| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1486 |
| DP1486 Toeholds and Takeovers | |
| Jeremy Bulow; Paul Klemperer; Ming Huang | |
| 发表日期 | 1996-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1996 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we argue that many of the rigidities that characterize European labour markets can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees. We then empirically investigate the determinants of labour market institutions and show that the results are consistent with this view. Among other things, we find: that higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection; that unemployment benefits are lower, the more employment reacts to wages; and that a higher level of unemployment and a right-wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Employment protection Labour market institutions Minimum wages Political economy Unemployment Unemployment benefits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1486 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530630 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy Bulow,Paul Klemperer,Ming Huang. DP1486 Toeholds and Takeovers. 1996. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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