army\u0026rsquo;s military intelligence unit and aligned with the Hadi presidency. While Ansar Allah have not been able to replicate such a significant gain against Saudi Arabian or Emirati military personnel abroad, the group has been able to expose weaknesses in the coalition\u0026rsquo;s defensive architecture.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eNonetheless, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUAVs have been successfully deployed to target and disable coalition \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2017/03/28/report-houthi-rebels-flying-iranian-made-kamikaze-drones-into-surveillance-radars/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eair defences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003einflicting notable reputational damage. As with \u003c/span\u003eOperation First Deterrence Balance\u003cspan\u003e, an \u003c/span\u003eattack\u003cspan\u003e against a Saudi Arabian Aramco facility in May 2019 showed how attacks with substantially inferior technology can succeed in rendering vulnerable what is intended to be \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/05/saudi-oil-infrastructure\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ecrisis-proof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003e infrastructure. Although Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s missiles have largely been intercepted by the coalition, unsophisticated UAV attacks are humiliating for a coalition led by the Middle East\u0026rsquo;s largest military spender.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eLow-flying UAVs have also gone undetected by coalition air defences. Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s UAVs repeatedly targeted airports in Saudi Arabia in \u003c/span\u003eMay\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e, June and \u003c/span\u003eJuly\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e 2019, \u003c/span\u003ekilling\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e one civilian and injuring scores across several attacks on Najran and Abha International. These attacks have not inflicted strategic damage, but the targeting of \u003c/span\u003ecivilian infrastructure\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e has signalled Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s escalation rationale. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eBy targeting civilian sites within the coalition territories with missiles, rockets and UAVs, Ansar Allah imposes two political costs on the coalition. First, it credibly threatens the security of these sites and the civilians using them, while also signalling its resolve for escalating the conflict further. Second, Ansar Allah highlights that the coalition\u0026rsquo;s targeting of the group\u0026rsquo;s military capabilities is futile and will only heighten the first cost.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eThe Saudi-led coalition has repeatedly targeted \u003c/span\u003eal-Dulaimi air base\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022text-decoration: none; color: windowtext;\u0022\u003el\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eocated next to Sana\u0026rsquo;a International \u0026ndash; a site that has reportedly been used to house Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s UAVs. However, as the high number of UAV attacks that have taken place in recent months indicates, these strikes have not disrupted Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s operations. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eThe coalition has also failed to build leverage with Ansar Allah, after the group \u003ca href=\u0022http://twitter.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1137732703833468928\u0022\u003eframed\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eits airport targeting strategy as a consequence of the coalition\u0026rsquo;s military campaign. By underscoring a causal link between Yemen\u0026rsquo;s humanitarian crisis and UAV attacks in coalition territories, Ansar Allah can portray its UAV strategy as defiance. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe dispute over the evidence surrounding its \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1131695072624484353\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etargeting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e of Abu Dhabi airport in July 2018 attests to this. While reports refer to the UAE \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/emirati-report-criticises-saudi-reaction-houthi-drone-attacks\u0022\u003eenacting\u003c/a\u003e a \u0026lsquo;protocol\u0026rsquo; of denial following Ansar Allah attacks into their territory, Ansar Allah launching an attack on a highly sensitive Emirati target and \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003epromoting\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e the incident \u0026ndash; even a year later \u0026ndash; amplifies the credibility of the threat posed by their UAVs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnsar Allah has found genuine propagandistic value in emphasising the role and threat of UAVs. Its showcasing of its military capabilities, as seen at a July 2019 \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=28269\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003emilitary exhibition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, has helped to construct a heightened perception of lethality. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003eThe group\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eQasef\u003c/em\u003e-1 UAV can fly 150 kilometres with a 30\u0026ndash;45 kilogramme explosive payload. In comparison, the \u003cem\u003eZilzal\u003c/em\u003e-1 missile used by the group has the same operational range but carries a 600kg explosive payload. Even if seemingly less lethal, UAVs have high symbolic value in Ansar Allah\u0026rsquo;s communications. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhat\u0026rsquo;s next?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe operational effectiveness of other UAV systems \u003c/span\u003eshowcased\u003cspan\u003e by Ansar Allah in July, such as the \u003cem\u003eSammad\u003c/em\u003e-3, remains to be seen. While the war\u0026rsquo;s stalemate endures, the group\u0026rsquo;s UAV campaign serves as an effective symbol of military defiance against its technologically superior adversaries. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUltimately, UAV use by Ansar Allah has not shifted the strategic calculus of the Saudi-led coalition. But given the group\u0026rsquo;s clear commitment to using these highly effective tools, as well as the emergent framing of their use in terms of \u0026lsquo;deterrence\u0026rsquo;, expect the use of these systems to persist.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_A64Aebb2qkyWAlKymnCZg"))});
The Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, has made use of UAVs as a low-cost way to punish the Saudi-led coalition and inflict reputational and political damage. While the tactical advantage of using UAVs is limited, their symbolic value against the coalition and their territories is significant, writes Dhia Muhsin.
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