| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1414 |
| DP1414 The Use of SDRs in the Financing of Official Safety-net Mechanisms | |
| Marcello De Cecco; Francesco Giavazzi | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies, in a model with unemployment, how labour market status affects the preferences for public spending, in the form of a public good or subsidies. It then derives the implications for the dynamics of government expenditures under the hypothesis of majority voting. These will exhibit positive persistence if the employed are marginally more powerful than the unemployed, and negative persistence if the unemployed are marginally more powerful. Under a uniform distribution of tastes for the public good, there is no persistence. The preferences of the unemployed may be non-single-peaked, so that high unemployment may destroy the existence of a voting equilibrium. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal policy Job creation Political economy Public spending Unemployment Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1414 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530557 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcello De Cecco,Francesco Giavazzi. DP1414 The Use of SDRs in the Financing of Official Safety-net Mechanisms. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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