| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1657 |
| DP1657 Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. China | |
| Roger Gordon; David Daokui Li | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the investment incentives given by contingent ownership structures that are prevalent in joint ventures. We consider a variation of the standard hold-up problem where two parties make relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future. In many interesting cases, including investments in human and in physical capital, the following ownership structure implements first-best investments: one party owns the firm initially, while the other party has the option to buy the firm at a set price at a later date. This result is robust to the possibility of renegotiation and uncertainty. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Options and convertible securities Property rights |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1657 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roger Gordon,David Daokui Li. DP1657 Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. China. 1997. |
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