|
\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://time.com/5759088/iran-nuclear-deal-soleimani/?utm_source=twitter\u0026amp;utm_medium=social\u0026amp;utm_campaign=editorial\u0026amp;utm_term=world_\u0026amp;linkId=80119512\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022color: ;\u0022\u003ePress reports\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e on 5 January that Iran had abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal over the killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani got it wrong on both accounts. The measures that Iran announced that day in terms of discarding restrictions on enrichment kept in place other commitments under the deal, crucially on inspections, and kept open the possibility of returning to the limits if the United States returns to its obligations on sanctions waivers. As for the timing, Iran has been saying for months that at the beginning of January it would further reduce its commitments to the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It has nothing to do with the assassination. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThere was reason to think it would be otherwise, with astute observers \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/europe/soleimani-iran-nuclear.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003epredicting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e an end to efforts to preserve the JCPOA. Many Iranian hardliners had already been pushing to leave the deal altogether, and even to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet calmer heads prevailed. The steps announced on 5 January included no immediate move to increase enrichment to the near weapons-usable level of 20%, nor any rush to jack up production. Iran\u0026rsquo;s \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793814276/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-limitations-in-wake-of-soleimani-killing\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003estatement\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e said its nuclear programme \u0026lsquo;no longer faces any operational restrictions, including enrichment capacity, percentage of enrichment, amount of enriched material, and research and development. From here on, Iran\u0027s nuclear program will be developed solely based on its technical needs\u0026rsquo;.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white; color: #333333;\u0022\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eWithdrawing from enrichment limits, while ominous,\u0026nbsp;is ambiguous both numerically and temporally. What higher level of enrichment, how many more centrifuges and what type, as well as what additional work on\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022padding: 0cm; border: 1pt none windowtext;\u0022\u003e research and development will be forthcoming,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e were all left unspecified and without timeframes. Nothing was said about the restrictions on the Arak research reactor that \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003ekeep the lid on any progress toward a plutonium path to nuclear weapons. \u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eMost importantly, keeping the inspection regime in place preserves the most permanent benefit of the accord. With International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors continuing their daily visits to Iran\u0026rsquo;s declared nuclear sites and maintaining the right to seek access elsewhere, the world can continue to be reasonably assured that Iran is not breaking out to pursue nuclear weapons.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eIn seeking to pressure the other parties to the JCPOA to restore the benefits the US took away by walking out of the deal in May 2018, Iran has taken a series of steps since last July to increase enrichment capabilities. It is notable that Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called the 5 January action the \u0026lsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1213900666164432900\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003efinal remedial step\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u0026rsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e. The ambiguity of it leaves open room for further escalation within the enrichment parameters, but also leaves space for negotiation and a message that the ball is in Europe\u0026rsquo;s court.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eHad Iran announced more provocative steps, European parties to the accord were preparing to initiate the JCPOA \u0026lsquo;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-europe/europeans-to-toughen-up-iran-stance-but-shy-away-from-sanctions-diplomats-idUKL8N28T5JN\u0022\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003edispute resolution mechanism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003e\u0026rsquo;, in effect declaring Iran in violation and starting a process that within 65 days could see all previous UN sanctions reimposed via the snap-back provisions. The Europeans were highly reluctant to take this step, but a provocative move by Iran, such as increasing enrichment to 20%, would have left them with little alternative. Tehran also needs continued support from Russia and China, which of late have become more critical.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eMediation efforts\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0022background: white;\u0022\u003eWhile made much more difficult in the aftermath of the Soleimani killing, mediation efforts can continue. They need not start from scratch. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn late September 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron nearly succeeded in arranging an initial detente between the US and Iran. French diplomatic sources confirmed press \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-rouhani-agreed-4-point-plan-before-iran-balked-french-officials/\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003ereports\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that US President Donald Trump had tentatively agreed to resume waivers of nuclear-related sanctions in exchange for Iran\u0026rsquo;s resumption of its commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. Macron\u0026rsquo;s plan also called for talks on regional issues and long-term arrangements concerning Iran\u0026rsquo;s nuclear activities. The plan floundered when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/donald-trumps-close-call-diplomacy-with-irans-president-hassan-rouhani\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003erefused to take a phone call\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e from Trump until the US president first committed to sanctions relief. European governments, joined by Japan, kept pushing, however, for diplomacy to preserve the JCPOA before Iran further abandoned its own commitments to it.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHopes were heightened in December, after the \u003c/span\u003e\u003ca\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-deal-behind-the-us-iran-prisoner-swap\u0022\u003eswap\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-deal-behind-the-us-iran-prisoner-swap\u0022\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eof detained Princeton PhD student Xiyue Wang for Iranian stem-cell scientist Masoud Soleimani, whom the US had jailed on a sanctions-busting charge. Iran\u0026rsquo;s expressed willingness to exchange more prisoners should have bought time for diplomacy. Unfortunately, the reprisals that Iran vowed after the assassination have put any further exchange in limbo, and could very well result in the taking of more hostages.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHawkish American commentators who \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-the-soleimani-assassination-could-pave-the-way-for-a-new-deal-with-iran/2020/01/03/3e82ca60-2e4a-11ea-bcb3-ac6482c4a92f_story.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003especulate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e that the assassination strengthens the US hand in forcing Iran to renegotiate its nuclear programme should take no succour from the relative moderation in Iran\u0026rsquo;s latest move. Tehran has remained firm from the start that any new deal with the US will be premised on lifting sanctions on Iranian oil sales and access to financial markets. Soleimani\u0026rsquo;s killing will only stiffen this demand, as no Iranian leader can easily shake hands with the assassin.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBy not responding to Soleimani\u0026rsquo;s assassination on the nuclear front, Iran has provided an opening for de-escalation. The other parties should seize the opportunity before things get worse \u0026minus; and they will get much, much worse if Trump follows through on threats to \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003ca href=\u0022https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/trump-iran-cultural-sites.html\u0022\u003e\u003cspan\u003etarget 52 cultural and other sites\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e if Iran retaliates. It is easy to imagine that Trump would want to include a nuclear site, in which case all hopes for nuclear negotiation would be lost. Iran\u0026rsquo;s next steps will depend on the de-escalatory measures and initiatives offered by the international community. Returning to the fulfilment of JCPOA terms is in every party\u0026rsquo;s interests, not only for the sake of nuclear non-proliferation but also in the effort to avoid a war with Iran.\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_fJWjppiawkOm8zLkO0ACcw"))});
Although Iran has announced that it will discard restrictions on enrichment, crucial commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remain in place. Returning to the fulfilment of the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal is in every party\u0027s interests, Mark Fitzpatrick and Mahsa Rouhi argue.
|
|
