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\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOn 20 November 2019\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethe chiefs of navy of Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States – admirals Hiroshi Yamamura, Tony Radakin and Mike Gilday respectively – signed a new trilateral agreement to increase cooperation. Symbolically, the signing took place aboard the UK Royal Navy aircraft carrier, HMS \u003cem\u003eQueen Elizabeth\u003c/em\u003e, which was moored off Annapolis on the US east coast. The navy chiefs were reaffirming a commitment made by their predecessors three years earlier. The reasons behind such undertakings are clear, but events in and around the Strait of Hormuz in the summer of 2019 underlined some of the hurdles to delivering coordinated international maritime action in practice.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGlobal naval partnerships\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn 2005–06, then-US Navy chief Admiral Mike Mullen developed a vision for increased global naval partnerships to deal with a range of maritime security challenges. This came to be known as the ‘1,000-ship navy’ and was a tacit recognition that no single navy, not even the US Navy, could deal with all maritime challenges on its own. It remained a somewhat nebulous concept, but there have been a range of diverse partnership initiatives since.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe most recent US maritime strategies, published in 2007 and 2015, both contained the word ‘cooperative’. But, while the first of these emerged in a relatively benign maritime environment, the second was published as concerns were growing about a return of great power competition and a more contested maritime domain. The idea of cooperation was therefore framed in more robust terms.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe changing maritime environment has been the driver behind a number of agreements between the US Navy and some of its key partners in recent years. The documents themselves are broad and generic, but the motivations behind them are significant. They are an acknowledgement that potential high-end maritime threats are becoming ever more challenging while lower-end threats are not going away. They also demonstrate that the US Navy is being spread thin by growing demands and altering priorities, while key allied navies are benefiting from capabilities only the US Navy possesses at a significant scale.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSimilar to the Japan–UK–US statement on naval cooperation, the French, UK, and US navies reached an agreement in 2017 to collaborate more closely, particularly on submarine and anti-submarine warfare and aircraft-carrier operations. France and the UK have also taken steps to increase maritime cooperation under the Lancaster House Agreement, while the UK and US navies signed an agreement in 2015 on increased integration of their carrier operations in the future.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile aboard HMS \u003cem\u003eQueen Elizabeth\u003c/em\u003e in November 2019, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the UK Naval Staff Admiral Radakin spoke of his ambition for UK and US carriers to become not only interoperable but interchangeable. Delivering this will certainly represent a challenge for the Royal Navy and the UK. Yet, one area where it might most likely come to pass is in and around the Gulf, where the US-carrier presence has become more intermittent.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3 class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe Gulf as a case study\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn the Gulf, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) arrangement, which comprises more than 30 nations, has in many ways been a lesson in the development of a cooperative maritime security framework under US leadership. However, it has had its limits, not least on the types of mission undertaken. While the attacks on shipping in May and June 2019 led to a broad acknowledgement of the global stake in freedom of navigation in the Gulf, there has not been a consensus on how to respond – chiefly because the major powers are not aligned on their overall policy towards Iran, which is seen as the main culprit of the attacks.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe UK was initially hesitant to join the new US-led international maritime security construct. France has made clear that its decision not to join, and to push for a European initiative, is driven by a desire not to be associated with the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ approach to Tehran. Japan has chosen its own cautious path of response – it still participates in the CMF and may make its own deployments for limited intelligence gathering but is not joining the new US-led maritime security construct.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere are also other significant actors in the maritime domain. China and Russia have held a series of joint exercises. However, the extent to which these will develop into a strategic partnership is questionable. There is an increasing desire by both regional and extra-regional states to see increased maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, but there are sensitivities holding back progress.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp class=\u0022Body\u0022 style=\u0022margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003eA further driver to expand cooperation will be shared capabilities. Developing F-35B operations at sea has been instrumental in UK–US collaboration – particularly US support to regenerate the UK’s carrier capability – and could spread to include Japan and potentially South Korea. Significant procurements of submarines and frigates are already leading to closer strategic relationships between the Royal Australian Navy and those of France and the UK. Indeed, a shared future frigate design\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e should see growing cooperation and interoperability between the navies of Australia,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Canada and the UK. How all these ambitions are delivered, and where – particularly geographically – the main focus of cooperation will be, will depend on how operational demands and the operating environment continue to evolve.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022text-align: left;\u0022\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThis analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime. The Military Balance+ includes comprehensive data on navies and maritime forces worldwide.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_VO0yKYemYEwwjeyGVkitg"))});
Agreements to increase cooperation between the US Navy and some of its key partners are an acknowledgement that potential high-end maritime threats are becoming more challenging, writes Nick Childs. But, as highlighted by events in and around the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, there are hurdles to delivering coordinated international maritime action in practice.
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