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EU’s credibility at stake with Albania and North Macedonia accession talks decision  智库博客
时间:2019-10-11   作者: Nicholas Crawford;Azra Dizdar  来源:International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom)
\u003cp\u003eMinisters from the 28 member states of the European Union will decide whether to begin membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia on 15 October, in advance of the European Council summit. Despite support from the presidents of the European Commission, Council and Parliament, it is no foregone conclusion that all states will agree to proceed. The French government is hesitant about further enlargement before EU institutional reforms are agreed upon, and the Dutch government has given only North Macedonia its support. Several options are open to the EU: it may agree to accession talks with both countries; it could begin talks with one but not the other; or it could refuse to begin talks with either of them. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe worst outcome for both the EU and the Western Balkans is not to proceed with membership negotiations. Refusing membership talks with both countries would undermine their pro-European governments, threaten the progress of liberal reforms in the wider Western Balkans, further erode the EU\u0026rsquo;s credibility on enlargement, and incentivise Western Balkan states to turn elsewhere for support. \u003cspan\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eApprehension about accession\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere are legitimate concerns about admitting either country to the EU. Albania is in the midst of political turmoil. President llir Meta and Prime Minister Edi Rama are at loggerheads: the president has blocked Rama\u0026rsquo;s appointments to key cabinet positions and Rama, in turn, has sought to impeach the president. Since February, the two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Movement for Integration (led by Meta\u0026rsquo;s wife), have boycotted parliament in their call for Rama to resign and staged major protests. Despite the Rama government\u0026rsquo;s genuine efforts to address corruption and organised crime \u0026ndash; involving the prosecution of senior ministers, police officials and judges \u0026ndash; serious problems persist. The EU also has concerns about declining media freedom in the country. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe EU looks comparatively favourably upon the government of North Macedonia. Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and his Social Democratic Union-led government have pushed ahead with reforms to bring the country into closer alignment with the EU, and settled the Prespa Agreement with Greece over the naming and cultural heritage of the country. However, any change of government would be a cause for concern. Although the main opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE (the largest party in the North Macedonian parliament) is in favour of EU accession, it is deeply implicated in recent corruption scandals and has received political support from Russia. Despite efforts by the Zaev government to curtail it, corruption remains a serious problem. In August 2019, Chief Special Prosecutor Katica Janeva was arrested for allegedly receiving bribes in exchange for handing out lighter sentences.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the further admission into the EU of countries in which liberal democracy is poorly applied and whose economies are imbued with patrimonialism comes with risks for its coherence. While initially successful, several more recent entrants into the EU, Hungary especially, have slid back on their commitments to liberal values and governance norms, and this has caused problems for the proper functioning of the EU. This is a legitimate concern with respect to both Albania and North Macedonia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, opening membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia does not mean that the EU can no longer encourage them to implement reforms or address corruption. Negotiations will last for several years and accession to the EU will depend on each country making further reforms to align with EU rules and to develop the capacity to enforce them. Even after accession, opportunities remain to press for further improvements to governance: in 2008, the EU withheld around \u0026euro;800 million in funds from Bulgaria pending measures to address organised crime.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eRisks of rejecting talks\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eShould the EU refuse to open accession talks with North Macedonia, the credibility of Zaev\u0026rsquo;s government would take a serious hit. The conclusion of the Prespa Agreement was a considerable risk for his party, with a majority of the population opposed to the agreement. It was acceptable only on the basis that EU membership talks would follow. A delay to discussions would moreover fuel disillusionment with the pursuit of EU membership. Prime Minister Rama would likewise take an electoral hit in Albania were EU membership talks to be postponed. The prospect of alternative governments in either country should give the EU pause for thought.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, in addition, a wider risk of undermining the incentives for any Western Balkan state to continue with their liberal reforms. The prospect of EU membership and efforts to comply with EU stabilisation and association agreements, and the \u003cem\u003eacquis communautaire\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan\u003e,\u003c/span\u003e are the fulcrum of Western Balkan states\u0026rsquo; political life. The overriding incentive to implement these reforms, in spite of vested interests, is the real prospect of EU accession. Albania and North Macedonia have undertaken the reforms asked of them, but if EU member states move the goalposts for accession or are seen to have no genuine interest in enlargement at all, they will have justifiable reason to question the wisdom of pursuing these politically costly reforms. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA refusal to proceed with talks would further erode the credibility and trustworthiness of the EU in the eyes of its eastern neighbours. There is already scepticism of the EU\u0026rsquo;s political appetite for further enlargement, but it has set out necessary and sufficient conditions for the start of accession talks. If the EU wants their trust, it must honour those conditions insofar as candidate countries meet them. By the European Commission\u0026rsquo;s admission, Albania and North Macedonia do satisfy these conditions. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWestern Balkan states already receive investment and support from Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states. To some extent they play these other actors off against the EU. But the fading prospect of EU accession would encourage the Western Balkans to further embrace these illiberal powers. For many, the prospect of inclusion in China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road Initiative offers an alternative way to access the funding and technical assistance they require for much-needed infrastructure investments, as well as better access to new markets. Sitting between the Chinese-leased port of Piraeus in Greece and Chinese-built railways in Serbia, North Macedonia has already received support from China and is a likely target for further Chinese funds.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAn important decision\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurther enlargement presents risks for the coherence of the EU and there are legitimate concerns about the durability of both Albania and North Macedonia\u0026rsquo;s efforts to align with its norms. However, it remains possible for the EU to mitigate these issues, which must, in any case, be set against the greater risks of refusing to open accession talks. The EU\u0026rsquo;s credibility in the Western Balkans is at stake, as is its influence. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMore immediately, the decision will affect the political fate of both countries\u0026rsquo; governments. A decision to begin negotiations with both Balkan states should encourage continued convergence with Europe\u0026rsquo;s liberal order. Beginning talks with North Macedonia alone would at least maintain the momentum towards EU membership in the region. However, to refuse accession talks with both Albania and North Macedonia would be a serious risk for the EU and for the prospective candidate countries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_aXmPvnIYUENwSNx33HI5Q"))});
\u003cp\u003eAs EU member states consider whether to open accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, Nick Crawford and Azra Dizdar warn that to close the door on further enlargement would risk the EU\u0026rsquo;s credibility and incentivise Western Balkan states to turn elsewhere for support.\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e

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