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\u003cp\u003eThe utility and limitations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are once again apparent in Libya\u0026rsquo;s civil war. Both the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) are \u0026lsquo;operating\u0026rsquo; and receiving external support with UAVs for the purposes of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and ground attack in the fighting on the outskirts of Libya\u0026rsquo;s capital, Tripoli.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA United Nations tally has the two sides conducting a total of over 900 UAV missions in the last six months, about five per day on average. Of these, 600 were conducted by the LNA and 300 by the GNA. The majority of the flights were in the ISR role. Even so, the GNA claims that up to two-thirds of the casualties that it endured during the period were as a result of UAV-delivered munitions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eExternal actors\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThe United Arab Emirates is widely reported to be providing support to the LNA, including through the deployment of six to eight \u003cem\u003eWing Loong\u003c/em\u003e I, perhaps also including some \u003cem\u003eWing Loong\u003c/em\u003e II, medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs. They are being flown out of Al Khadim airbase south of Tripoli and from locations closer to the Libyan capital. There are indications that a satellite link is being used to allow beyond-line-of sight control for the \u003cem\u003eWing Loong\u003c/em\u003e UAVs, allowing for remote operation. At least two UAE-owned Schiebel \u003cem\u003eCamcopter\u003c/em\u003e S-100 rotary UAVs have also been deployed, as well as an unknown number of Iranian-made \u003cem\u003eMohajer\u003c/em\u003e-2 UAVs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThe GNA meanwhile is receiving UAV support from Turkey, with up to 12 \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e TB2 MALE UAVs being operated from airfields at Misrata and Mitiga, along with Turkish operators. Line-of-sight limitations have hampered GNA efforts to use the \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e for long-range missions. The UAV is believed to have a line-of-sight datalink range of up to 150km. There have been reports of attempts to overcome this by setting up ground relay stations in Tripoli, Misrata and Jufra to extend the operating radius. These, however, need to be in territory controlled by the GNA, and thus remain a problem. Mobile ground-control stations are also being employed. The latter was believed to have been used as part of the \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e attack that resulted in the destruction of two LNA Ilyushin Il-76 \u003cem\u003eCandid\u003c/em\u003e heavy transport aircraft in July 2019.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eWing Loong\u003c/em\u003e and the \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e are capable of delivering semi-active laser munitions at short stand-off ranges. The systems, however, are not being operated with impunity. Up to six \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e and at least one \u003cem\u003eWing Loong\u003c/em\u003e have been lost, a mix likely of operator errors and surface-to-air fire.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eAn issue for both factions is the small number of UAVs each has at its disposal, limiting their capacity for sortie generation. The forces targeted are also increasingly aware of the number of munitions being carried by the UAVs and attempt to conceal themselves until they believe the bombs or missiles have been expended.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eThe LNA and the GNA have also attacked each other\u0026rsquo;s UAV operating sites and support infrastructure. The GNA appears to have adopted dispersed operations with the \u003cem\u003eBayraktar\u003c/em\u003e as a result of such attacks.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: #212121;\u0022\u003eISR shortcomings\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eIrrespective of their ISR capabilities, armed UAVs have also been implicated in numerous strikes that have resulted in civilian casualties. This is indicative of problems with the exploitation and dissemination of targeting intelligence between the UAV providers and the factions being supported, and within the LNA itself, given that it is made up of a number of different militias. The GNA faces a similar issue, if not on quite the same scale, since it appears to rely less on armed UAVs to support its ground forces.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cbr /\u003e\nWhile it is conceivable, indeed if not likely, that additional UAVs, and possibly more capable types, will be operationally deployed, they are unlikely to deliver a decisive advantage because of their operational limitations. Furthermore, both sides are seeking to acquire more capable surface-to-air missile systems that will further hamper the use of UAVs.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background-color: #ffffff; color: #000000;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis article is part of a series of pieces inspired by the debate at the\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.iiss.org/events/manama-dialogue/manama-dialogue-2019\u0022 style=\u0022color: #69a9e3; background-color: transparent;\u0022\u003eIISS Manama Dialogue\u003c/a\u003e, taking place in Bahrain on 22\u0026ndash;24 November 2019. Follow #IISSMD19 for live coverage across the weekend as powerful policymakers from the Middle East and beyond address the region\u0027s most pressing security challenges.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_AvDDyYKuzEaZzO663TxQZA"))});
Although both sides in Libya\u0027s emerging civil war have made use of UAVs, the current strategic and tactical usefulness of these systems remains limited, as Franz-Stefan Gady explains.
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