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\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTaiwan’s 11 January elections are seen as a watershed event, both for this island of 23.5 million people and for the world.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIf incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen wins – as seems likely – this will be claimed as an (increasingly rare) victory for the global liberal-democratic order. During her first four-year term, Tsai has sought to diversify Taiwan’s ties away from the Chinese mainland and towards other ‘like-minded’ democracies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBut should her nearest rival – the populist, pro-Chinese candidate Han Kuo-yu – prevail, this will be read as another successful step in authoritarian China’s march to Asian dominance.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHowever, Taiwan’s election matters less than this conventional wisdom suggests. Regardless of who wins, this longstanding Asian flashpoint is heading inexorably towards a major strategic crisis. This – not presidential polling numbers – is the key trend to watch.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTsai’s difficult balancing act\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTo be fair, Tsai’s first term has been an unenviable balancing act. She has had to placate ‘deep-green’ pro-independence sentiment within her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), without unduly provoking Beijing.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis delicate task will only get tougher as Taiwan’s estrangement from the mainland intensifies. A clear majority (56.9%) of the island’s inhabitants now identify as ‘exclusively Taiwanese’. Over 70% believe that Taiwan is already an independent country, not a province of China as Beijing would have it. These sentiments are strongest among younger Taiwanese, who have never lived on or even visited the mainland.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSome commentators speculate that Tsai might shun ‘deep-green’ sentiment during a second term. Taiwan’s two-term limit means she cannot seek re-election in 2024, potentially giving her a freer hand to compromise with Beijing.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eYet this is a double-edged sword. Tsai could just as easily become a ‘lame duck’ leader in the eyes of the deep-green camp. This faction challenged her for the Party’s presidential nomination and fell only 8.19% short in a June 2019 primary. Her challenger, and eventual running mate William Lai, is a self-described ‘Taiwan independence worker’.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHopes for cross-strait calm resulting from an improbable Han Kuo-yu victory are just as unlikely to materialise. The last time Han’s Kuomintang Party held power, during the administration of Ma Ying-jeou (2008–16), China–Taiwan ties deepened. A total of 23 (mostly economic) cross-strait agreements were signed. In November 2015, Ma and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in Singapore.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBut how much further could Han realistically take cross-strait engagement? Ma’s initiatives sparked the ‘Sunflower movement’ – a series of protests that occupied Taiwan’s parliament in March–April 2014 and that, significantly, were the inspiration for Hong Kong’s ongoing demonstrations.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTaiwanese resolutely oppose unification with the mainland, even were China to become a democracy. Consistent with this, Han has been forced to publicly reject Beijing’s preferred ‘one country, two systems’ reunification framework – the very same formula now proving so incendiary in Hong Kong.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSolution to the ‘Taiwan problem’ eludes Xi\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSpeculation is rife that Xi will move militarily to annex the island from as early as 2021, to coincide with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) hundredth anniversary.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThis seems fanciful. Despite the major advances that China’s military has made since the mid-1990s, Xi knows that it still lacks the wherewithal to pull off a demanding amphibious invasion across the inhospitable Taiwan Strait. A failed military campaign would be political suicide for him, and quite possibly the CCP.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eYet conflict remains a possibility. Its most likely source is inadvertent escalation, stemming from an incident occurring at the wrong place or time, which spirals out of control.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn March 2019, for instance, two Chinese J-11 fighters purposefully crossed the Taiwan Strait’s tacitly acknowledged median line – the first time in two decades that such an incursion had taken place. Tsai pledged to ‘forcibly expel’ any repeat performance.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLikewise, on 1 July 2016 a Taiwanese Navy vessel accidentally fired an anti-shipping missile in the direction of the mainland. The missile ultimately struck a Taiwanese fishing boat, killing its captain. But what if this episode had happened exactly five years later, amid the nationalistically charged atmosphere of the CCP’s centenary celebrations? And what if the missile had struck a Chinese fishing boat or, worse still, a military ship?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe mechanisms needed for managing a cross-strait crisis of this nature are currently lacking. A hotline agreed at the Ma–Xi summit has been suspended.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRegional importance of crisis-management mechanisms\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIn a December 2019 presidential debate, Tsai claimed that Beijing will be forced to speak to Taiwan sooner or later. If and when it does, the development of more robust cross-strait crisis-management and avoidance mechanisms must be high on the agenda.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChina is ultimately a pragmatic power. It froze ties with Taiwan following Tsai’s May 2016 inauguration, but allowed Ma’s 23 agreements to remain. It has agreed to crisis-management and avoidance measures in other testy relationships. In mid-2018, for instance, Beijing and Tokyo introduced a new ‘communication mechanism’ connecting senior defence officials and designed to avoid accidental air and maritime clashes.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBut this task is too important to be left solely to China and Taiwan – or, for that matter, to the unpredictable Trump administration. Other trade-dependent countries of this region – such as Australia, Japan and Singapore – also have much at stake. Each would lose immeasurably from a Taiwan conflict. Their leaders must therefore advocate, collectively, for these much-needed measures.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBrendan Taylor is professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University and author of ‘Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management’, a new Adelphi book published by the IISS.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_EsMf5FULG069IiOwKUJmyg"))});
Regardless of who wins Taiwan\u0027s elections on 11 January, the island is heading towards a major strategic crisis. The development of more robust cross-strait crisis-management and avoidance mechanisms must be high on the agenda, Brendan Taylor writes.\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e \u003c/div\u003e
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