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\u003cp\u003eSoon after the annual Chinese Communist Party leadership retreat at Beidaihe, Xi Jinping reappeared in public in a far-flung and historic Chinese Ming dynasty bastion along the Great Wall of China, the Jiayu Pass, in Gansu province. Addressing a symposium there, retracing the path of the Red Army\u0026rsquo;s historic Long March in 1934, Xi called upon Communist Party members to overcome the barriers along the \u0026lsquo;Long March of the new era toward national rejuvenation\u0026rsquo;. With the 70th anniversary of the People\u0026rsquo;s Republic on 1 October approaching rapidly, one such barrier is the unrest plaguing Hong Kong.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFollowing the scenes that paralaysed Hong Kong airport in mid-August, the city experienced a brief lull in violent exchanges between the police force and anti-government protesters. With similar levels of violence occurring recently, the Hong Kong police have progressed to an elevated tier of countermeasures including the discharge of live ammunition and the deployment of water cannon vehicles. Three key figures of the pro-democracy movement have also been arrested in advance of planned protests, including Joshua Wong a key leader of the 2014 pro-democracy umbrella movement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt Beidaihe, Xi Jinping and the members of his politburo standing committee (PBSC) will have agreed on a plan of action to work with Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s Chief Executive Carrie Lam to attempt to extinguish the Hong Kong protest movement. In all likelihood, the plan has three dimensions: firstly, a gradually intensifying plan of attrition in Hong Kong aimed squarely at the protest movement and secondly, a domestic and international influence and propaganda campaign wielding the full force of the machinery of the Chinese state. The last aspect of the campaign is to promote the benefits of the \u0026lsquo;Greater Bay plan\u0026rsquo;, which aims by 2035 to integrate Hong Kong and the other cities of the Pearl River Basin into a megalopolis to rival Tokyo or California\u0026rsquo;s bay areas.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eA coordinated response\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eVice Premier Han Zheng, Xi\u0026rsquo;s point man for handling Hong Kong affairs on the PBSC, is spearheading this effort. Han, who leads the Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, has launched a multi-pronged campaign to underpin the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party with Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s residents and to rally patriotic sentiment across China and internationally. Importantly, Yang Jiechi, the politburo member responsible for foreign affairs, and You Quan, Minister at the United Front Work Department are also members of the group. With such a powerful team in place, the international impact of the campaign is taking effect.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn a series of press conferences, the Central Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office has likened the violence to terrorism, nearing the bottom line for Beijing. Carrie Lam has used the same foreboding language in tense press conferences in Hong Kong. Beijing is insistent on the integrity of her authority and that of her police force. Any discussion between the Hong Kong government (HKSAR) and the protest movement is unlikely to be a negotiation, but rather a statement of the futility of any further escalation and a stern warning of the consequences for Hong Kong. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eConcurrently, Xi, as Chairman of China\u0026rsquo;s Central Military Commission has deployed a contingent of paramilitary People\u0026rsquo;s Armed Police to Shenzhen, a major city on the Chinese mainland across the bay from Hong Kong. Such a move is designed to remind China, and the world, of Beijing\u0026rsquo;s resolve to safeguard the authority of the HKSAR government. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSeveral key organisations executing the campaign include the United Front Work Department, the International Liaison Department and the Propaganda Department. China\u0026rsquo;s state media have promoted counter-protest sentiment across all outlets available, including foreign social media platforms. Twitter and Facebook have accused the Chinese state of orchestrating a misinformation campaign online, prompting such platforms to remove accounts and offending material. This includes posts from alleged fake accounts propagated by bots comparing, for example, Hong Kong protesters to ISIS terrorists, and describing protesters as cockroaches. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCompanies identified by the Chinese authorities as employing protesters now face retribution from Beijing. Under pressure to reveal the names of Cathay Pacific employees involved in the protests to the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), the airline\u0026rsquo;s CEO Rupert Hogg instead resigned.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBlaming \u0026lsquo;foreign powers\u0026rsquo; and leveraging diplomatic power\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnother key Chinese tactic is to point the finger of blame squarely at foreign powers, like the US and UK, and accuse them of interfering in China\u0026rsquo;s internal affairs and fomenting \u0026lsquo;colour\u0027 revolution. One of the most sensitive concerns and bottom lines for Beijing is any promotion of cross-fertilisation of the Taiwanese and Hong Kong independence movements. In the wake of a USD 8.8 billion defence package from the US to sell the latest variant of the F16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan, the F16V, legislators from Taiwan\u0026rsquo;s Democratic Progressive Party and on Capitol Hill have shown solidarity with the Hong Kong protest movement.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChinese state media meanwhile, are running stories showing Hong Kong-based US diplomats meeting with key anti-Beijing and protest movement figures, and the activities of the US National Endowment for Democracy in funding the protest movement. Footage of angered and harassed passengers at Hong Kong airport confronting protesters has also been circulated widely on Chinese social media platforms.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDonald Trump and Mike Pompeo have suggested that any serious surge in violence might affect any forthcoming trade agreement with China, and G7 members at their recent meeting expressed their support for Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s autonomy, prompting acerbic rebuttals from China\u0026rsquo;s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSimultaneously, China\u0026rsquo;s ambassadors and envoys across the world have apparently received central directives to do whatever possible to counter anti-Beijing sentiment and to boost patriotic fervor among the Chinese diaspora and expat community. Liu Xiaoming, China\u0026rsquo;s ambassador to the UK, held a press conference recently in which he condemned the protest movement and singled out violent actions against the Hong Kong police. In several cities abroad and on university campuses, pro-Beijing demonstrations have led to confrontation with supporters of the Hong Kong protests.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePromises of a Greater Bay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe final element to Beijing\u0026rsquo;s strategy is to offer a positive view of Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s future prosperity, integrated into the Greater Bay area plan. On 18 August, as over a million protesters braved downpours to march against the Hong Kong government, China\u0026rsquo;s State Council announced a directive to enhance and upgrade Shenzhen\u0026rsquo;s role as a centre for technological innovation and a hub for the internationalisation of the Renminbi. Incentivisation plans to promote integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen were also announced. The Greater Bay area has been touted as a key interface for the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly for the Digital Silk Road. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn Beijing\u0026rsquo;s view, the reform plan for Shenzhen is not about sidelining Hong Kong but instead heralds an enormous economic mega-project across the Pearl River basin, amalgamating Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and other key cities into an economic powerhouse with a population of some 70 million people.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhen the Greater Bay area plan was announced in March 2019, Han Zheng emphasised the need to take better care of Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s younger generation and to nurture a sense of patriotism among them when he addressed a Hong Kong delegation to the National People\u0026rsquo;s Congress in Beijing. The implication is that by offering economic incentives to Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s youth through the promise of the Greater Bay plan, they will be able to see beyond their immediate concerns for their city\u0026rsquo;s political future.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eThe wider implications beyond Hong Kong\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs China\u0026rsquo;s international United Front campaign to stymie the Hong Kong protests gains momentum, the effects are being felt globally. Apart from the immediate damage to Hong Kong\u0026rsquo;s economy, the unrest is now viewed within the context of current tensions and the trade war between China and the US. But perhaps the most sensitive question for Beijing is the impact of the protest movement on Taiwanese voters at the presidential election in January 2020, who are watching along with the rest of the world to see how Beijing will attempt to quell further unrest in Hong Kong.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/div\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_avmiu7n2QUuhKiPbv5f6g"))});
In the face of continuing protests, Xi Jinping has mobilised the Chinese Communist Party to pursue a comprehensive campaign to end the civil disobedience in Hong Kong. Alexander Neill explains the likely elements to this campaign and their wider implications.
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