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\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOvershadowed by its worrisome breaches of the 2015 nuclear deal, this month Iran took another step in the nuclear arena that could be of even greater concern to its neighbours. But the reasons for concern about the construction of a second reactor at Bushehr, for which concrete was \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclearpower-idUSKBN1XK0AG\u0022\u003epoured\u003c/a\u003e on 9 November, are not what you might think. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe nuclear power plant presents minimal proliferation concern. It will use enriched uranium fuel from Russia, which is partnering in the construction and will repatriate the spent fuel. Iran is reporting all aspects of the construction, in compliance with rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe issue that neighbours may have with the new reactor, as with the first Bushehr plant, is that Iran remains an outlier in terms of nuclear safety. Given that Bushehr is closer to several Arab capitals than it is to Tehran, they have reason to worry about the environmental impact of reactor operations there. Alone among states that have introduced nuclear power, Iran has yet to accede to the IAEA \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-nuclear-safety\u0022\u003eConvention on Nuclear Safety\u003c/a\u003e. The convention sets international benchmarks on the siting, design, construction and operation of reactors, and on safety assessments. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eProgress on nuclear safety\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhen I first \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13567888.2011.581851\u0022\u003ewrote\u003c/a\u003e about this issue eight years ago, Iranian friends told me the government was preparing the paperwork for its adherence to the convention. Yet, the process has remained in limbo, even during the period in 2016 when Iran was working in harmony with other parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to meet its nuclear obligations.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIran deserves credit for making progress on some aspects of nuclear safety. In July, its parliament, the Majlis, by a wide margin, \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/iran/atomic-energy-organization-iran-aeoi/irans-accession-bill-joint-convention-spent-fuel-radiating-waste-management-ratified\u0022\u003eratified\u003c/a\u003e accession to the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and Radiating Waste Management. It is unusual for the Majlis to agree to any international instrument, especially given that Iran is under intense US sanctions. That the body did so in this case is thanks, in no small part, to assistance provided by the European Union.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUnder Annex III of the JCPOA, on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, the EU has been quietly cooperating with Iran to enhance its nuclear safety capacity \u0026ndash; an unsung way in which the EU has met the expectations of the accord. Among other forms of \u003ca href=\u0022https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/press-statement-third-eu-iran-high-level-seminar-international-nuclear-co-operation-2018-nov-27_en\u0022\u003eassistance\u003c/a\u003e, the EU has shared its experience and methodology for performing nuclear stress tests,\u0026nbsp;an important means of assuring the safe operation of the Bushehr reactor.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRussia\u0026rsquo;s assistance in building Bushehr-2 is similarly in accordance with JCPOA Annex III. Russia also emphasises nuclear safety; after all, any accidents at Bushehr would be detrimental to its reputation. This nuclear cooperation with Iran by both Russia and the EU is technically \u003ca rel=\u0022noopener noreferrer\u0022 href=\u0022https://www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/\u0022 target=\u0022_blank\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; padding: 0cm; border: 1pt none windowtext;\u0022\u003esanctionable\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e\u0026nbsp;by the US. But in the case of the EU work, the aid is so small in monetary terms that it flies under the radar. A small number of larger projects, including one to revise the Arak research reactor to sharply restrict its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium, have continued to receive \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://time.com/5716007/iran-nuclear-cooperation-waivers/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003esanctions waivers\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #201f1e;\u0022\u003e that must be renewed every 90 days. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSuch cooperation is still under threat, however, under the uncompromising \u003ca href=\u0022https://thehill.com/homenews/house/468885-liz-cheney-to-introduce-legislation-preventing-trump-administration-from\u0022\u003elegislation\u003c/a\u003e advanced by some Iran critics that all interactions with Iran in the nuclear field should be stopped, regardless of their benefit for non-proliferation and nuclear safety. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTehran\u0026rsquo;s provocations\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAnd Iran is increasingly giving the critics more ammunition. Since July, it has steadily reduced its adherence to JCPOA limits, in two-month stages if the oil-export rights conferred by the JCPOA are not restored. First to go was the quantitative 300kg limit on Iran\u0026rsquo;s low-enriched uranium stockpile, which is now at 550kg. Then the qualitative 3.67% limit on the enrichment level was exceeded, going to 4.5%. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn September, Iran exceeded the limits on the number and kind of centrifuges allowed for enrichment, including by testing a variety of advanced centrifuges. The enrichment capacity is now 35% greater than allowed by the JCPOA. \u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nUnlike other steps, the breach on testing advanced machines may be irreversible, because the knowledge gained by running them cannot be erased. On the other hand, Iran\u0026rsquo;s announcements about advanced centrifuges are mostly for show; real R\u0026amp;D gains are made by smaller, incremental laboratory-scale improvements.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe worst provocation came on 5 November, when Iran resumed enrichment at the small facility dug inside a mountain at Fordow. That site is notorious for having been set up in secret a decade ago, apparently for military-use enrichment \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn an unrelated incident shortly before the Fordow announcement, Iranian authorities violated a free-travel arrangement with the IAEA by \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-07/iran-nuclear-crisis-seen-escalating-with-new-inspections-report\u0022\u003edetaining\u003c/a\u003e an inspector for 12 hours while she attempted to depart Iran. The diplomatic incident came after Iran suspiciously claimed that a screening machine at the portal of the Natanz enrichment facility set off an alarm as the inspector was entering.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOn top of all this, the IAEA has confirmed finding anthropogenic, or man-made, uranium particles at a warehouse site in the Turquzabad district of Tehran where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed Iran had been storing 15kg of radioactive material. Although the uranium particles were unenriched, Iran was obliged under its NPT-required safeguards agreement to report any such uranium to the IAEA. Not having done so represents grounds for a new finding of a safeguards violation. So too is Iran\u0026rsquo;s evasion in response to the IAEA\u0026rsquo;s efforts to learn the source of the detected particles. According to Israeli \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/ex-iaea-official-irans-apparent-explanation-uranium-tehran-site-dubious?utm_source=AM+Nukes+Roundup\u0026amp;utm_campaign=aa98cbd05b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_25_12_19_COPY_01\u0026amp;utm_medium=email\u0026amp;utm_term=0_547ee518ec-aa98cbd05b-391782129\u0022\u003esources\u003c/a\u003e, the samples had characteristics that are not consistent with any facilities that Iran has previously reported to the IAEA.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNone of this offers sufficient reason to end cooperation on nuclear safety. It is the one area in the nuclear domain in which all states, including Iran\u0026rsquo;s fiercest regional adversaries, have a shared vested interest. If critics have their way and the JCPOA completely breaks down, this will not stop Iran\u0026rsquo;s nuclear \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eprogramme\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. Enrichment will continue, only now without any imposed limits at all, and with reduced verification. The Bushehr reactor will continue to operate, with reduced international cooperation on safety. Is this what the critics really want?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis article is part of a series of pieces inspired by the debate at the \u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/events/manama-dialogue/manama-dialogue-2019\u0022\u003eIISS Manama Dialogue\u003c/a\u003e, taking place in Bahrain on 22\u0026ndash;24 November 2019. Follow #IISSMD19 for live coverage across the weekend as powerful policymakers from the Middle East and beyond address the region\u0027s most pressing security challenges.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_cnPUNMWq4ECGP47lv7jhIw"))});
Iran will continue to pursue its nuclear programme, regardless of what happens with the JCPOA. But without it, vital cooperation on nuclear safety will be jeopardised, reminds Mark Fitzpatrick.
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